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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the issue of rules of origin and their impact on trade flows. Four 
objectives are sought: i) to provide further evidence on the impact on trade of product-
specific preferential rules of origin; ii) to develop a restrictiveness index based on 
empirical findings; iii) to open the path for the impact of the rules of origin on 
particular sectors other than textiles; and iv) to contribute with further evidence on 
regime-wide provisions. 
Literature on rules of origin is reviewed in Chapter 2. While theoretical literature 
establishes certain conditions under which rules of origin can increase welfare, 
empirical literature is unanimous about the negative effects they have on trade flows. 
Two main aspects stem from the review of the empirical literature. First, empirical 
literature on rules of origin remains still very limited in scope. Second, in order to 
proxy the stringency of the rules, traditional literature relies on restrictiveness indices 
based on an ex-ante observation rule. This rule depends on the DXWKRUV·appreciation, 
which can potentially be incorrect. Chapter 3 provides a broad explanation about the 
different type of product specific and regime-wide rules of origin. 
The framework to assess the impact of specific rules and regime-wide provisions on 
trade flows is developed in Chapter 4. The analysis is conducted using a gravity model 
of disaggregated panel data for four reporting countries and 16 FTA partners, 
controlling for reporter and partner fixed effects. In order to account for different ways 
of modeling specific rules of origin, four different methods are confronted. Data 
sources and explanations are also provided in this Chapter. 
Each of the methods is estimated for total trade flows, exports and imports, as a way to 
improve the validity of the estimates. The results, along some issues regarding the 
proper form of the specification are presented in Chapter 5. The results prove 
significant for every specification and suggest that regional value content type of rules, 
as well as self-certification procedures promote trade within the FTAs.  
Using the estimates from the previous chapter, an ex-post restrictiveness index is 
constructed in Chapter 6. This index is subsequently used to assess the stringency of 
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the rules of origin by sector and by agreement stringency levels. One of the main 
differences of this index with past indices is the relatively high level of leniency it 
assigns to regional value content rules. The validity of the ex-post index is checked by 
estimating the impact of rules of origin on North-South trade as well as on agricultural, 
industrial and textile imports, finding support on the results.  
$IWHU DQDO\]LQJ WKH VWDWH RI SOD\ RI UXOHV RI RULJLQ LQ WRGD\·V ZRUOG SROLF\
recommendations are provided in Chapter 7. There is a practical unanimity on the 
need to reform the rules of origin as they currently stand. The possibility to choose 
across-the-board between a regional value content rule and current rules, coupled with 
self-certification procedures appears to address the concerns of researchers, industry 
and policy makers. 
IV 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors Oliver Morrissey and Wyn Morgan for their 
guidance, support and mostly, their patience throughout many years. 
I am also grateful to other supervisors I have had in the past, notably Robert Hine, who 
gave me the opportunity to join this programme; similarly, Alexander Hijzen, who 
followed my early years of work. 
Most especially wish to thanks my family, who has been helping in every possible way 
throughout the entire process.  
  
V 
 
 
 
General Index 
 
 
 
Abstract  II 
Acknowledgments IV 
Appendix Index X 
Chapter 1. Introduction 14 
1.1. Background, Motivation and Aims ......................................................................................... 14 
1.2. Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 18 
1.3. Structure ..................................................................................................................................... 20 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 22 
2.1. Theoretical Literature ................................................................................................................ 23 
2.2. Empirical Literature .................................................................................................................. 37 
2.2.1 Development of ex-ante Restrictiveness Indices ............................................................ 38 
2.2.2 Ex post literature ................................................................................................................ 42 
2.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 51 
Chapter 3. Types of Rules of Origin 53 
3.1. Preferential vs. non-preferential RoO ..................................................................................... 53 
3.2. Product specific vs. regime-wide RoO ................................................................................... 53 
3.3. Product-specific rules ................................................................................................................ 54 
3.3.1 Wholly obtained rules (WO) ............................................................................................ 54 
3.3.2 Substantial transformation ............................................................................................... 56 
3.3.2.1. Change in tariff classification 56 
3.3.2.2. Percentage rules 61 
3.3.2.3. Technical Test rules 64 
3.3.3 Combinations of Rules ...................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.3.1. Supplementary rules 66 
3.3.3.2. Complementary Rules 67 
3.3.3.3. Combinations of supplementary and complementary rules 67 
3.3.3.4. CTC exceptions 68 
3.3.3.5. Positive exception 69 
3.4. Regime-wide RoO ..................................................................................................................... 70 
3.4.1 Cumulation ......................................................................................................................... 70 
3.4.1.1. Bilateral cumulation 70 
3.4.1.2. Diagonal cumulation 72 
3.4.1.3. Full cumulation 73 
3.4.2 De minimis.......................................................................................................................... 73 
3.4.3 Absorption principle ......................................................................................................... 74 
3.4.4 Certification procedures ................................................................................................... 75 
VI 
 
3.4.5 Minimal operations ........................................................................................................... 76 
3.4.6 Prohibition of duty drawback .......................................................................................... 77 
3.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 77 
Chapter 4. Estimating the Economic Impact of Rules of Origin: Methodology and 
Data  79 
4.1. Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 79 
4.1.1 The Gravity Equation ........................................................................................................ 80 
4.1.1.1. Gravity for North-South and North-North trade 82 
4.1.1.2. Gravity for disaggregate trade 86 
4.1.1.3. Exports, imports and total trade 89 
4.1.1.4. A Justification for Panel Data 89 
4.2. The equation ............................................................................................................................... 92 
4.2.1 Variable Specific Issues ..................................................................................................... 93 
4.2.2 Modeling Rules of Origin ................................................................................................. 96 
4.3. Data and Statistics ................................................................................................................... 104 
4.3.1 Trade Data ........................................................................................................................ 105 
4.3.2 Gravity Data ..................................................................................................................... 107 
4.3.3 Data on Rules of Origin .................................................................................................. 108 
4.3.4 Summary Statistics .......................................................................................................... 108 
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................... 112 
4.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 120 
Chapter 5. Estimation and Results 123 
5.1. Estimation ................................................................................................................................. 123 
5.1.1 Model Predictions ............................................................................................................ 133 
5.2. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 136 
5.2.1 Presentation of the Results ............................................................................................. 136 
5.2.2 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 145 
5.2.2.1. Gravity Variables 151 
5.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 152 
Chapter 6. Restrictiveness Index for RoO 154 
6.1. Motivation ................................................................................................................................ 154 
6.2. Criticism of ex-ante indices of restrictiveness ..................................................................... 155 
6.3. Building an Ex-Post Restrictiveness Index ........................................................................... 157 
6.4. Comparison with ex-ante indices .......................................................................................... 160 
6.4.1 Estevadeordal (2000) ....................................................................................................... 160 
6.4.2 Cadot et al. (2006) ............................................................................................................. 160 
6.5. Classification of agreements in terms of restrictiveness .................................................... 161 
6.6. Sectoral Restrictiveness ........................................................................................................... 163 
6.7. Empirical Applications ........................................................................................................... 167 
6.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 175 
Chapter 7. Review Process of Rules of Origin 178 
7.1. Historical Background on Rules of Origin ........................................................................... 178 
7.2. Rules of Origin Around the World ....................................................................................... 180 
7.3. Preferential Rules of Origin and the Multilateral Trading System ................................... 182 
7.4. Voices in Favor of RoO Revision ........................................................................................... 185 
VII 
 
7.5. Current Efforts ......................................................................................................................... 189 
7.6. Policy Proposal ........................................................................................................................ 191 
7.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 194 
Chapter 8. Conclusion 196 
8.1. Summary of main aspects ...................................................................................................... 196 
8.2. Main contributions .................................................................................................................. 205 
8.3. Directions for future research ................................................................................................ 205 
Bibliography 207 
 
VIII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures Index 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Alteration of the Input Mix after Imposing RoO .............................................. 27 
Figure 2.2. Increased Welfare with RoO ............................................................................... 29 
Figure 4.1. Freq. and Value of Change in Tariff Chapter (% of Total Rules) ................. 113 
Figure 4.2. Frequency and Value of Change in Tariff Heading (% of Total Rules)....... 113 
Figure 4.3. Freq. and Value of Change in Tariff Subheading (% of Total Rules) .......... 114 
Figure 4.4. Frequency and Value of CTC and Exceptions (% of Total Rules) ................ 114 
Figure 4.5. Frequency and Value of Regional Value Content (% of Total Rules) .......... 114 
Figure 4.6. Freq. and Value of Regional Value Content-EU(% of Total Rules) ............. 115 
Figure 4.7. Frequency and Value of Technical Test (% of Total Rules) ........................... 115 
Figure 4.8. Frequency of Wholly Obtained (% of Total Rules) ........................................ 115 
Figure 4.9. Frequency and Value of Combinations of Rules (% of Total Rules) ............ 116 
Figure 4.10. Frequency and Value of Alternative Rules (% of Total Rules) ................... 116 
Figure 4.11. Frequency of Each Combination of Rule ....................................................... 117 
Figure 4.12. Percentage of Total Trade by Type of Rule ................................................... 118 
Figure 4.13. Chile's Total Trade with Partners ................................................................... 119 
Figure 4.14. EU's Total Trade with Partners ....................................................................... 119 
Figure 4.15. Mexico's Total Trade with Partners ................................................................ 119 
Figure 4.16. USA's Total Trade with Partners .................................................................... 120 
Figure 6.1 Comparison of ex-ante indices ........................................................................... 156 
Figure 6.2. Restrictiveness of Agreements .......................................................................... 161 
Figure 6.3. Restrictiveness of Agreements .......................................................................... 162 
Figure 6.4. Sectoral Restrictiveness Across Selected Agreements ................................... 164 
 
IX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table Index 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Calculation of Estevadeordal (2000) restrictiveness index ............................... 38 
Table 2.2. Calculation of Cadot et al (2006) restrictiveness index ..................................... 40 
Table 2.3. Comparison of estimates for different types of RoO ......................................... 50 
Table 4.1. Variables modeling Specific Rules of Origin ...................................................... 97 
Table 4.2. Description of the different combination of RoO ............................................. 102 
Table 4.3. Reporter and Partner Countries ......................................................................... 105 
Table 4.4. Illustration of the use of size variables .............................................................. 106 
Table 4.5. Summary Statistics ² CHL ................................................................................... 109 
Table 4.6. Summary Statistics ² EU ...................................................................................... 109 
Table 4.7. Summary Statistics ² MEX .................................................................................. 110 
Table 4.8. Summary Statistics ² USA ................................................................................... 110 
Table 4.9. Correlation matrix among variables .................................................................. 111 
Table 5.1. Poolability Test ...................................................................................................... 123 
Table 5.2. Breusch-Pagan Test for Random Effects ........................................................... 124 
Table 5.3. Fixed Effects Test .................................................................................................. 125 
Table 5.4. Hausman Test ....................................................................................................... 126 
Table 5.5. Collinearity Diagnostic ........................................................................................ 128 
Table 5.6. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity ...................................................... 130 
Table 5.7. Results from the second regression running the residuals over the lagged 
residuals ................................................................................................................................... 131 
Table 5.8. Significance of Lagged Residuals ....................................................................... 131 
Table 5.9. Expected Gravity Coefficients ............................................................................ 136 
Table 5.10. Combination of Rules ......................................................................................... 139 
Table 5.11. Grouped Rules .................................................................................................... 141 
X 
 
Table 5.12. Grouped Rules by Family .................................................................................. 142 
Table 5.13. Unique Rules ....................................................................................................... 144 
Table 6.1. Decomposition of the Restrictiveness Index ..................................................... 159 
Table 6.2. Restrictiveness Index by HS Section ² Comparison of Estevadeordal and 
Suominen (2004bis) and Ex-post Index ................................................................................ 165 
Table 6.3. North South Trade-All Sectors-Index ................................................................ 171 
Table 6.4. North-South Sectoral Trade-Imports from South-Index ................................. 171 
Table 7.1 Regime-wide provisions in NAFTA and PANEURO ...................................... 181 
Table 8.1. Different Types of Product Specific Rules of Origin ....................................... 198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Index 
 
 
 
Appendix 1.1. List of RTAs in force ..................................................................................... 218 
Appendix 5.1. Random Effects and OLS Estimation ......................................................... 224 
Appendix 6.1. List of Rules Ordered by Restrictiveness According to the Ex-Post Index
 ................................................................................................................................................... 225 
Appendix 6.2. Developed and Developing Countries in the Sample ............................. 226 
Appendix 7.1. List of Agreements Containing Provisions on Rules of Origin, by date of 
entry into force ........................................................................................................................ 227 
Appendix 7.2. List of RTAs According to the Criteria Used in Origin Determination 230 
 
XI 
 
 
XII 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
Acronyms Specific to Rules of Origin 
& Equivalent to "in addition of" 
ALT Alternative between rules 
CC Change in Chapter 
CCex Exception to Change in Chapter 
CTC Change in Tariff Classification 
CTCex Exception to Change in Tariff Classification 
CTH Change in Tariff Heading 
CTHex Exception to Change in Tariff Heading 
CTI Change in Tariff Item 
CTS Change in Tariff Subheading 
CTSex Exception to Change in Tariff Subheading 
COMB Combination of rules 
EXC Exception to any type of Change in Tariff Classification 
MC Import Content 
OR Equivalent to "either... or" 
RoO Rules of Origin (unless specified, refers to product-specific rules of origin) 
RVC Regional Value Content 
RVCEU Regional Value Content-PANEURO type 
TT Technical Test 
WO Wholly Obtained 
General Acronyms 
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CAFTA Central America Free Trade Area 
CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum 
CBP Customs and Border Protection 
CES Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
CGE Computable General Equilibrium 
CIF Cost, insurance, freight 
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
CRS Constant Returns to Scale 
CU Customs Union 
ECOWAS Economic Community of Western African States 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EIA Economic Integration Agreement 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
EU European Union 
EURO-MED European-Mediterranean Countries 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FE Fixed Effects 
FOB Free on board 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
XIII 
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GLS Generalized Least Squares 
HS Harmonized System 
HWP Harmonized Work Programme 
IIT Intra-Industry Trade 
IRS Increasing Returns to Scale 
ITC International Trade Center 
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 
LSDV Least Squares Dummy Variable 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur, in Spanish - Southern Common Market 
MFN Most Favored Nation 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
ORRC Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce 
PANEURO Paneuropean System of Rules of Origin 
PS Partial Scope Agreement  
RE Random Effects 
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area 
SEP-4 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
SPS Sanitary and PhitoSanitary Measures 
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade 
TDCA Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement EU-South Africa 
USTR United States Trade Representative 
WLS Weighted Least Squares 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
 14 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background, Motivation and Aims 
Assessing the origin of trade flows is key in world trade. Governments need to compile 
accurate import statistics to analyze the origin of their imports to properly shape their trade 
policy. Also, products from different countries may be subject to different measures like 
tariff-quotas, safeguard measures or different duties. Determining the origin of goods is a 
FRPSOH[RSHUDWLRQPRUHVRLQWRGD\·VJOREDOL]HGZRUOGZKHUHGLIIHUHQWVWDJHVRISURGXFWLRQ
of a good may take place in several countries. In order to address this question, countries 
establish a definition of origin. The set of definitions, or rules, that establish the origin of 
goods are known as rules of origin (RoO).  
There are many ways of defining origin and historically, each government has had a 
different approach. LaNasa (1995) notes how a first proposal to regulate RoO under the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was refused by a group of countries on the 
EDVLV WKDW ´RULJLQ ZDV LQHVFDSDEO\ ERXQG XS ZLWK QDWLRQDO Hconomic policies, which are 
XQDYRLGDEO\GLIIHUHQWLQGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVµAs a result, RoO vary widely from one country 
to another. This can be a potential problem for producers, as their exports may be recognized 
to originate in one country or another depending on the rules of the importing territory, and 
hence face varying conditions. Multilaterally, the potential problem posed by the rules of 
origin started to gain prominence as it became evident that the EU was using the rules with 
discriminatory purposes (Forrester, 1994).1 A first attempt to legislate this aspect of trade 
relations came in 1982, when GATT members started studying this issue.2 This early attempt 
barely achieved any progress. Later, the Uruguay Round resulted in a more serious effort to 
intensify work in this regard with the signature of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
                                                     
 
1
 Throughout this thesis, the denomination of European Union (EU) is used to refer to the group of countries that 
were first part of the European Economic Community, then European Communities and now the European 
Union.  
2
 http://www.wto.org/spanish/tratop_s/roi_s/roi_info_s.htm 
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Agreement on Rules of Origin. One of the main objectives of the Agreement on Rules of 
Origin is to harmonize multilateral rules of origin for all products. Several deadlines have 
been missed since the Uruguay Round and progress to harmonize multilateral remains slow. 
According to the outgoing Chair of the Committee on Rules of Origin, by 2010 
harmonization had only been achieved on 55 percent of the products.3 
In a world where most trade takes place under the same conditions for every country as it 
was intended to be under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) provision of the GATT, the 
importance of determining origin would not be as crucial, as imports would receive the same 
treatment independently of their origin.4 This is not so when trade is conducted under a 
preferential basis as RoO serve to determine whether the good qualifies for preferential 
treatment. With the spectacular increase in the number of FTAs in the past 20 years, RoO 
have gained increased relevance.5  
In a Free Trade Area (FTA), RoO are originally intended to avoid trade deflection. This 
phenomenon consists of channeling exports from third countries into the FTA through the 
member with lowest tariff. These products are subsequently re-exported to the remaining 
countries of the agreement at the preferential within-FTA tariff, avoiding the payment of 
higher duties in those countries. The country with the highest tariff then experiences an 
unintended decrease in its tariff revenues. Since FTAs are designed to promote trade 
between two (or more) partners and not to boost imports from third country competitors, 
governments devote important efforts in the negotiations to determine what is considered to 
be originating in the partner countries.6 As a consequence, the extent to which imports can 
benefit from preferential treatment depends chiefly on the definition of origin, i.e. on the 
rules of origin. If origin is drafted in a restrictive manner, RoO can undermine the effects of 
trade liberalization between the partners of an FTA by setting requirements that are too 
costly to comply with by the exporters, hence bypassing the benefits of the FTA (Anson et al., 
2005). 
                                                     
 
3
 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/roi_25mar10_e.htm 
4
 Other than the uses mentioned above, at the multilateral level, rules of origin also gain some relevance for 
labelling issues. See WTO (2007b) for a description of WTO disputes on this matter.  
5
 See Appendix 1.1 for a list of RTAs in force. 
6
 For instance, MERCOSUR-EU negotiations to sign an FTA are currently in their 20th round due to a number 
of outstanding issues. According to Thorstenten (2008), a Brazilian trade representative, rules of origin was the 
³ELJLVVXH´ 
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In view of this, RoO have the potential to transform from an uncontroversial technical 
neutral device to implement necessary trade policies (LaNasa, 1995) to instruments adapted 
to serve protectionist interests (Palmeter, 1987). As Cadot et al (2004) note, RoO should be 
seen as an economically sensitive issue rather than a technical one.  
,QIDFW LI WKH´prizHµRIIHUHGE\WKHSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQW LVVXEVWDQWLDO LHDFRQVLGHUDEOH
margin of preference in a large market, stringent RoO may cause a producer to change its 
source of inputs from a cheaper source to a more expensive regional source (Ju and Krishna, 
1998). This potential to distort trade is an intrinsic characteristic of RoO. It follows that the 
rules can be shaped so as to protect powerful industries in certain countries, hence acting as 
a counter-liberalization factor (Deardorff, 2004). 
An additional concern comes when the RoO embodied in two agreements differ widely as 
producers may be forced to choose between their destination market. In the presence of an 
ever increasing number of RTAs, exporters are faced with the complexity of having to fulfill 
the criteria of different rules of origin which may be divergent, not only in their substance 
but also in their procedural requirements.7 Take the case of a South African exporter of soups 
and broths and preparations thereof (Harmonized System (HS) ex 2104). Under the EU-
South Africa Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), he cannot prepare 
soups from prepared or preserved tomatoes and other vegetables (HS 2002 and HS 2005). In 
parallel, for the same product, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) FTA 
prescribes that the value of non-originating materials does not exceed 60% of the ex-works 
price of the product, although nothing prevents him from using prepared or preserved 
tomatoes. In such situation, the exporter may have to face the decision of choosing between 
both markets and losing the preferential market access offered by the agreements. 
Nowadays, protocols of rules of origin have turned into lengthy and complex legal 
documents. Products are conferred origin in accordance to the specific rule assigned to each 
of them in these protocols; the kind of rules that apply specifically to one product are called 
product specific rules of origin. 8  They can be broadly classified into fouUPDLQ´IDPLOLHVµ: 
                                                     
 
7
 RTAs is the WTO terminology for reciprocal agreements liberalizing part or all trade among the parties. RTAs 
can be Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions or Partial Scope Agreements. 
8
 As an indication of the complexity of these documents, US agreements typically amount to around 2,000 
product-specific rules of origin.  
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wholly obtained, change in tariff classification, regional value content and technical test 
rules; each of them with distinctive advantages and disadvantages.  
In addition to the product specific rules of origin, protocols usually include provisions that 
apply to the agreement as a whole, covering disciplines such as certification procedures, the 
extent to which countries can accumulate materials/processes with other countries, or 
tolerance rules allowing the presence of a maximum value of non-originating materials. 
These disciplines are referred to as regime-wide provisions.  
In view of this complexity, and their intended initial neutral nature, rules of origin did not 
attract much attention from the public (LaNasa, 1995). However, since the early 90s, a new 
literature spawned. Three factors contributed decisively to this development in the literature. 
First, increasing internationalization of production; as Forrester (1994) points out, original 
rules in the EU were designed as if production took place in one single country. In an 
evermore globalized world, defining origin became a much more complex process.9  
Second, the intense increase in FTA numbers after the uncertainty created by the outcome of 
the Uruguay Round; in 1991 there were 50 active RTAs in the world; by 2000 that number 
had increased to 200, according to WTO Secretariat figures.10 Rules of origin are intrinsically 
more sensitive in FTAs than multilaterally as they become the device which decides if 
preferences are granted. Third, Harilal and Beena (2003) highlight how, following several 
successful GATT rounds of negotiations, countries had lost by the mid 1990s much of their 
power to conduct trade policy by the use of tariffs. In order to retain control over trade 
policy, they needed to restore to non-traditional mechanisms. Indeed, literature on RoO 
started to develop during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994).11  However, the definite push that 
turned attention to this topic was the signature of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and the protectionist use of RoO by the US.12 As Ju and Krishna (1995) note, 
attention around FTAs developed especially after the signature of NAFTA. However, early 
                                                     
 
9
 See Palmeter (1987) for a description of pre-NAFTA rules of origin in the US. 
10
 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
11
 See Hoekman (1993), Krueger (1993), Krishna and Krueger (1995) or Vermulst (1992) for early work on 
RoO. 
12
 See Estevadeordal (2000), Cadot et al. (2002), Anson et al. (2005) for studies concentrating on the effects of 
NAFTA RoO. 
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work concentrated mainly on policy issues and theoretical work and it was in the early years 
of this century when empirical literature started developing.13  
In spite of this recent trend, there are still relatively few studies assessing the impact of rules. 
In particular, four main gaps have been identified. First, attempts to measure the 
restrictiveness of rules of origin are EDVHGRQ´UHVWULFWLYHQHVVLQGLFHVµWKDWE\DVVLJQLQJRQH
degree of restrictiveness to each particular rule, proxy the overall restrictiveness of an 
agreement. These indices are potentially incorrect, as the value assigned to each type of rule 
LVJLYHQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHDXWKRU·VH[SHFWDWLRQWKXVWKH\DUHKLJKO\VXEMHFWLYH6HFRQGWRP\
knowledge, the precise effect of the different product-specific rules of origin has only been 
evaluated in two studies, remaining much scope for additional assessment.14 Third, the 
impact of the rules on sectoral trade has limited to textiles, bypassing every other sector. 
Lastly, regime-wide provisions have only been modeled in a handful of examples.  
The aim to close the gap in these aspects of the literature represents the main motivation of 
this thesis. As a consequence, it pursues four main objectives: i) to provide further evidence 
on the impact on trade of product-specific preferential rules of origin; ii) to develop an index 
of restrictiveness of the rules based on empirical findings; iii) to open the path for the impact 
of the rules of origin on particular sectors other than textiles; and iv) to contribute with 
further evidence on regime-wide provisions. 
1.2. Methodology  
This thesis attempts to provide an estimate of the impact on trade of product specific rules of 
origin and regime-wide provisions. With these estimates, it is then possible to construct an 
ex-post index of restrictiveness of the different types of RoO. A commonly used device to 
analyze different trade-related policies in the last years has been the gravity model, which 
has shown to represent a good fit for estimating trade flows.15 In its basic form, the gravity 
model predicts bilateral trade as a function of two countries· PDVV DQG GLVWDQFH 7KH
economic mass of the countries reflects potential supply and demand whereas distance 
                                                     
 
13
 Estevadeordal and Suominen (2003), Augier et al  (2004) or Anson et al (2005) are among these. 
14
 See Cadot et al (2002) and Cadot et al (2006) 
15
 Cheng and Wall (2004) overview a wide range of issues analyzed through gravity modeling. 
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reflects resistance to trade. In its logarithmic form, which is usually used, it takes the 
following form: 
ijtijjiij dYYT HEEED  3210     (1.1) 
where ijT is trade between countries i and j, iY   and jY represent the economic size of the 
countries, usually measured by their GDP, and ijd , represents the geographical distance 
between both countries. Since economic mass and distance cannot be alone considered to 
explain bilateral trade flows, the gravity model has been completed by a myriad of factors 
that are thought to influence bilateral trade. Some of them, such as common language, 
common border or belonging to the same FTA, have become customary in gravity equations. 
Equation (1.1) is then augmented to include them, as follows: 
ijt
I
i
J
j
ijijjiij DdYYT HEEEED  ¦¦
  1 1
43210     (1.2) 
where ijD are the dummy variables that capture the co-existence of certain factors between 
the countries of interest. It follows that virtually any policy variable, like it is the case of the 
different types of RoO can be then plugged into the equation.  
One of the key motivations of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of product specific RoO. 
Therefore, it becomes mandatory to use disaggregated trade data. In addition, in order to 
ensure the general applicability of the findings, the methodology needs to cover a 
representative amount of trade. For this reason, trade data accounts for exports and imports 
between North-North, South-South and North-South countries. Lastly, researchers deriving 
the theoretical foundations of the gravity model have found that the model may be subject to 
misspecification bias unless heterogeneity is accounted for (Feenstra, 2002). Thus, the gravity 
model used is constructed under these premises. A prominent way to account for 
unobserved country specific factors is through the use of fixed effects. These are plugged 
into a panel data of four reporting countries and 17 reporting countries over four years.  
The model presents a number of notable characteristics. First, total exports and total imports 
to/from the world are used as size variables instead of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A 
similar way of specifying size variables is found in Cadot and de Melo (2007). Second, due to 
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collinearity issues, reporter countries are grouped into two groups, developed and 
developing, rather than allowing the presence of different fixed effects for each country. 
Lastly, rules of origin are modeled in four different ways.  
The first method allows for all possible interactions between rules. It adds a dummy variable 
for each type of rule as well as for every time there is a combination or alternative between 
the rules. The second method consists of taking away all the combinations, alternatives and 
exceptions from the sample. In this fashion, it is possible to isolate the effects of each type of 
rule.  
The third method is an extension of the second. It groups the rules into families (Change in 
Chapter (CC), Change in Tariff Heading (CTH) and Change in Tariff Subheading (CTS) 
under Change in Tariff Classification (CTC))  so as to assess the impact of the main families 
of rules. Finally, the fourth method individualizes each type of possible 
combination/alternative/exception between the rules. It accounts for 37 different possible 
rules; each of them assigned a different dummy variable. The last relevant variable relates to 
the processes of certification used in FTAs, accounting for the difference between self-
certification and public certification.  
Estimation of the model is done using Generalized Least Squares in order to correct for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of the data. A further transformation consists of using 
logarithms, in order to solve normality problems in the residuals.  
Each product specific rule of origin is observed to have a different impact on trade. The 
restrictiveness index is subsequently obtained from the sum of the coefficients of each of the 
product specific variables from these regressions. The resulting index assigns a different 
value for each type of rule and for each combination therein. This index is then used to assess 
the restrictiveness of the rules of origin in each agreement and to proxy the stringency of the 
rules. 
1.3. Structure  
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on rules of origin, both 
from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Chapter 3 provides an extensive 
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description of the types of rules of origin and regime-wide provisions present in origin 
protocols; each type of rule is followed by an illustrative example. Chapter 4 represents the 
core of this thesis: it justifies and builds the gravity model used to perform the analysis, 
assessing the questions related to economic theory. The second part of this chapter describes 
and explains the sources of the data and provides a series of descriptive and summary 
statistics. Chapter 5 provides a series of econometric considerations for the proper form of 
the estimation model. The chapter is completed with the presentation of the results from the 
various estimations performed. Chapter 6 builds on the findings of the previous chapter to 
develop the restrictiveness index. Subsequently, the index is compared to other indices 
present in the literature and used as a proxy of the stringency of the rules of origin to 
estimate their impact on North-South trade as well as on textiles, industrial products and 
agriculture. Chapter 7 discusses current issues related to rules of origin, both from a legal 
and an economic point of view, and provides policy recommendations on the basis of the 
findings of this thesis. Lastly, Chapter 8 presents a summary of the main aspects, the main 
contributions of the thesis and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
The economic study of RoO did not start until the mid 1990s, and has remained limited in 
scope thereafter. The late and sluggish development of RoO analysis is partly explained by 
three overarching reasons. First, as Krishna and Krueger (1995) note, until the mid 1990s 
there was a lack of general interest about the role of the implementation of trade restrictions. 
Instead, economists focused on the incentives provided by trade agreements, leaving little 
scope to policy measures like RoO. According to LaNasa (1995), there was a perceived 
misconception about the essentially technical character of RoO. Second, until the expansion 
of FTAs in the mid 1990s, trade was mainly multilateral, with all trading partners facing the 
same RoO. With the spread of FTAs, countries started to confront different and 
discriminatory RoO, prompting interest in their effects. In particular, the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA), as in many other areas of trade, was the spark that caused 
economists to turn their attention to its components.16 The third reason is the reduction of 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs. After the Uruguay Round, tariffs were drastically 
reduced, leaving little margin of maneuver to governments on this respect. In view of this 
new scenario, other trade policies like trade defense mechanisms, or RoO gained more 
importance. 
Whichever the limitations, the study of RoO has developed in recent years, both in theory 
and practice. Theoretical literature has mainly concentrated on explaining if and how RoO 
hamper trade and their consequences; empirical literature, by its part, has focused on 
establishing the impact of the rules on trade flows, and can be broadly divided in two type of 
analysis: ex ante and ex post. The reminder of this Chapter presents the most relevant findings 
in these two fields of study. 
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 Estevadeordal (2000), Cadot el al. (2002) and Anson et al. (2005) are examples of empirical studies on 
1$)7$¶V5R2 
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2.1. Theoretical Literature  
Theoretical literature on RoO has been centered around the impact of RoO on prices, 
production, trade flows, and welfare. The general structure of most studies in this area 
follows an approach which consists on calculating those variables at pre-Free Trade Area 
(FTA) equilibrium and then assessing the distortion brought in by the inclusion of the RoO. 
Since the rules have the potential to impact different layers of the production chain in 
vertically integrated production structures, many studies look at the effects on both the 
intermediate and the final goods markets.  
By and large, the assumptions used in most studies are fairly similar. Most of them grow 
from partial equilibrium models, in perfect competition, with constant returns to scale and 
perfect substitutes goods. Attempts to depart from the core locus of analysis include 
Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003), who construct a general equilibrium model to look into 
the political economy of RoOs; Krishna and Krueger (1995), who look at the different effects 
for welfare that the presence of a monopolist of intermediate goods brings about; or Francois 
(2005), who develops a model under product differentiation. The way to specify the form of 
the RoO varies in the studies, although all of them share the election of a Regional Value 
Content (RVC) (or MC) type of rule for the analysis.17 The reason for this election resides on 
the complexity to model both Technical Test (TT) and Change in Tariff Classification  (CTC). 
Being regional value content rules the main type under consideration, it seems natural that 
the literature on RoO found its inspiration on the local content literature of the early 1980s.   
Literature on local content protection provided a theoretical basis to the policies that favored 
local inputs in manufacture. One of the most prominent works in this field of economic 
policy was that of Grossman (1981), who developed the framework for the analysis of this 
issue used in subsequent work on RoO. The focus of this study lies on the resource 
reallocation ² mainly on the intermediate good market ² created by the imposition of a local 
content requirement. 18  The author defines three different types of content requirement: 
content protection in physical terms, content protection in value added terms and preference 
content. Physical content protection is defined as the requirement to include a minimum 
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 MC refers to import content. For the economic purpose of this work, it will be equalled to RVC. 
18
 According to Grossman (1981) , content protection schemes usually require the obligation to incorporate on 
the final good a certain level of local value added or local materials. Failure to meet such requirement implies the 
payment of high tariffs on all imported intermediates.  
 24 
amount of domestic intermediate in the production of the final good; value added content 
requires a share of domestic value added embodied in the final price of the product; and 
preference content deals with the tariff incentive granted to developing countries provided 
they comply with a minimum content requirement in the exporting country, i.e. a rule of 
origin except it does not contemplate sourcing from the country granting the preference. 
Grossman develops a partial equilibrium model under the assumptions of perfect 
competition and small economy, where domestic and foreign inputs are perfect substitutes, 
as well as the factors of production (labor and intermediates).  
The author investigates the effects of local content requirements on prices and output of 
intermediate goods through the examination of the pre and post policy equilibriums. For the 
physical content protection case, the firm maximizes the following equation:  
wLMtPMPMMLPF mmm 

*)1(**),(max      (2.1) 
subject to 0 t when the content requirement k is fulfilled (i.e. if *))(1(* MMkM  and 
mtt  

when it is not. L represents labor, M and M* domestic and foreign intermediates with P 
and P* being their prices, w wage and mt

 a tariff equivalent. From this setting the author 
derives that the firm will choose to under fulfill the content requirement when the price paid 
for the foreign input )1(* mm tP  is lower than the average-weighted price of foreign and 
domestic inputs mm PkkP *)1(   .19  It follows that when the firm decides not to comply 
with the content requirement, the demand for domestic inputs is zero unless 
)1(* mmm tPP  . Through these observations and the supply equilibrium condition for the 
domestic input )(')( MCMPm  , the author obtains his main conclusions: 
1. Implementing a physical content requirement results in an increase of the 
domestic intermediate at first but for high levels of domestic content the 
result is ambiguous. The logic behind this observation is that the producer 
will choose to substitute foreign inputs for domestic to meet the ratio but 
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 The average weighted price is taken by combining the first-order conditions of the profit maximization 
equation with respect to the imported and the domestic input.  
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will also substitute both inputs for labor, in account of the more expensive 
average input price.  
2. The effect on the value added for the industry is ambiguous. The 
predominant effect will depend on the elasticity of the domestic input 
production to its output price and the elasticity of final good production to 
changes in intermediate prices. If they are elastic, it will drive up domestic 
cost considerably causing a cutback in final output.  
The author also establishes the effect on a content protection policy on the price of the 
domestic input. He rearranges the first order conditions of the domestic intermediates into:  
m
mm
mm P
PkkP
kPP
PF  
 }
*)1(
)1*)((1{2        (2.2) 
from where it can be seen that an increase in the domestic content requirement k brings along 
a reduction in the domestic price of the intermediate, hence acting as a tariff on foreign input 
and a subsidy for final good producers.  
The author continues the analysis by looking into variations of this model. The first one is to 
contemplate value-added, rather than physical content policies. The main difference is that 
the domestic share can now be included in any of the domestic factors of production, not 
necessarily exclusively in the inputs. This translates into a different restriction that states that 
0 mt if *),()1(** MMLPFjMP m d , where j represents the ratio of local value added. 
The main divergence with the previous analysis is that there need not be one input price 
limit at which the firm chooses to meet the requirement. This is possible if there is enough 
value added on the inputs alone, without having to purchase domestic intermediates. A 
related consequence is that the price at which the producer will choose to satisfy the content 
requirement is no longer independent from the production of the final good.20 Another effect 
is that the subsidy effect referred to above also extends to labor, i.e. across all factors of 
production. Grossman also extended his study to several goods and different market 
structures to conclude that the effects of a local content protection policy are difficult to 
predict.  
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 Grossman (1981) does not clarify in what way it is related in this case, stating only that it will depend on the 
substitution possibilities in final output production.  
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Finally, Grossman (1981) discusses the effects of content preference policies on exporting 
markets. The observations reveal that under the circumstances that the supply for 
intermediates is such that the content requirement is almost attained, there may be offsetting 
effects. As the demand for intermediates goes up (as a response by the final good producers 
opt to increase the domestic intermediate to benefit from the programme), the price of the 
final output may also increase, which will bring along an increase in the supply of the final 
good. This, however does not exclude the possibility of a lower output of the final good as a 
response to the higher price, thus missing the objective of the policy.   
Another important contribution to the theory of local content was that of Mussa (1984) who 
changes specifications in the production function in Grossman (1981) to dispute the results 
therein. In particular, he uses a homogeneous, linear, neo-classical production function 
which allows for an increasing difficulty in input substitutability as opposed to the perfect 
substitutability assumed by Grossman (1981). Basing the analysis on the relative output price 
of domestic to imported intermediates, the author finds that an increase in the content 
requirement will benefit the supplier of the domestic producer. A crucial aspect is that in 
order to comply with the domestic content requirement, the final good producer must 
receive a penalty in case of not doing so. This penalty, he argues, normally comes in the form 
of a tariff in case of non-compliance. This tariff only affects production at low levels of 
domestic input, i.e. when the requirement is not satisfied. By increasing the cost of foreign 
inputs only after a certain level, the penalty does not affect final good output price as long as 
the requirement is satisfied.21 This property of local content schemes makes them preferable, 
according to the author, to tariffs, which increase the average price of the final product 
irrespective of the compliance or not with the requirement. Finally, he extends his model to 
other types of market structures to find that a domestic content requirement does not alter 
the conditions when a monopoly exists in the final good market and a monopsony in the 
domestic input market unless the requirement causes the monopoly and the monopsony to 
exist.  
Based on a similar approach as the one used in local content literature, theoretical 
considerations about RoO also centered the attention on the chain effects induced by an 
DUWLILFLDO UHVWULFWLRQ RQ WKH ´QRUPDOµ LQSXW FRPELQDWLRQ RI SURGXFHUV ,Q D YHU\ VLPSOLVWLF
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 Mussa (1984) explains that under compliance above a certain level of domestic input, the suboptimal 
combination of factors does not minimize costs but does not alter the final price. 
 27 
way, RoO alter the choice of the producers because in order to enjoy duty free treatment, 
they have to comply with the restriction laid down in the rules. In principle, the producer 
will no longer be able to produce under the optimal combination of inputs, which would 
raise the costs of production. This is shown in Figure 2.1, taken from Krishna (2005). 
 
Figure 2.1. Alteration of the Input Mix after Imposing RoO 
Assuming that K is foreign input and L, local, the slope of the rays from the origin represents 
the combination of non-member and member inputs in the production of the good. Before 
the FTA, or in the absence of RoO, the tangent between the iso-quant and iso-cost curves of 
the firm is found at Z. The slope of the ray from the origin through Z gives the proportion of 
non-member and member inputs used in production. If a RoO is set, the choice is tipped 
towards a greater use of the member input, and only combinations above the iso-quant are 
possible, at a higher iso-cost curve. This point is represented by X, where the new 
combination of inputs, with higher local input is used. Note that the greater the exigency to 
use member inputs, the higher the cost in which the firm incurs.  
These different effects have been proven more or less formally in a wide range of studies. 
The common point of these studies is that rules of origin distort markets. In general, they are 
found to be welfare reducing, although several authors have shown under what conditions, 
RoO may actually increase market access and/or welfare. The reminder of this section looks 
at examples of both cases. 
The first study that looked into the negative effects of RoO was Krueger (1993). The author 
differentiates the welfare effects on CUs and FTAs because FTAs can have additional trade 
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GLYHUWLQJHIIHFWVE\´H[SRUWLQJSURWHFWLRQµYLD5R222 CUs and FTAs will both bring about 
trade diverting effects via the substitution of the more efficient world producer by the higher 
cost producer in the Customs Union (CU)/FTA. But in addition to that, restrictive RoO will 
reinforce this shift to the less efficient producer by encouraging producers in the FTA 
partners to buy from them in order to comply with the RoO, an effect that would not occur 
in CUs due to the common external tariff. It is the advantage of the most efficient of the 
partners (but less efficient than the rest of the world) to set restrictive rules of origin so as to 
ensure protection to that market. In the semi-formal explanation, the author relates 
compliance with the RoO to the effective protection granted on the final good. In particular, 
producers of the final good will choose to source from the less competitive (compared to rest 
of the world) intermediate producer in the partner country if:  
0
1
)1(1 !

y
fytt xus
c
us ,       (2.3) 
where cust and 
x
ust are the tariffs on clothing (final good) and textiles (intermediate) in the US, f 
is the share of intermediate purchased in the US in the final good and y is the value of textiles 
purchased per unit of clothing. This formula represents the criterion for positive effective 
rate of protection in the US. In fact, as long as the effective rate of protection in the partner 
country is higher than in the home country it would always pay local producers to buy from 
other FTA members rather than from lower cost producers from rest of the world (provided 
there is a need to buy from the partner country to comply with the RoO). According to 
Krueger (1993), RoO become then very powerful protectionist policies for intermediate good 
producers.  
Another example of how RoO can result in a reduction of output is presented by Krishna 
and Krueger (1995), who analyze an imperfect competition model (where FTA partner is a 
monopolist), based on the work of Hollander, in which they assume Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) as well as fixed coefficients in production. They show that under a cost based 
RoO, and being local and foreign inputs perfect substitutes, there would be a raise of 
marginal costs for the monopolist, thereby decreasing its output, although for low levels of 
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 If an FTA sets stringent RoO, it may become profitable to source intermediate goods from the same market 
that will later be the export market. The intermediate good producer (which is the final good export market) will 
have an incentive to set stringent rules.  
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restriction, it will still be worthwhile for the monopolist to accept the restriction. There 
would be increased costs for the monopolist, which would in turn translate into a fall of 
output for the FTA.  
However, an overview of the literature reveals that under certain conditions, RoO may also 
increase trade and improve welfare, as well as having very different effects on different 
markets. Figure 2, taken from Krishna (2005), shows one situation in which RoO can result in 
increased welfare. 
 
Figure 2.2. Increased Welfare with RoO 
Consider an FTA between A and B where the price in B of the final good equals world price 
and the unit cost of production ( BB CPP   * ), and where there is no local production in A, 
which has the higher tariff of the two countries. The pre-FTA level is given at F. When the 
FTA is created and RoO integrated, there is a considerable gain of welfare at 0D  (along the 
RoO restrictiveness curve). For low levels of restriction D (below oD ), the unrestricted costs 
of producing in B equal the restricted costs )(DBR . In such case, A would now consume all 
its final good from B. In the absence of RoO, and in the absence of transport costs, B would 
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trans-ship all the world production to A, although not necessarily increasing its own 
production. As for A, for low levels of restriction, there is no impact whether they exist or 
not, as the price in A does not rise. Consumer surplus increases as price falls from 
)1( AB tC   to BC  and tariff revenue falls, but less (EFCD>EFGD). As the rule becomes more 
restrictive, consumer surplus decreases through the increase of prices and eventually, 
towards 2D , welfare must be lower than prior to the FTA. Beyond 2D , the RoO are not met 
and there is no preferential treatment, hence no change in welfare.  
This finding has been modeled formally in a number of studies. Assuming perfect 
competition model, constant returns to scale and small country conditions Krishna and 
Krueger (1995) show that under a certain level of restrictiveness of RoO, in a perfect 
FRPSHWLWLRQ PRGHO ZLWK &56 86· WKH LPSRUWHU WDULIIV EHFRPH HIIHFWLYHO\ ]HUR DV DOO WKH
imports are produced in Mexico (which has zero tariff for all inputs and world price for that 
import) after the formation of an FTA. Trade patterns can be greatly affected; investment 
flows are likely to come into Mexico and; welfare, which is not monotonic in the 
restrictiveness of RoO, increases for low levels of restrictiveness.  However, Krishna and 
Krueger (1995) show how different specifications in their model may result in important 
changes in the results. They point out the difference between the short and the long run. In 
the long run, all the effects highlighted above are likely to materialize. In the short-run, this 
is not the case as investment flows will take some time to flow into Mexico and Mexico 
would only be able to absorb part of US demand. Also, CRS will take some time to 
materialize, ZKLFKPHDQVWKDW0H[LFR·VLQFUHDVHGSURGXFWLRQZRXOGEULQJDERXWDQLQFUHDVH
in marginal costs, choking off supply. If there is no change in world price, the US price 
remains unchanged and there is a loss in welfare due to a loss in tariff revenue in the US. If 
there were no RoO and no transport costs, production in Mexico would not be affected and 
there would be a welfare gain in the US (since prices would immediately go down, which 
would outweigh the loss of tariff revenue). 
Another different specification refers to the way in which the RoO is spelled, establishing the 
difference between a price-based versus a cost-based restriction.23 The decision to comply or 
not with the RoO will be determined by whether the restriction lies below the tariff inclusive 
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 In the cost based definition, the restriction requires a minimum amount of local input over total input. In the 
price based, the restriction requires that the price minus the foreign input exceeds a certain level.  
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import price in the US. For low levels of restriction, in the long run there is no difference 
with low levels of restriction in the cost-based case. However, in the short-run the price-
based rule allows for more gains to Mexican producers based on the observation that the 
restricted cost function in a price based scheme is decreasing as price in the US rises.24 In the 
short run, the profit made by companies is higher in this case than in the cost based scenario, 
where the restricted cost function is simply a function of the restriction.   
Falvey and Reed (2002) present another way in which RoO may benefit the importing 
country through the change in the terms of trade induced by RoO in a country that only 
imports the final good. In their partial equilibrium model, they consider three countries, of 
which two are perfectly competitive exporters and one an importer (which has monopsony 
power). Production of the final good requires an intermediate and value added. Finally, the 
good is not consumed in the exporting country. The results of their model depend on the 
increasing unit costs in the supply of all inputs, although only in the short run. The authors 
calculate the welfare effect of a change in total imports in a set up where intermediates are 
complemented by non-tradable value added. The authors derive the optimal tariff and note 
that while a uniform tariff raises welfare, the fact that each exporting country has different 
supply functions suggests further gains if tariffs are made discriminatory. The optimal 
discriminatory tariff becomes: 
'
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where 0jt is the optimal discriminatory tariff to goods from each exporting country and 
'
jv is 
the change in value added for different quantities of the final good in the exporting 
countries.25 The authors then define a RoO as a requirement to set a minimum ratio of 
intermediate on total output from that country. This restriction alters the initial choice of the 
producers between intermediate and value added. If an increase in the ratio of the 
intermediate to value added raises output it implies that there will be a reduction in the 
average cost. This may occur because the firms in the exporting countries choose a 
combination at which prices from the two sources are equated, rather than their marginal 
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 The higher the price, the easier it becomes to comply with the restriction. 
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 7KHYDOXHDGGHGLQWKHH[SRUWLQJFRXQWU\LVUHODWHGWRWKHLPSRUWHU¶VZHOIDUHWKURXJKWKHREVHUYDWLRQWhat it is 
part of the price paid for the final good in the importing country. 
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costs. This results in an equilibrium where the price equals the average cost, which may be 
higher than necessary for a given level of output. If the RoO changes the combination of 
inputs so as to decrease the average cost, there will be a fall in price and hence, an increase in 
ZHOIDUH,WIROORZVWKDWDQ´RSWLPDOµ5R2FDQEHVHWWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWLQWHUPHGLDWHLQSXW
elasticities, yielding an optimal tariff which also raises welfare as in the case of no RoO.  
A basic characteristic of RoO is that they may affect different products in vertically 
integrated markets, thereby giving rise to different effects in each markets. Ju and Krishna 
(1998) study the effect on firm behavior and prices for both the intermediate and the final 
good, as well as the consequences on the market equilibrium and outcome for both goods 
markets, when RoO are taken into consideration in the creation of an FTA. 
The authors set up a model with both intermediate and final goods, with two countries plus 
rest of the world. Both countries produce both goods but only one country exports the final 
good to the other. They use a CRS setting in the short-run, not allowing for investment, 
which could imply one country not having the capacity to fulfill WKHRWKHUFRXQWU\·VGHPDQG
Through the derivation of the profit maximization problem for the perfectly competitive 
firms, the authors look at the effects of RoO on prices, for both countries and for both goods. 
They find that firms in the exporting country specialize their production towards one market 
or another. At the same time, firms choosing to produce for the local market have a fixed 
level of profits, while those exporting have profits which are increasing in the price of the 
final good in the importing market and decreasing in the price of the FTA made intermediate 
as well as the level of restriction.  
Under this sequence, the authors show that prices of imported inputs do not change after the 
formation of the FTA. Domestic prices for inputs do change, as they equalize in both FTA 
partners and needs not be equal than the imported price as the domestic inputs can be used 
to comply with the RoO. Prices of the final good also change, with the importing country 
(the more expensive prior to the FTA) falling if the exporting country is large enough to 
satisfy its demand and remaining unchanged if the exporting country is small. The 
equilibrium price leaves exporting firms indifferent between exporting or selling at home 
EHFDXVH WKH KLJKHU SULFH SDLG LQ WKH SDUWQHU·V PDUNHW LV FRPSHQVDWHG ZLWK WKH FRVW RI
complying with the RoO. The authors then continue to show the impact on market access. 
They defend that for loose RoO, intermediate imports will increase whereas final good 
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imports will decrease, because final good production in the exporting country is inversely 
related to the restrictiveness of the RoO. For loose rules, cheaper production of the final 
good, hence more output, which crowds out imports of the final good but increases imports 
of the intermediate. It must be noted that this point can only hold if there are no tariffs in the 
exporting country for the imported input, as it would otherwise provide an incentive to use 
local inputs rather than imported. The effect on the final good market can be seen as trade 
diversion. However, the authors recall that there is no more production taking place for the 
local market, which increases imports of the final good to the exporting country, this is, trade 
substitution. Since production decreases with the restrictiveness of the RoO, for levels of 
restrictiveness above a certain threshold, there are less exports than what would have been 
produced locally, so trade diversion is reversed. In order to observe the market access effect 
on the FTA and in both countries, the authors resort to the derived demand and input price 
effects, which act together with the level of restriction of the RoO to determine the results.  
By reducing the tariff of a good, demand increases but local supply decreases. Since there are 
RoO that require the use of local supply, demand for the final good is reduced and the 
derived demand effect reduces demand for the intermediate. The input price effect consists 
in a reduction of the input price due to lower tariffs increases supply, which causes supply of 
the final good to increase, hence reducing imports of the final good. 
Rodriguez (2001) furthers the analysis of the impact on intermediate and final good markets 
deriving a modified version of the multistage model developed by Dixit and Grossman 
(1982). His model consists of a three country set up where each country intervenes in a 
different production stage, by increasing labor intensity and over the continuous interval 
[0,1]. The good goes along the production chain from country 1 to 2 and from there to 
country 3, where the final good is finished. As such, tariffs on intermediates are dragged 
DORQJ WKLV SURFHVV DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\ LQFUHDVH WKH SULFH 7KH SURGXFHU·V FRVW PLQLPL]DWLRQ
problem is given by the following equation:  
³ ³³   23
12 23
12
2312
1 32
3
0
1
23 )()()1()()1)(1(
i
i i
i
ii difdiiftdiifttMin     (2.5) 
where it  are the respective tariffs in each country and )(if i are the respective unit cost 
functions. The key of this model lies on the fact that the margins of comparative advantage 
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vary endogenously. As the price conditions change in one country (because of the formation 
of an FTA), production stages vary marginally to one country or another.  
Under this setting, the author finds that non-binding RoO, i.e. those that do not require a 
change in the source of the intermediate, create trade for both FTA members, compared to a 
pre-FTA world.26 This trade creation represents a more efficient combination of processes 
within the pre-FTA setup. At the same time, there is no change in the production undertaken 
in the non-member, so there is no trade diversion. Further, such a RoO would also reduce 
prices in all three countries for the final good. The logic of this lies on the fact that when 
tariffs disappear between two countries, and there is no cost associated with the compliance 
of the RoO, this cheaper price is carried along to other countries. However, when restrictive 
RoO are considered, the results vary considerably. First there is what the author calls the 
trade regression effect, which is the inefficient relocation of production across FTA members.27 
In addition, trade diversion also exists with the non-member as a result of a shift in the 
margin of comparative advantage between the non-member and the member with the closest 
production structure. Also, production costs and prices increase with the level of 
restrictiveness in the FTA. 
Based on the work of Rodriguez (2001), Lloyd (2002) looks into possible ways of improving 
RoO specification for developing countries. This model adapts the one presented by 
Rodriguez (2001) of a continuum of stages to show that a RoO on value added would be 
more efficient than DQ ´DOO-or-QRWKLQJµ 5R2 7KLV 5R2 ZRXOG EH HTXDO WR WKH 0)1 UDWH
minus the value added included in the free trade area, which could eventually be 100 
percent, hence eliminating the tariff. Such a RoO would be preferable for developing 
countries under a preferential scheme, as it would encourage reaching higher degrees of 
processing in the developing country. The model changes that of Rodriguez (2001) by 
DVVXPLQJGLIIHUHQWFRVWVRISURGXFWLRQLQGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHV8VLQJDQ´DOO-or-QRWKLQJµ5R2
on goods from the developing country raises the costs of those goods that do not comply 
with the requirement, protecting production in the developed country for higher degrees of 
processing. On the contrary, a value added RoO encourages production in the developing 
country reverting to a free trade situation.  
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 It must be noted that the pre-FTA world is not free trade but contemplates MFN tariffs for all members.  
27
 As opposed to trade diversion which is the inefficient relocation of trade between members and non-members. 
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Cadot et al. (2002) add to the observation of the effects of RoO on intermediate and final 
goods drawing a model that highlights the relationship between RoO and effective-
protection formulae. They build on a two-country model, where only one country produces 
the intermediate good. This good is only consumed by the other country and, with perfect 
substitutability between foreign and domestic intermediates and decreasing returns to scale, 
they show that the benefit from using the preferential regime is: 
IIFF aptpb UD **  ,        (2.6) 
where D is the restriction imposed by the RoO, and takes the form of a percentage of the 
quantity of the intermediate good from the FTA that must be used in the production of the 
final good; a is the input-output coefficient; and IU the ad valorem equivalent of the 
premium on the home-made intermediate good generated by the RoO. Whenever the 
restriction is 100 percent ( 1 D ), this formula comes down to an effective protection 
expression. When instead of a tariff elimination under the preferential treatment there is a 
tariff reduction at a rate FW , the previous formula becomes: 
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It follows that b is decreasing in FW and increasing in D . If 0 b 28, then 0W
D
d
d
, which 
means that deeper preferences are associated with a higher restriction. This result suggests a 
degree of substitutability between tariffs and RoO, although the authors do not explore the 
conditions to choose one mechanism or another. However, this question is partly answered 
in Anson et al. (2005) who use the findings of Cadot et al. (2002) to conclude that the effects of 
a RoO would be two: 
1. Final-goods producers would shift their purchases of intermediates to 
intra-FTA intermediates 
2. If final goods are imperfect substitutes by origin, consumers will shift 
towards intra-FTA from the rest of the world trade if b>0. If this shift is 
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 :KHQ)7$SDUWLFLSDQWVDUH³MXVWLQGLIIHUHQWEHWZHHQVLJQLQJRUQRW´ 
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not too strong, the share of intermediate trade in total intra-FTA trade 
is expected to rise.  
 
Further evidence of how RoO can impact differently both the intermediate and the final good 
is presented by Francois (2005) who develops a model in which he includes the use of a set of 
global equilibrium prices for the examination of trade between different pairs of countries 
under various RoO. The demand for regional varieties of the intermediate good results in a 
function of the degree of substitutability between the varieties and of the price for the final 
good. The restrictions imposed by the rules are introduced as increased trading costs when 
the countries enter an FTA. This yields an elasticity representation of the impact of rules-
induced price increases on the use of intermediates for FTA partner-destined final goods 
from where the author derives the intermediate input demand. A number of results stem 
from this system: 
1. The volume of trade in final goods will fall between FTA partners 
2. Import demand for final goods shifts away towards third-country suppliers, 
whereas demand for intermediate goods shifts to FTA partner suppliers 
3. The level of intermediate trade may or not increase. On one hand intermediate 
trade increases as a result of the RoO but on the other hand, the fall in final 
good production drives down demand.  
4. Intermediate goods will represent a larger share of total intra-FTA trade.  
Finally, the political economy of RoO is modeled in Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) who 
concentrate on the importance of RoO for accepting or not an FTA. Departing from the 
widely accepted premise that RoO grant additional protection when tariffs disappear, the 
authors show that FTAs that are not acceptable to certain economic groups become 
acceptable only after the imposition of RoOs. In doing so, they analyze the welfare effects of 
FTAs, with and without RoO. They build their model using a general equilibrium setting. 
However, when exploring welfare effects, they revert to partial equilibrium. Their model has 
three goods (0, 1, 2 and m), where m is the input, 1 and 2 are final and 0 is the numeraire 
under perfect competition and CRS. They derive the demand function from the first-order 
conditions of a utility function using quasi-linear preferences. With regards the production 
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IXQFWLRQWKH\LQWURGXFHD´WZR-VWHSµFKDLQZKHUHE\WKHUHLVDILUVW-VWHSFRPSRQHQW´9µWKDW
is complemented by m to produce 1. Each country imports and exports one good. Tariffs are 
GHWHUPLQHGHQGRJHQRXVO\DQGIDOO WR]HURLQERWKFRXQWULHVIRUWKHLQSXW´PµDQGSRVLWLYH
tariffs for the final goods. In their setting, tariffs are inversely proportional to the elasticity of 
LPSRUW GHPDQG DQG WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V ZHLJKt in social welfare. Also, tariffs are directly 
proportional to the ratio of domestic output of good the final good to its imports. The 
determination of tariffs is important because it presumes that a final good exporter would be 
in favor of the FTA as it has free imports and protected market for output whereas input 
exporters have nothing to gain.  
In this context, they analyze the welfare effects of RoO for trade diverting and trade creating 
FTAs. They show how preference in the final good entails the imposition of RoO on the 
input, which will bring about trade diversion in this good as producers of the final good will 
need to use inputs from the FTA. This, in turn, entails the creation of a captive market for 
intermediate good producers. However, because producing the final good becomes more 
expensive, trade diversion is reversed in the final good market. With weakly binding rules, 
the gain in the final good outweighs the loss in the input. By the contrary, strict rules reverse 
this situation. 
However, if the preference is purely trade creating such that the post-FTA price is at its free 
trade level, the imposition of RoO is unambiguously harmful. In this case, there is no trade 
diversion in the final good market to be reversed, and the RoO still cause trade diversion in 
the input market. An FTA that was rejected (by both consumers and producers) is now 
DFFHSWHGLQWKHSUHVHQFHRI5R2EHFDXVHRIWKHSURGXFHUV·VXUSOXVHYHQWKRXJKWKH)7$DV
a whole loses out with RoO.  
2.2. Empirical Literature  
By and large, empirical literature has concentrated on the impact of RoO on trade. The 
intrinsic complexity of RoO, with a myriad of provisions affecting one same product, 
together with the innumerable different regimes has complicated traditional empirical 
analysis, leading economists to look for alternative ways of assessing the impact of RoO. In 
particular, assessments of the impact caused by RoO can be grouped into two main 
categories: development of (ex ante) indices of restrictiveness and ex post analysis.  
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The ex ante literature scrutinizes RoO protocols and assigns values to each type of RoO, as 
well as to the different regime wide provisions. By its part, ex post literature focuses on the 
analysis of existing trade-related data and the impact of RoO on its variations. Each method, 
as it is explained below, has its pros and cons. 
2.2.1 Development of ex-ante Restrictiveness Indices 
A considerable part of the ex ante literature builds on a restrictiveness index first developed 
by Estevadeordal (2000). This index, inspired in work previously done by Garay and 
Estevadeordal (1996), results from a need to compare RoO regimes. It is created by assigning 
values to each type of product specific RoO and then averaging these values to result in one 
figure that indicates the overall restrictiveness of a RoO regime. Each observation can take a 
value between 1 and 7 (1 being the least restrictive, 7 the most) depending on the 
restrictiveness associated to each specific rule. In the many instances in which several rules 
can be combined for one product ² either complementing or supplementing each other ² the 
author contemplates combinations of the rules, increasing the level of restrictiveness the 
more complicated he considers them to be. The least restrictive is a change in the tariff item 
(8-digit) level, whereas the most restrictive is a change in the section level combined with a 
technical test rule. Combinations like percentage rule and change in tariff subheading fall 
half way in restriction, according to this index. The index is then calculated as follows: 
Table 2.1. Calculation of Estevadeordal (2000) restrictiveness index 
 
y = 1 ,I\&7, 
y = 2 If CTI  < y* < CTS  
y = 3 ,I&76\&76	59& 
y = 4 ,I&76	59&\&7+ 
y = 5 ,I&7+\&7+	59& 
y = 6 ,I&7+	59&\&7&6HFWLRQ 
y = 7 ,I&7&6HFWLRQ\&7&6HFWLRQ	77 
The way to allocate these values follows an observation rule that has an intrinsic degree of 
VXEMHFWLYLW\,WVHWVWKHOHYHORIUHVWULFWLYHQHVVEDVHGRQWKHDXWKRU·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIZKDWLV
more or less restrictive and assigning same levels of restrictiveness to rules that may or not 
have the same restrictiveness.  
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Although the index pioneered by Estevadeordal (2000) has the shortcomings outlined above, 
its construction has the advantage of allowing for the possibility of averaging the values for 
each product (either trade-weighted or not) over the entire tariff universe to obtain a figure 
that can be presented as the sectoral or overall restrictiveness of the RoO regime.29 Also, it 
has been subsequently modified to further refine the classification of rules. Suominen (2004), 
cited in Estevadeordal et al. (2007) modifies the index so as to allow for different values of 
restrictiveness depending on the percentage level or for the case in which no CTC is 
required.30 Anson et al (2005) introduces more variations into the same 1 to 7 scale, assigning 
values to combinations of specific rules not previously calibrated by Estevadeordal (2000). 
Very similarly, Cadot et al (2006) follows the same logic to further complete the index, and 
provides a very exhaustive classification, again based in the same scale. Evidencing the 
complexity of RoO, this index contemplates 34 different categories of product specific rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
29
 ([DPSOHV RI WKLV DUH (VWHYDGHRUGDO DQG 6XRPLQHQ  WR FRPSDUH (8¶V DQG 1$)7$ 5R2 UHJLPHV RU
Estevadeordal and Suominen. (2006) to compare regimes worldwide. 
30
 7KLV LVSURPLQHQW LQ WKH(XURSHDQIDPLO\RI5R27KHVSHFLILF UXOHRIRULJLQUHDGV LQ WKHVHFDVHV³&KDQJH
IURPPDWHULDOVRIDQ\KHDGLQJ´QRWDGGLQJDQ\IXUWKHUUHVWULFWLRQ 
 40 
Table 2.2. Calculation of Cadot et al (2006) restrictiveness index 
 
r=1 (R1) 
y*=NC 
y*=WO 
y*=R2+allow (*) 
r=2 (R2) 
y*=CTS 
y*=TT 
y*=EXC 
y*=R1+R2 
r=3 (R3) 
y*=R2+R2 
y*=CTH+allow (*) 
r=4 (R4) 
y*=CTH 
y*=RVC1 
y*=RVC1+Oth.Req 
y*=CTH+R2+allow (*) 
r=5 (R5) 
y*=RVC2 
y*=RVC2+Oth.Req 
y*=RVC1+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+RVC1 
y*=CTH+RVC1+R1 (or R2)+allow (*) 
r=6 (R6) 
y*=CC or 
y*=RVC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+RVC2 
y*=CTH+RVC2+R1+allow (*) 
y*=CTH+RVC1+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+VRC1+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=RVC1+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
r=7 (R7) 
y*=RVC2+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+RVC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CTH+RVC2+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CC+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CC+VC 
y*=CC+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CC+RVC+R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
NC=No change 
Note: y* is the latent variable approximated by the 
observation rule and assignment to the 
corresponding R value on the left-hand side 
column; (*) only applies for EU ROO; RVC1 if 
RVC>40%, RVC2 if RVC<=40%; Oth.Req are 
NONOR, VC-R. 
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Another index of a similar nature was developed by Garay and Cornejo (2001), who 
decompose the index in four components (Change in Tariff Heading  (CTH), Exception to 
Change in Tariff Heading (CTHex), percentage rule and Technical Test (TT)) and look at 
them independently, allocating values for each of the four categories, each of which having a 
scale and range independent of the others. For instance, CTH can take values from 1 to 8 
depending on the level at which the change is required, whereas the percentage rule takes 
the value of the percentage required in the rule.31  
Harris (2007), quoted in Estevadeordal et al (2007) constructs another ex ante index assigning 
positive and negative points to each rule which allows for the combination of 
complementary and/or supplementary rules. The index allocates a positive figure between 
+2 and +8 to each of the different types of CTC (from least to most restrictive). From there, an 
additional rule, like RVC adds another positive figure (whose value depends on the level of 
local content required). On the contrary, an addition (positive exceptions that are allowed) 
subtracts points. The higher the figure, the more restrictive the rule is. 
These indices focus entirely on the product specific rules, leaving aside regime-wide rules. 
This gap was overcome by Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004), who developed a 
comparable ex ante index that looks into the regime-wide provisions which, according to the 
authors, are trade-facilitating. Hence, it concentrates on the inclusion or not of diagonal 
cumulation, full cumulation, drawback, self-certification and tolerance rules (and the 
different values at which it can be set), taking values between 1 (least facilitating) to 5 (most 
facilitating). 
In an attempt to combine in one ex ante figure the impact of both product specific and 
regime-wide RoO, Gretton and Gali (2005) propose a further contribution. The logic of their 
index diverges from the ones discussed above as they assign weights to the different aspects 
of a RoO protocol and then they multiply each weight by a factor of restrictiveness. There are 
three main categories, the first one proxying product specific rules. It is assigned a weight of 
0.6 on the overall index, of which 0.2 correspond to each of the main categories of product 
specific rules (CTC, percentage rules and TT). The more restrictive the CTC is, the higher the 
factor will be. At the same time, if the rule is complemented by a RVC, there is a further 
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 For instance, a RVC requiring 40 percent would take the value of 40 in the column corresponding to the 
percentage rule in this index. 
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increase in the index. The second category refers to regime-wide RoO, and it has a weight of 
0.25. If for instance the regime contemplates cumulation, its corresponding weight takes a 
value of zero. The third category looks at other aspects like diversity of rules faced by each 
country, i.e. whether members are part to several FTAs with different rules. The overall 
figure can take a value between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most).  
These indices and their extensions have been used as standalone measures to assess the level 
of restrictiveness of RoO regimes or have been introduced into econometric models as 
exogenous variables. Estevadeordal et al (2007) justify their appropriateness as measures of 
UHVWULFWLYHQHVV EHFDXVH WKHVH PHWKRGV DUH ´SDUWLFXODUO\ XVHIXO IRU HQGRJHQL]LQJ DQG
FRPSDULQJ 5R2 UHJLPHVµ VLQFH WKH\ FDQ IRFXV RQ WKHLU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLU
effects. At the same time, they recognize the short-comings of these approaches, namely the 
IDFWWKDWWKH\REYLDWHWKH´LQSXW-RXWSXWµVWUXFWXUHRIWKHFRQFHUQHGSURGXFWWRUHDOO\DVVHVV
the impact of the RoO. Without knowing the actual impact of each rule, it cannot be 
ascertained that a rule is more restrictive than other. With this observation in mind, these 
indices may suffice to describe and compare RoO regimes, but any comment about their 
restrictiveness must be taken with extreme caution, as at their very core they rely on the 
DXWKRU·VGLVFUHWLRQWRDVVLJQstringency values.  
2.2.2 Ex post literature 
RoO and their connection to trade flows and other variables have been the focus of attention 
of several empirical studies. In general terms, the study of RoO has been centered on one 
main question: their impact on trade flows.32 In later years, more refinement has facilitated 
the study of particular policies, such as cumulation.33 However, work has also considered 
RoO as one of the driving factors for other issues RWKHU WKDQ WKH PDLQ ´LPSDFW-on-WUDGHµ
question. For instance, the International Trade Center (ITC) (2001) explores the relation 
between RoO and export credit insurance; Estevadeordal et al. (2006) focus on the impact of 
RoO as a determinant of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, analyzing the relationship 
between NAFTA RoO restrictiveness and FDI flows in Mexico; Ishikawa et al. (2007) 
H[SORUHGWKHILUP·VSURILWVLQWKHSUHVHQFHRI5R2 
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 Estevadeordal (2000), Cadot et al. (2002, 2006), Portugal-Perez (2008), among others are examples of this 
trend. These studies are further discussed below.  
33
 Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) and Augier et al. (2004) fall in this category. 
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With regards to the techniques used, the empirical study of RoO has been dominated by the 
use of econometric modeling, in particular through the use of gravity modeling and other ad 
hoc formulations.34 Although much smaller in number, examples of other techniques are also 
present. For instance, Mattoo et al (2003) estimate the growth in Malagasy and Mauritian 
exports under the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) building a partial equilibrium 
model that depend on tariff equivalents of the export quotas, tariffs on imports in the US, 
supply and the cost of complying with the RoO. The latter depends by its part on the cost of 
switching purchases of inputs and transport. Their results suggest that the absence of RoO 
could increase exports by eight percent for Mauritius and at least 19 percent for Madagascar. 
The remainder of this section provides details about the key empirical studies on RoO.  
Estevadeordal (2000) builds a model to explain the linkages between tariff negotiations and 
RoO in NAFTA. He uses the index explained in the previous section, which he introduces as 
DIXQFWLRQRI´REVHUYDEOHµYDULDEOHVXVHGWRREWDLQDSUHGLFWLRn of the restrictiveness index. 
He estimates the following equation: 
),,,(1 RoWUSIITRoWMEIITUSMEIITDIFMFNfRIROO   , (2.8) 
where ROO-RI is the restrictiveness index and takes the values assigned following the 
observation rule described above, MFN-DIF is the MFN differential between Mexico and the 
US, IIT-ME-US is the intra-industry trade between Mexico and the US in the years 1990-1992 
and the remainder two variables are the respective measure for Mexico and the US and the 
rest of world. The ordered probit estimation allows the author to obtain a continuous 
indicator for the restrictiveness index, which is then introduced in the following equation as 
an endogenous variable to explain the years of liberalization, which proxy the degree of 
liberalization:  
),,,,(2 MERATEXPMERATIMPMEMARPREMEUSYERIROOfUSMEYE   ,
            (2.9) 
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 Other than econometric analysis, Appiah (1999), quoted in Georges (2007) undertook the first Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) study to find that RoO could deduct up to 2.8 percentage points from the income 
gains of NAFTA. Georges (2007) provides a further overview of other examples with CGE. Other non-
econometric studies include %UHQWRQDQG0DQFKLQ ZKR ORRNDW(8¶V LPSRUWV IURPSUHIHUHQWLDOSDUWQHUV
and, providing descriptive evidence, they argue that RoO account for their very low utilization rates (as low as 
31 percent for GSP in 1999). 
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where YE-ME-US are the years of liberalization of Mexico to the US under NAFTA, YE-US-
ME is the equivalent for the US, PRE-MAR-ME is the initial preferential margin of Mexico vis 
à vis the US, IMP-RAT-ME are Mexican imports from the US relaWLYHWRWRWDO0H[LFR·VWUDGH
and EXP-RAT-ME the equivalent for exports. The estimation is done using cross-section 
techniques averaging data for the period 1990-1992. 
7KHUHVXOWVRIWKHILUVWHVWLPDWLRQFRQILUPWKHDXWKRU·VSUHGLFWLRQWKDWWKHKLJKHUWKHVpread 
EHWZHHQPHPEHUV·WDULIIVWKHPRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKH5R2EHFRPH7KLVLVLQWHUSUHWHGDVWKHUROH
of RoO in preventing trade deflection. The second equation, estimated using standard 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques, confirms the hypothesis that RoO are an 
important element in determining the depth and speed of liberalization as both variables are 
significantly positively correlated. As a consequence, the author sees RoO as well as 
preferential tariffs as primary policy instruments in market access negotiations in FTAs.  
Estevadeordal·V (2000) index and variations in the same spirit have been used as control 
variables in econometric analysis, whether to assess the impact on trade of RoO themselves 
or to compare them with other policies. For instance Cadot et al. (2002) assess the cost impact 
for 0H[LFDQ H[SRUWV FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK 1$)7$·V UXOHV RI RULJLQ LQ WZR ZD\V L XVLQJ D
revealed-preference mechanism, using data on NAFTA utilization rates; and ii) using an 
index of RoO restrictiveness constructed by Estevadeordal (2000) only on NAFTA, using 
data at the 6-digit level. In the second method they compare the positive (expected) effect of 
tariff preference with the effect (negative) of RoO and find out that have a similar effect. 
Under perfect substitutability of intermediate goods (whether domestic or imported), they 
draw a model where they relate tariff preferences and rules of origin restrictiveness. They 
argue tat except for those products where there is 100 percent utilization rate and those with 
zero percent, tariff preferences may be offset by rules of origin, in fact they may be exact with 
opposite sign. If this is true, Mexican exports to the US should be largely unaffected by 
NAFTA, as RoO is just another way of disguising tariff protection. FurWKHU0H[LFR·VH[SRUWV
to the US should not differ widely from exports to other markets, provided the tariff faced by 
Mexico in other partners does not differ much from the one faced in the US. They assess this 
hypothesis using Mexican exports as weights in Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation,35 
and regressing them on a RoO restrictiveness index and exports to the rest of the world. 
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 Because it can be thought that RoO determine the dependant variable (exports) as they affect its price, 
although this may not be necessary and hence, OLS estimates need not be biased. 
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Subsequently, they compare the predicted values of Mexican exports in three different cases: 
as NAFTA stands today under current tariff preferences and RoO; one without tariff 
preferences and RoO; and another one without RoO. The results of the first scenario can be 
LQWHUSUHWHGDVWKHLPSDFWRIWKHWRWDO´1$)7$SDFNDJHµRQ0H[LFDQH[SRUWVWKHVHFRQGWKH
combined effect of RoO and preferences and the third, as the impact of RoO. When they 
SHUIRUPWKLVH[SHULPHQWXVLQJ WKHFRHIILFLHQWVREWDLQHGZKHQXVLQJ(VWHYDGHRUGDO·V LQGH[
Mexican exports would increase by 35.5 percent if RoO were set at an overall restrictiveness 
level of 2.36 
Another use of Estevadeordal (2000) index is found in Anson et al (2005), who calculate the 
impact of RoO on exports through the following gravity model:  
ijijijij
k
ijkijjijiij ROOCUPTADUMDISTYYM PEDDDDDGGD  )1ln()ln()ln(ln 543210
    (2.10) 
where ijG  are the country and year fixed effects, kijDUM the vector of dummies capturing the 
typical gravity variables (language, colony, etc.), ijPTA and ijCU variables that take the value 
of 1 if any pair of countries belong to the same FTA or customs union and )1ln( ijROO the 
restrictiveness index, somewhat modified from Estevadeordal (2000). They run a regression 
on 149 countries and 15,280 observations, both with and without fixed effects and find that 
the restrictiveness index has a negative impact on the FTAs but lower than the positive 
impact of the FTA itself.  Subsequently, the authors confirm the negative impact of RoO on 
exports regressing Mexican exports to the US on tariff preferences, RoO restrictiveness and 
exports to the rest of the world. Although this model is recognized by the authors to lack a 
solid economic foundation, they find evidence that RoO decrease exports by 33.8 percent.  
The authors further explore the impact of RoO by developing a model that looks at 
utilization rates, rather than exports, in the same spirit as Cadot et al (2002). Tariff 
preferences give a lower bound on the costs of RoO. For utilization rates of 100 percent, RoO 
costs can be assumed to be not greater than the tariff preference. For utilization rates of 0 
percent, RoO costs can be assumed to be not lower than the tariff preference, i.e. if costs were 
lower than the tariff preference, there would be some utilization. For those utilization rates 
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 Estevadeordal (2000) index ranges from 1 to 7. 
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between 0 and 100 percent, they break down the costs by finding the distortive cost and they 
assume the remaining cost as the administrative cost associated to the RoO. Their results 
show that administrative costs linked to RoO account for around 2 percent ad-valorerm, 
which represents 47 percent of the preference margin enjoyed by Mexican exporters.  Cadot 
et al. (2006) use a similar approach to break down the costs associated to RoO. They do this 
by assuming that that is the cost incurred in by firms in sectors that are close to 100 percent 
utilization rate (>90 percent) and have a restrictiveness index below at 2 or below (out of 7). 
They find that the administrative costs associated to RoO are 3.4  percent for the Pan-
European System of Rules of Origin (PANEURO) and 1.8 percent for NAFTA. 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) undertake a study over a very large sample of 
countries (155) to assess the trade effects of aggregate imports of RoO. They do so in a 
number of ways, always relying on gravity modeling and using the restrictiveness index as 
proxy to capture RoO. First, they look at aggregate trade and, in addition to the 
restrictiveness index, they introduce the facilitation index as described in the previous 
section. Their model takes the following specification:37 
HEEEEEE
EEEEEEE

 
ijijijijijij
ijijjijiij
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121110987
6543210
, 
            (2.11) 
where they add many of the gravity variables plus ijROORI  and ijFACIL , which are the 
average measures of the product specific and facilitation restrictiveness indices for each 
regime. The results obtained show that introducing the restrictiveness variable in the 
regression highly increases the positive impact of the PTA variable, while the restrictiveness 
coefficient is negative by a similar amount. This leads the authors to confirm the negative 
effect of restrictive RoO on trade. Additionally, the facilitation index shows a positive impact 
RQIORZVFRHIILFLHQWRI ,QWKHLUYLHZ´WKHFRPELQHGHIIHFWRIUHJLPH-wide variables 
that instill flexibility to the application of product-specific RoO serves to boost tUDGHµ7KH
positive figure of the facilitation index prompts the authors to decompose it to further 
explore its components. When they do so, the facilitation index, is replaced by 
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 All the non-dummy variables are taken in logs. They regress this model for the years 1981-2001 using panel 
data estimation techniques with year, importing and partner country dummies. Another example of this type of 
regression can be found in Wagner, Head and Ries (2002) 
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ijCUMUDIAG , ijCUMUFULL , ijDRAWBACK , ijSELFCERT and ijDEMINIMIS . The first four 
variables are dummies that take the value of one when that policy exists in the protocols; the 
latter takes the value of the de mninims allowed in the protocol (i.e. between 0 and 15). All the 
five variables are positive and significant, although diagonal cumulation only at the 10 
percent level.  
Augier et al (2004) further the study of cumulation. In particular, they undertake an impact 
study of the PANEURO system of diagonal cumulation on textile exports from the Southern 
Mediterranean countries. To this purpose they serve themselves of a modified gravity model 
as follows:  
ijijijij
ijijijijjiij
ROOQuotaLanguageBorder
PTADisttariffRUVEQX
10987
6543210 )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(
DDDD
DDDDDDD

 
, 
            (2.12) 
where iQ  represents total textile production in the exporting country; jE  total apparent 
textile consumption in the importing country;38 ijRUV  are the relative unit values used to 
proxy prices; ijtariff gives the bilateral MFN or preferential average between countries; 
ijDist , ijBorder , ijLanguage and ijQuota are usual gravity dummies; and ijROO is the 
variable that models cumulation. It takes the value of 1 when the exporting country has an 
FTA with the EU but no cumulation, zero otherwise.39 In addition to the countries taking 
part in the Barcelona process, the authors include five other selected countries. The cross-
section equation is estimated using Tobit methodology for years 1995 and 1999. Their results 
suggest that the lack of diagonal cumulation trade lowered by as much as 73 percent in 1995 
and 81 percent in 1999.  In a follow up study, Augier et al (2005) confirm these results by 
performing a study that looks at the same question but using panel data estimation and 
dividing their sample into aggregate, intermediate and manufacture trade. They use the 
difference in difference approach using three different control groups and find that the lack 
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 This variable is constructed by deducting exports from the sum of total production plus imports in the 
importing country. 
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 This definition implies that not having an FTA with the EU and having one with cumulation both take the 
same value.  
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of cumulation could impede trade by 25 percent to 70 percent between EU spokes, 
depending on the time period and trade flow considered.  
Some studies have tried to fine-tune the estimation of the impact of RoO by looking at 
different sectors or different types of product-specific RoO. Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(2004bis) perform an exercise by replacing the analysis of aggregate trade to sectoral trade on 
intermediates. For this purpose, they choose chemicals, machinery, television and radio 
transmitters, textiles and vehicles and study the impact of the restrictiveness and facilitation 
variables described above. Interestingly, both variables show positive and significant impact. 
The result of the facilitation index variable parallels their previous result for aggregate trade 
but the one for the product specific restrictiveness index differs completely, showing now 
positive figures. The authors argument that this finding is in line with the theory, that 
suggests that RoO boast trade in intermediates. Furthermore, the authors combine both 
variables with time dummies and show that the impact of each of them increases over time, 
which could be evidence of the experience that exporters adapt over time to deal with the 
RoO.  
Trying to disentangle the effects of the different types of RoO has become another avenue of 
research in recent times. Three examples of such attempts are Portugal-Pérez (2008), Cadot et 
al. (2002), and Cadot et al. (2006). These three papers are of special relevance considering the 
purpose of the present study. 
Portugal-Pérez (2008) undertakes a study of the impact of regional value content rules and 
technical test rules on African textile exports to the US and the EU for the years between 1996 
and 2004. The author augments the usual gravity model by introducing a dummy variable 
for RVC and another one for TT. He uses Tobit estimation to account for truncated data; he 
explores 236 varieties of apparel for 22 exporting countries at the Harmonized System (HS) 
6-digit level, yielding 33 408 observations. The model takes the following specification:  
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where kjtiR
,
,
is the dummy variable that controls for AGOA eligibility;  kjtiVC
,
,
is the dummy 
WKDW FRQWUROV IRU (8·V VSHFLDO WUHDWPHQW IRU QRQ-knitted apparel;40 prefkjtit ,,,  and mfnktit ,,  are the 
respective preferential and MFN tariffs; ktY LVWKHH[SRUWHU·V*ross Domestic Product (GDP); 
k
i
j
i xDD is the country pair fixed effects;41 and 
02Madag
iD contrROV IRU 0DGDJDVFDU·V VSHFLDO
circumstances in 2002.  
The author finds that the presence of an alternative RVC rule is associated with an increase 
of 45 percent of exports. This is justified by the author by the fact that this rule is presented in 
the (8·V system as an alternative to the double transformation rule, which many African 
countries cannot meet. Even more strikingly, the single transformation rule under AGOA is 
reported to increase exports in 303 percent. 
Cadot et al (2002) decompose the restrictiveness index used in the model presented above 
into several dummies that represent different RoO types. They explain Mexican exports 
using WLS cross-section estimation for the year 2000 at the 6-digit level. The equation takes 
the following form: 
 
kikk
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            (2.14) 
iR is the vector of five different dummies that take the value of one if the corresponding RoO 
takes one of the following forms: CTH, CTS, Exception to Change in Tariff Item (CTI), 
Exception to Change in Tariff Classification (CTCex) , RVC. The variables CHAP*FOOD and 
CHAP*TEXTILE are manipulations due to wrong results of the Change in Chapter (CC) 
dummy. kiD is a vector of dummy variables for each HS Chapter. All the coefficients appear 
with the expected negative sign and significant. When they use the results of this regression 
on the projection exercise described above, they show that the type of rule that has a greater 
negative impact on Mexican exports is a CC, followed by a CTH. The remaining variables 
would also increase exports if relaxed except the Exception to Change in Tariff Classification 
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 This rule foresees an alternative RVC allowing apparel non-qualifying for cumulation, provided that its value 
does not exceed 40 percent (in some cases 47.5 percent) when exporting on a preferential basis to the EU. 
41
 The author notes that exporter and importer specific fixed effects cannot be added due to multicollinearity. 
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(CTCex), which has a positive impact on exports.42  Using the same model for Mexican 
exports to the US, Cadot et al (2006) provide new estimates for each type of rule. Their model 
adds by introducing the TT type of rule to the vector of dummies. Also, they enlarge the 
period of study, considering years 1994 to 2001 and use panel data techniques. Their 
specification also controls for time effects and fixed effects at the section level. As before, it is 
done by WLS. Table 3 compares the results obtained by both studies. The difference in 
magnitude of the coefficients is explained by the fact that Cadot et al. (2002) does not take 
logs for exports. 
Table 2.3. Comparison of estimates for different types of RoO 
 
 Cadot et al (2002) Cadot et al (2006) 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
XROW 
3.63 
(97.6) 
0.577 
(0.006) 
PREF 
26.09 
(15.31) 
1.887 
(0.193) 
CTI 
-2197.41 
(-3.04) 
NA 
CTS 
-308.36 
(-2.18) 
-0.773 
(0.112) 
CTH 
-658.84 
(-6.00) 
-0.751 
(0.115) 
CC*FOOD 
-387.68 
(-1.05) -1.095 
(0.131) 
CC*TEXTILE 
-533.09 
(-1.02) 
CTCex 
230.67 
(3.84) 
0.506 
(0.036) 
RVC 
-985.41 
(-19.70) 
-0.432 
(0.032) 
TT NA 
1.000 
(0.055) 
Both studies show some interesting results. First, CTC are always associated with negative 
impacts although their magnitude is not necessarily consistent with the predictions. While a 
CC requires in principle the most restrictive change, in Cadot et al. (2002), it is the second 
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 The coefficient on the CTI variable is the one with largest negative impact but has a low effect on trade 
simulations as it affects only low-volume tariff lines.  
 51 
least restrictive, although this may be biased by the different specification of this variable. A 
CTI reveals to be the most restrictive type of RoO in Cadot et al. (2002), and CTS, the least, 
which is inconsistent with the predictions. In Cadot et al (2006), the order of restrictiveness is 
more coherent with theory, with CTS and CTH showing practically the same impact. An 
RVC rule has a negative impact in both cases, although in neither study it has the largest nor 
the smallest coefficient. Exceptions to the CTC increase trade according to both studies. 
However, a note of caution must be added here. Most RoO protocols have two kinds of 
H[FHSWLRQV´QHJDWLYHµDQG´SRVLWLYHµ43 The former is supposed to add further restrictions to 
the rule, while the latter relaxes it. Hence, they should have opposite impacts. To my 
knowledge, neither of these studies makes a distinction between both types. Finally, the 
positive impact of the TT RoO is striking in Cadot et al (2006). The authors argue that this 
may be caused by the fact that TT is in most cases associated with a CTC. However, this 
would not provide the necessary explanation, as no CTC type of rule is positive. A TT has 
been criticized by its ad hoc opaque nature, according to Brenton and Manchin (2003) 
WHFKQLFDO UHTXLUHPHQWVDUH ´PRUH VSHFLILF DQG PRUH UHVWULFWLYH WKDQ &7+µ <HW in view of 
this result it may be the case that it is actually carved to adapt to the production structures 
already in place, resulting in a lenient type of rule.  
2.3. Conclusion  
Literature on RoO can be broadly divided in theoretical and empirical. None of them was 
developed until the mid 1990s and has remained limited in scope thereafter.  
Theoretical literature was largely influenced by the literature on local content protection 
started by Grossman (1981) and Mussa (1984). Most studies on this regard explore the impact 
of RoO on prices, production, trade flows, welfare and on the chain effects on intermediate 
and final goods. Most studies start their analysis by focusing on the alteration that the 
imposition of a RoO brings to the optimal combination of inputs of the pre-FTA equilibrium. 
From here, the overview of the economic literature on RoO reveals that these instruments 
can be powerful policy mechanisms in affecting a wide range of trade related aspects. In 
particular, there are five main observations. First, RoO tend to cause harmful effects on 
welfare although, under certain conditions, they can actually improve it; second, RoO are 
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 See Sections II.3.3.4 and II.3.3.5 for a discussion on this question.  
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more likely to result in positive effects when compared to pre-FTA scenarios that 
contemplate tariffs rather than free trade; third, intermediate goods are likely to experience 
increased demand at the expense of final good producers; fourth, as the restrictiveness of the 
RoO increases, so does the probability that they produce harmful effects and; fifth, the details 
of each particular situation matter.   
Empirical literature on RoO can be divided into ex-ante and ex-post literature. The former 
scrutinizes RoO protocols and assigns values to each type of RoO, as well as to the different 
regime wide provisions. This current of the literature was developed under the need to 
compare origin regimes across trade agreements and concentrates largely on the 
development of ex-ante indices of RoO restrictiveness. By its part, ex post literature focuses on 
the impact of RoO on different trade-related variables, such as trade volumes, tariff 
preferences or the cost of compliance with RoO. A majority of the work done uses the 
restrictiveness indices developed ex-ante as exogenous independent variables that explain the 
trade variable under scrutiny. Additionally, there are a handful of studies that code RoO in 
different ways so as to assess the estimated impact on trade volumes, although these studies 
are usually quite limited in scope. 
From the review of the empirical literature there are two main findings that become relevant 
in the present context. First, there is unanimity in that RoO impede trade when taken as a 
package. To my knowledge, no study has shown positive trade effects of RoO when looking 
at a representative selection of trade flows.44 However, the second main finding is that when 
RoO are disaggregated into their different components, some of them that can actually 
increase trade. This is the case of some regime-wide trade facilitating measures, and some 
concrete types of product-specific RoO. The potential for further research to explore this 
latter finding is encouraged by the fact that only a handful of studies have looked at these 
questions.  
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 Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) concentrate on selected intermediates. 
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Chapter 3. Types of Rules of Origin 
 
3.1. Preferential vs. non-preferential RoO 
A first distinction of RoO families must be done between preferential and multilateral, or 
non-preferential, RoO. Often, the general public is mistaken by thinking that the types of 
rules used in these two groups are different, while they are not. The distinction between 
preferential and non-preferential comes on their use. The first group is used in preferential 
trade, i.e. FTAs, while the second is used in multilateral trade.45  
Non-preferential RoO do not discriminate origin between World Trade Organization (WTO) 
PHPEHUV ZKLFK UHSUHVHQW D YDVW PDMRULW\ RI WRGD\·V ZRUOG therefore, their impact in 
altering trade flows is minimal. As LaNasa (1995) observes, rules of origin have a distortive 
effect in so far they are used in a discriminatory way. Therefore, this study concentrates 
entirely on preferential RoO.   
3.2. Product specific vs. regime-wide RoO 
RoO protocols are complex texts full of technicalities that lay down the conditions which a 
product must satisfy in order to be considered originating. In pre-NAFTA liberalization 
agreements, such as LAIA, it was not uncommon to set one same rule to confer origin for the 
entire protocol. In modern FTAs this is not the case and RoO protocols contain a different 
rule for each product, defined at the chapter, heading or subheading level, as the case may 
be. These individual rules are called product-specific RoO.  
In addition to the product-specific rules, protocols contain a number of clauses that apply to 
all products. These clauses refer to the procedural requirements needed to demonstrate 
origin, accumulative production in other countries or de minimis rules, among others. These 
clauses are known as regime-wide RoO.  
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Both product-specific and regime-wide RoO are presented and analyzed in this thesis since 
both types may have an impact on trade flows depending on their structure. The fact that 
both product-specific and regime-wide rules coexist when conferring origin to a product 
makes it difficult to oversee either of them.    
3.3. Product-specific rules 
Since RoO are definitions of what is considered to be originating and each country can have 
its own definition for each good, the range of product-specific rules is potentially unlimited. 
While there are some similarities among the types of product-specific rules used across the 
world, there are also several differences, and combinations of them, further complicating the 
picture.  
As a broad first division, goods can be conferred originating status if they have been wholly 
obtained or if they have been substantially transformed in the partner country. The 
remaining part of this section describes both types of rules, as well as their different 
variations.  
3.3.1 Wholly obtained rules (WO) 
This type of rule applies to primary goods and products made solely thereof that have been 
obtained directly within the territory of the country in question.  
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Definition of wholly obtained: EU-Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) Economic Partnership 
Agreement (Protocol I, Article 6) 
1. The following shall be considered as wholly obtained in the territory of the CARIFORUM 
States or in the territory of the EU Party: 
(a) mineral products extracted from their soil or from their seabed; 
(b) fruit and vegetable products harvested there; 
(c) live animals born and raised there; 
(d) products from live animals raised there; 
(e) (i) products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted there; 
(ii) products of aquaculture, including mariculture, where the fish are born and raised there; 
(f) products of sea fishing and other products taken from the sea outside the territorial 
waters of the EU Party or of a CARIFORUM State by their vessels; 
(g) products made aboard their factory ships exclusively from products referred to in (f); 
(h) used articles collected there fit only for the recovery of raw materials, including used tires 
fit only for retreading or for use as waste; 
(i) waste and scrap resulting from manufacturing operations conducted there; 
(j) products extracted from marine soil or subsoil outside their territorial waters provided 
that they have sole rights to work that soil or subsoil; 
(k) goods produced there exclusively from the products specified in (a) to (j). 
 
Example 1: EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Protocol I 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
Chapter 01 Live animals 
All the animals of  Chapter 1 used 
must be wholly obtained 
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Although most countries keep a similar definition for wholly obtained rules, there are some 
variations, as in the case of fish obtained in international waters. Most of the countries would 
consider it to be wholly obtained if it has been caught by a vessel of the country, but the 
definition of vessel from a country may vary. For the EU the nationality of a vessel is 
determined by several conditions, like the percentage of nationals onboard; for the US, 
nationality is determined by the flag they carry. Products that are obtained as a combination 
of wholly obtained products in the territory of the parties are also given originating status 
automatically.  
3.3.2 Substantial transformation 
When the materials used in the manufacture of a product are not originating, or when 
originating and non-originating materials are combined, it is required to ´VXEVWDQWLDOO\
WUDQVIRUPµWKRVHPDWHULDOVWRFRQIHURULJLQin order to the final product. These are the rules 
that normally gain most of the attention since they are the ones in which there is more scope 
to impose stringent criteria. There are three main ways to define substantial transformation: 
3.3.2.1. Change in tariff classification 
A change in tariff classification (CTC) of the product·V components is a very common way to 
assess whether the product has undergone substantial transformation in a country. Normally 
this rule demands all the materials used in the production of a good to have changed by the 
end of the production process the tariff classification they had when were imported into the 
country that will subsequently export within the Free Trade Area (FTA).  
This rule is normally based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
Systems, or Harmonized System (HS). This system is internationally harmonized up to the 6-
GLJLWOHYHO&RXQWULHV·FRGLQJV\VWHPVDOWKRXJKEDsed on the HS, go beyond, even to the 12-
digit level. Since there are several levels of classification, ranging from sections to the 12-digit 
level, a CTC may acquire different forms, depending on the level at which the change of 
tariff classification is required for that product. In practice, preferential rules are negotiated 
ranging from change in chapters (2³digit level) to change in subheadings (6-digit level). The 
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level from which the materials are required to change is what determines the type of CTC. 
Consequently, different types of CTC are:46  
- Change of Chapter (CC): When the rule requires the materials to change to the level at 
which the rule is presented from any other chapter 
Example 2: United States²Central America²Dominican Republic FTA (CAFTA-DR) 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried 
out on non-originating materials 
that confers originating status 
09.01 
Coffee, whether or not 
roasted or decaffeinated;  
coffee husks and skins; 
coffee substitutes containing 
coffee in any proportion 
A change to heading 09.01 from 
any other chapter. 
2005.10 
Homogenized vegetables, 
prepared or preserved 
(excluding by vinegar) 
A change to subheading 2005.10 
from any other chapter. 
- Change of Tariff Heading (CTH): When the rule requires the materials to change to the 
level at which the rule is presented from any other heading. 
Example 3: EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Protocol I 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
ex 2008 
-  Peanut butter; mixtures based 
on cereals; palm hearts; maize 
(corn) 
Manufacture in which all the materials 
used are classified within a heading 
other than that of the product 
2009 
Fruit juices (including grape 
must) and vegetable juices, 
unfermented and not containing 
added spirit, whether or not 
containing added sugar or other 
sweetening matter, containing 
20% or less by weight of added 
sugar or other sweetening matter 
Manufacture in which all the materials 
used are classified within a heading 
other than that of the product 
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 WTO, Committee on Rules of Origin. G/R/WO/56, 25 May 2000. 
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- Change of Tariff Subheading (CTS): When the rule requires the materials to change to the 
level at which the rule is presented from any other subheading.47 
Example 4: Chile-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
3204 
Synthetic organic coloring 
matter, whether or not 
chemically defined; 
preparations; synthetic 
organic products of a kind 
used as fluorescent 
brightening agents, whether 
or not chemically defined 
A change to heading 3204 from any 
other subheading 
6812.20 Yarn and thread, of asbestos 
A change to subheading 6812.20 
from any other subheading 
As it can be seen in the examples, the key element to determine into what category of CTC 
the rule falls is the level from which the materials must transform, and not the level at which 
the rule is described. A CC implies a change in the first two digits between the input and the 
final good, a CTH a change in the third and fourth digits and a CTS in the fifth and sixth 
digits. Taking the example of a producer of pineapple and orange juice (mixtures of juices, 
HS 2009.90), the implications of the different types of rules would be: 
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 A Change of Tariff Heading-Split (CTHS, (when the rule requires the materials to change to the level at which the rule is 
presented from any other split heading) and Change of Tariff Subheading-Split (CTSHS, when the rule requires the materials to 
change to the level at which the rule is presented from any other split subheading) are being discussed at the WTO multilateral 
negotiations but are not used in preferential agreements. 
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Example 5 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description 
of product 
Type of Rule  Implication 
2009.90 
Mixtures of 
juices 
CC 
All the materials must originate 
from chapters other than 20 
CTH 
All the materials must originate 
from headings other than 2009 
(whether or not from chapter 20) 
CTS 
All the materials must originate 
from materials other than 
subheading peanut butter 
(2009.41) (whether or not from 
heading 2009 or chapter 20) 
According to the CTH rule laid down in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, pineapple and orange 
juice producers can manufacture juice from imported prepared pineapple (HS 2008.20) and 
prepared orange (HS 2008.30) as they belong to a different heading, HS 2008. Both the 
prepared pineapple and the prepared orange would undergo a CTH to become juice, which 
would then acquire originating status. However, the rule does not allow producers to mix 
pineapple juice (HS 2009.41) and orange juice (HS 2009.11), as both juices separately belong 
to the same heading as mixtures of juices (HS 2009). If the rule was a CC, it would force 
producers to manufacture the juice from locally produced prepared pineapple and orange, 
as the materials would not undergo the corresponding change in chapter (both prepared 
pineapple and pineapple juice belong to Chapter 20). On the other hand, if the rule was a 
CTS, it would allow producers to manufacture the juice from imported pineapple juice and 
orange juice directly, as the materials used would suffer a change in subheading (from HS 
2009.11 and HS 2009.41 to HS 2009.90).  
As it can be seen in the example above, in the presence of a CC rule, the manufacturer could 
only import fresh fruit; a CTH would also allow the producer to obtain the juice from 
imported prepared fruit; and a CTS would increase his options to produce his juice from 
already made juices. Hence, the higher the level from which the rule requires to transform 
the materials, the more restrictive it becomes. 
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&7& UXOHV DUH ZLGHO\ XVHG LQ WRGD\·V )7$V 7KLV W\SH RI UXOH LV SUHIHUUHG LQ WKH
Harmonization Work Programme on non-preferential RoO foreseen in the WTO Agreement 
on Rules of Origin.48 The are three main reasons for this predilection. First, its transparent 
nature, as it is very straightforward to determine if a change in classification has taken place. 
The second reason is that it relies on the HS, which is widely used and known by customs 
officials around the world. The combination of these two factors makes it very simple to 
asses if origin can be granted or not. The third reason resides on its hierarchical nature as 
postulated by LaNasa (1995). The farther into the chapter the heading is, the more processing 
has been involved; thus a change in the tariff heading should imply a sufficient degree of 
transformation on the product.   
On the other hand, the CTC requires a thorough knowledge by the part of the producer, 
which may have difficulty in identifying the correct material and termination for the final 
product when exporting to a certain country. A second disadvantage of the CTC is its 
conception as a coding system and not as a manufacturing guide, which means that some 
manufacturing processes do not entail a change in tariff classification while in other 
occasions a minor operation may. This question has proven to be the more critical downside 
of using the CTC, as shown by the discussions taken place in the WTO Committee on Rules 
of Origin (CRO).49 In these negotiations, there have been a number of cases where countries 
have disagreed on the applicability of a CTC rule. One classical example is that of coffee. Not 
considering coffee husks and skins, the HS assigns only four subheadings to this commodity 
(HS 0901.11, HS 0901.12, HS 0901.21 and HS 0901.22). These four headings code coffee in 
roasted or not, decaffeinated or not. In practice, this means that any operation other than 
roasting and decaffeinating does not entail any change of tariff classification. As a result, 
operations such as crushing, grounding or mixing cannot confer origin if a CTC rule is set. 
On the other hand, roasting does confer origin, and traditional coffee producing countries 
argue that it should not since roasting Kenyan coffee in the EU would render the coffee is 
European.  
                                                     
 
48
 Article 9 of the Agreement sets the procedures to develop harmonized specific criteria for goods. When defining substantial 
transformation, the Agreement calls members to use a change in tariff classification as a basis for conferring origin. Although 
percentage rules and technical rules are also accepted, these are seen as supplementary criteria.   
49
 The CRO discusses non-preferential RoO but the technicalities inherent to them are the same as for preferential rules. 
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3.3.2.2. Percentage rules 
This type of rule sets a requirement of local content in the value of the final good. There are 
two ways in which these rules are expressed: setting a minimum percentage of originating 
value or establishing a maximum limit of non-originating value in the final good. The first 
type is usually referred to as regional value content (RVC) rule, and the second, as import 
content (MC) rule 7KH 59& UXOH FDQ EH H[SUHVVHG LQ WZR GLIIHUHQW ZD\V WKH ´EXLOG-XSµ
method, which considers the value of the originating materials, and the build-down method, 
which subtracts the value of the non-originating materials from the value of the product. 
This method is akin to the MC rule in that it takes into account the value of the non-locally 
SURGXFHGHOHPHQWVDOWKRXJK LWGLIIHUV LQ WKHZD\RIH[SUHVVLQJ LW7KH59&´EXLOG-GRZQµ
method takes the value of these materials from the final good, and sets a minimum 
threshold; the MC rule adds this value and lays down a maximum limit. The formulae used 
to calculate these percentages are as follows:  
59&´EXLOG-XSµPHWKRG 
100x
V
VOMRVC            (3.1) 
59&´EXLOG-GRZQµPHWKRG 
 100x
V
VNMVRVC          (3.2) 
 
3) MC 
 100x
V
VNMMC  ,         (3.3) 
where  V is the value of the final good, VOM the value of the originating materials and 
VNM the value of the non-originating materials. These terms differ depending on the 
country. For instance, the EU uses the ex-works price of the product as its V , whereas the US 
XVHVWKH´DGMXVWHGYDOXHµZKLFKLVWKHYDOXHFDOFXODWHGLQDFFRUGDQFHWRWKH:72&XVWRPV
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Valuation Agreement ² primarily the transaction value ² adjusted, if necessary to exclude 
any costs incidental to international shipment, i.e. resulting in the Free on Board (FOB) price. 
In both cases, this price includes all the technical costs associated to the product, such as 
labor, as well as the profit.  
With respect to the value of the materials, in the EU the reference price is the customs value, 
calculated in accordance with the Agreement on Customs Valuation, adjusted to include 
international transport. In the US, the price used is the same as for the final good  (the 
adjusted value). Since the ex-works price of the product is lower than the FOB price (as it 
does not include internal transport) and the value of the non-originating materials is higher 
(as it includes international transport) in the EU than in the US, the resulting figure of non-
originating value in the EU ZLOOEHKLJKHUWKDQLQWKH86DFFRUGLQJWRHDFKRQH·VIRUPXODH
The percentage of regional value content normally depends on the circumstances. It changes 
from product to product within the same agreement and also within different agreements. 
According to Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006), its range normally oscillates between 40 
percent and 50 percent of regional value (or 60 percent and 50 percent of non-originating 
materials) but values below and over those figures are not uncommon.  
Example 6: MC, Southern African Development Community (SADC) FTA  
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
Chapter 94 
Furniture; bedding, 
mattresses, mattress 
supports, cushions 
and similar stuffed 
furnishings; lamps and 
lighting fittings, not 
elsewhere specified or 
included; illuminated 
signs, illuminated 
name-plates and the like; 
prefabricated buildings. 
Manufacture in which the value of 
the materials used does not 
exceed 60 % of the ex-works price of 
the product. 
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Example 7: RVC, Trans-Pacific SEP 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
1902 
Pasta, whether or not 
cooked or stuffed (with 
meat or other 
substances) or otherwise 
prepared 
A change of heading is not required 
provided there is a 
regional value content of not less 
than 45 percent. 
As an illustration, a manufacturer of upholstered chairs from South Africa would fall under 
Example 1 above. If he produced $2 chairs made of imported wood and foam, where 1.2$ 
was the cost of importing the wood, $0.2 the cost of importing the chair, labor and overheads 
accounted for $0.4 and profit for $0.2, his calculation to comply with the MC rule would be: 
%70100
2
4.1   xMC  , 
not complying with the 60 percent limit. If he found a regional producer of foam, the VNM  
would decrease to $1.2, reaching the specified maximum (60percent). However, from the 
formula it can be seen that shifting to regional producers would not be the only way to fulfill 
the criteria. If he were to increase labor costs or profits by at least 0.33$, V would increase 
enough to reduce the weight of the non-originating materials to the required 60% of the 
good. This example reveals one of the negative aspects of using this sort of rule. By basing its 
compliance on the local value added to the final good, it penalizes low-cost, labor intensive 
producers, creating a problem for developing economies. Using the same reasoning, a 
paradoxical situation may occur whereby the inefficient high-cost producer can achieve 
access to the partneU·V PDUNHW ZKHUHDV WKH PRUH HIILFLHQW SURGXFHU LV OHIW RXW $QRWKHU
complication of this system is that it depends on external factors that are beyond its control, 
such as exchange rates or commodity prices. If the price of the non-originating materials 
increases, it may impede the final good to obtain originating status. An additional issue is 
that it is difficult for customs authorities to ascertain the exact percentage of locally added 
value, as is includes all costs related to production, such as patents or purchase of assets that 
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are difficult to account. This is complicated by the fact that countries have different 
definitions for each of the elements of the formula, further setting hurdles to international 
transactions.   
On the positive side, a percentage rule is probably the type of rule that better grasps the very 
purpose of the rules of origin, i.e. ensuring that a certain degree of processing takes place 
regionally. Another advantage relates to the fact that since producers know the elements and 
costs of their materials used, they could take the appropriate measures to restructure their 
production in a way such to comply with the rule. A final positive aspect is that it sets a 
transparent threshold that producers can aim at.     
3.3.2.3. Technical Test rules 
The complexity and variety of RoO cause difficulties to classify them into types. CTC and 
percentage rules can be easily categorized but there several variations that are broadly 
combined into the third group of rules that determine substantial transformation. These are 
called technical test rules (TT). In essence, these are the rules that require any particular 
action to take place on the final good in order to confer originating status. Rules that require 
(or prohibit) a particular process to be undertaken fall in this category and so do the rules 
that require (or prohibit) the final good to source from a specific input.  
Example 8: TT ² specific operation, ASEAN-Korea FTA 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
5309 Woven fabrics of flax 
Printing or dyeing accompanied by 
at least two preparatory or finishing 
operations 
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Example 9: TT ² specific input, SADC FTA 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
ex Chapter 
62 
Articles of apparel and 
clothing 
accessories, not knitted 
or crocheted; 
except for: 
 
Manufacture from yarn 
The rule described in example 2 is widely used in textiles. It has been called yarn forward (or 
fabric forward if it requires to be manufactured from fabric) because it requires that the 
materials used are not at a later stage of processing than yarn. These rules are very common 
in textiles. When designed, these rules take into account the different stages of production in 
textiles: fiber to yarn, yarn to fabric, fabric to apparel. These rules require the product to 
undergo a certain number of transformations processes in the same country to become 
originating. Depending on the number of transformations needed, they can be single, double 
or triple transformation. The more jumps the final good has to satisfy, the more stringent the 
rule is.    
The design of TT rules does not have any preconceived standards with regards to its design, 
which makes them the most flexible type of rule. They can be adapted to the circumstances 
of each production process and lay down the specific elements needed for a good to become 
originating in each situation. However, this flexibility becomes too burdensome to describe 
the innumerable production stages of all the goods. At the same time, TT rules better serve 
protectionist interests, as industry lobbyists, who are the ones that best know their 
production patterns, can mislead authorities in their conception (LaNasa, 1995). Another 
drawback of this system is that in a world of technological improvements, it would have to 
be constantly readapted. Finally, it becomes very complicating for importing authorities to 
verify that the production processes have really taken place in the exporting country 
(Brenton, P., 2003).    
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3.3.3 Combinations of Rules 
The different groups described above are the PDLQ ´IDPLOLHVµ RI 5R2. However, a closer 
study of the protocols on rules of origin around the world reveals that it is very frequent to 
find combinations of the rules described above, whether supplementing or complementing 
each other. Exceptions to CTC rules are also very common whether to tighten or relax the 
required change. These combinations and exceptions result in endless possible types of RoO, 
which may have very subtle variations among them. The administrative complexity that 
stems is only paralleled by the research difficulty. 
3.3.3.1. Supplementary rules 
There are many instances in which two different types of rules are laid down together for the 
same product. Virtually in every case, the choices are a CTC or percentage rule, although 
other combinations are also possible. They are usually referred to as alternative rules. 
Example 10: Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement (SEP-4) 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out on 
non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
2009.90 Mixtures of juices 
A change to subheading 2009.90 from 
any other 
subheading; or 
A change of subheading is not 
required provided there is a 
regional value content of not less than 
45 percent. 
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Example 11: Supplementary TT and RVC rules, EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
HS 
heading 
No. 
 
Description of 
product 
 
 
Working or processing carried out on non-
originating materials that confers originating 
status 
                                           or                       
2711 
 
Petroleum 
gases and other 
gaseous 
hydrocarbons 
Operations of 
refining and/or 
one or more 
specific 
process(es)1 
Other operations than those 
referred to in column (3) in 
which all the materials used 
are classified within a 
heading other than that of 
the product.  However, 
materials classified within 
the same heading may be 
used provided their value 
does not exceed 50% of the 
ex-works price of the 
product 
In the examples above, the producers can choose between two options in each case. Whether 
a CTC and an RVC in Example 1 or a between a TT and an MC in Example 2. Because this 
situation increases the options of the producer, it represents an additional flexibility of the 
origin criteria. The more instances these alternatives exist, the more liberal the rules become.  
3.3.3.2. Complementary Rules 
The opposite situation comes when two different criteria are specified together in the same 
rule to confer origin, which is only given if both criteria are fulfilled. Meeting two criteria 
instead of one, adds complexity to the rule.  
3.3.3.3. Combinations of supplementary and complementary 
rules 
The complexity of the RoO is enhanced by the fact that it is possible to combine both 
supplementary and complementary rules (which can, each of them, be a combination of 
CTC, percentage, TT or WO rules) 
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Example 12: Combination of supplementary and complementary rules, ASEAN-Korea FTA 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
1103.20 Pellets 
Change to Subheading 1103.20 from any 
other Chapter, provided that the 
materials of Headings 10.03 and 10.06 
are Wholly-Obtained or Produced in the 
territory of any Party; or A regional 
value content of not less than 40 percent 
of the FOB value of the good, provided 
that the materials of Headings 10.03 and 
10.06 are Wholly-Obtained or Produced 
in the territory of any Party 
In the example above, the producer can choose between a CC or an RVC (supplementary 
rules) with the condition that in both cases, all the materials from headings HS 1003 and 1006 
are wholly produced (complementary rule)  
3.3.3.4. CTC exceptions  
A very frequent case is to introduce exceptions to CTC rules (CTCex), which prohibits the 
utilization of a certain material from a certain digit level that is otherwise permitted by the 
main rule. This exception can be added at any digit level; the higher the level of exception, 
the more restrictive the rule becomes. 
Example 13: CTCex, North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
HS heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
4016.93 
Gaskets, washers and 
other seals 
A change to subheading 4016.93 from 
any other heading, except from 
headings 40.09 through 40.17 
2825.70 
Molybdenum oxides and 
hydroxides 
A change to subheading 2825.70 from 
any other subheading, except from 
subheading 2613.10. 
The CTH rule for subheading HS 4016.93 is further restricted by not allowing materials from 
headings HS 4009 through HS 4017, which reduces the number of materials from which the 
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producer can source. Again, the higher the level of classification of the exception (chapter, 
heading and subheading level), the more number of materials that are prohibited, increasing 
the restrictiveness of the rule. 
3.3.3.5. Positive exception 
There is another case in which the main CTC rule can have an exception, although in this 
case used to relax the application of the rule (CTC+). These rules are drafted so as to allow 
materials of the same family as the ones prohibited by the main rule.  
Example 14: CTC+, EU-Egypt FTA 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out on 
non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
Ex Chapter 
29 
Organic chemicals; except 
for: 
Manufacture from materials of any 
heading, except that of the product. 
However, materials of the same heading 
as the product may be used, provided that 
their total value does not exceed 20 % of 
the ex-works price of the product 
ex 8211 
Knives with cutting 
blades, serrated or not 
(including pruning 
knives), other than knives 
of heading 8208 
Manufacture from materials of any 
heading, except that of the  product. 
However, knife blades and handles of 
base metal may be used  
In the examples above, although the requirement is a CTH, a change from that particular 
heading would also confer origin under certain circumstances, even if it belongs to the same 
heading as the product in question. In the first case, the condition to use materials from the 
same heading is to comply with an MC requirement. In the second example there is no 
limitation, but only certain products are allowed freely.  
The types of rules described above are the most common in origin protocols. However, rules 
may be drafted so as to combine in at least 70 different ways.50  
                                                     
 
50
 See Chapter 4 for an illustrative list of different types of rules.  
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3.4. Regime-wide RoO 
The rules described so far affect only the good concerned. Each good has to meet them to 
become originating. RoO specific rules are always complemented by a series of provisions 
that apply to the entire universe of products (or to most of them, depending on eventual 
exceptions). These all-product provisions are known as regime-wide RoO. Any aspect 
contained in the FTA agreements or origin protocols that affect the determination of origin of 
the ensemble of products is a regime-wide RoO. They deal with a whole range of issues, 
from the treatment received by parts or accessories to the penalty received by an exporter 
submitting a fraudulent proof of origin.  
There are a number of regime-wide provisions that have attracted most of the literature on 
RoO, namely cumulation, de minimis, and to a lesser extent certification procedures, the 
absorption principle and prohibition of duty drawback.51 Here, I concentrate on the first four, 
as the prohibition of duty drawback is an aspect that goes beyond the determination of 
origin.  
3.4.1 Cumulation 
Cumulation (or accumulation, as it is called in US FTAs) is the provision that allows 
materials and/or processes used/undertaken in another partner of the agreement to be 
considered originating in the country where the final good is produced. Cumulation is 
considered to be a very important provision in order to integrate the economies of the FTA.52 
The reason is that it allows manufacturers to structure different stages of their production in 
those countries of the FTA were conditions are best for that particular stage and still satisfy 
the origin requirements. There are three types of cumulation: bilateral, diagonal and full, 
described below. 
3.4.1.1. Bilateral cumulation 
This type of cumulation is the most basic of all. It allows the use of materials originating in 
an FTA partner to be considered originating when used in the production of a good in 
                                                     
 
51
 See Cadot et al. (2006), Estevadeordal (2000), Estevadeordal and Suominen (2003), Cornejo and Harris (2007) and Augier et al 
(2004) for different views on regime-wide provisions. 
52
 Augier et al (2004) 
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another partner as if they had originated there.53 To illustrate bilateral and the other types of 
cumulation, let us consider the example of a manufacturer of mixture of juices, although in 
this case, extra sweet juice, and the specific rule contained in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA will 
be used: 
Example 15 
HS 
heading 
No. 
Description of product 
Working or processing carried out 
on non-originating materials that 
confers originating status 
2009 
Fruit juices (including 
grape must) and 
vegetable juices, 
unfermented and not 
containing added spirit, 
whether or not 
containing added sugar 
or other sweetening 
matter containing more 
than 20% by weight of 
added sugar or other 
sweetening matter 
Manufacture in which: 
- all the materials used are classified 
within a heading other than that of 
the product;  
- the value of any materials of 
Chapter 17 used does not exceed 
30% of the ex-works price of the 
product 
Example 16:  
A manufacturer of juice mix made of pineapple and orange in the EU uses orange juice (HS 
2009.41) produced by him and pineapple juice (HS 2009.41) imported from CARIFORUM. 
The CARIFORUM producer also imports sugar from Cuba. The pineapple juice he produces 
has an ex-works price of $ 0.50, of which $ 0.15 correspond to sugar.54 The sweet pineapple 
juice becomes originating in CARIFORUM because it meets the specific RoO. The orange 
juice is originating in the EU because it is made of wholly obtained materials. Bilateral 
cumulation allows the producer of the final good to use originating materials from other 
                                                     
 
53
 When defining cumulation, the literature on RoO ignores the case of several countries belonging to the same agreement. Bilateral 
cumulation is considered to happen between two partners of an FTA; diagonal cumulation between countries that have a network of 
FTAs among them. The case of several countries belonging to the same FTA is largely ignored. Here, I consider bilateral cumulation 
to cover that case as well.   
54
 Sugar is contained in Chapter 17. 
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countries of the FTA, so when the originating pineapple juice is mixed with the orange juice, 
the final mixture automatically acquires originating status in the EU.55  
3.4.1.2. Diagonal cumulation 
The provision of diagonal cumulation allows materials from countries belonging to different 
FTAs to consider originating materials from other countries of the FTA network as long as all 
the countries have FTAs in place and the same RoO in all of them.  
Example 17:  
Consider an FTA between Mexico and CARIFORUM with the same specific RoO for HS 2009 
as in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. The EU and Mexico already have an FTA.56 Consider also 
that the three blocks have diagonal cumulation provisions among them. As in Example 15, 
the sweet pineapple juice originating in CARIFORUM is imported into the EU, where it is 
mixed with originating orange juice. The ex-works price of the final good is $1.00, of which 
$0.50 are associated to the orange juice. However, there is no need to pass the test of the 
specific RoO because both juices are originating from the EU-CARIFORUM FTA, which 
grants the final mix EU origin. Under diagonal cumulation, the manufacturer in the EU can 
then export the mixture of juices to Mexico under preferential terms.  
Example 18: 
The CARIFORUM producer now decides to add higher quality sugar in such a way that the 
resulting ex-works price of his pineapple juice is $0.65, of which sugar accounts for $0.30. 
The sweet pineapple juice does not meet the specific RoO because sugar accounts for more 
than 30 percent of the ex-works price of the product. The non-originating pineapple juice is 
then exported to the EU, where it is mixed with orange juice, which again contributes to the 
final price with $0.50. The resulting mix does not acquire originating status because the 
required CTH has not taken place on all the non-originating materials, as mandated by the 
specific rule (pineapple juices is the same heading as mixture of juices, HS 2009).  
                                                     
 
55
 There is no need to restore to the specific rule because the final good is considered wholly produced in the EC, as it is made only 
from materials wholly obtained in the area. 
56
 The actual specific RoO for HS 2009 in the EC-Mexico FTA is slightly different, as it is complemented by a percentage 
requirement for sugar products. In this example, I disregard this variation of the rule for practical purposes.  
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3.4.1.3. Full cumulation 
The most complete case of cumulation is that of full cumulation. Under this provision, FTA 
members may accumulate not only originating materials but also production processes 
before passing the origin test. A material that enters the FTA area and is transformed in a 
country but does not meet the specific RoO can be exported to another country of the FTA 
(non-preferentially), undergo another stage of production and then become originating.  
Example 19: 
In the same case as the one described in Example 17 the final mixture of orange and sweet 
pineapple juice becomes originating and allowed to be exported under preferential terms in 
both Mexico and CARIFORUM. The reason is that since full cumulation allows to 
accumulate processes, the final mixture of juices meets the specific RoO in the EU. The ex-
works price of the final product is $1.15, of which non-originating sugar accounts for $0.30. 
The reminding materials of the sweet pineapple juice are originating, so they do not need to 
undergo the RoO test, i.e. there is no need for the pineapple juice, except the sugar, to meet 
the specific RoO. Since the orange juice added in the EU dilutes the percentage of the value 
of the sugar below 30 percent of the ex-works price of the product, the final mixture is now 
granted EU origin and can be exported under preferential terms to CARIFORUM and 
Mexico.    
As it can be shown from the previous examples, full cumulation facilitates the integration of 
productive structures by allowing combining processes of non-originating goods and still 
achieve originating status. This is of particular interest for developing countries where they 
may not have the structure to substantially transform one good but just add partly to this 
transformation. 
3.4.2 De minimis 
The de minimis or tolerance is a recurrent provision in most origin protocols that permits final 
goods that do not meet the specific RoO if the non-originating materials contained therein do 
not represent more than a certain threshold of the total value of the product. As in the case 
with the determination of the regional value content, here there are differences between 
FTAs with regards what price to consider, whether FOB, ex-works, Cost, insurance, freight 
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(CIF), etc. The lower the price (ex-works<FOB<CIF), the more restrictive the de minimis 
provision becomes, as it is easier for the non-originating materials to surpass the threshold. 
As Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) point out, the threshold varies between FTAs but is 
normally set in the range of 7-10 %. It is also frequent to exempt entire sectors from this rule. 
For instance in the Pan-European System of Rules of Origin (PANEURO), it does not apply 
to textiles, for which there is a substitute provision based on the weight instead of value. This 
tolerance rule does not apply when the value of the non-originating materials would imply 
that the total value of the non-originating materials would exceed any percentage rule 
specified for the product in question.  
Example 20:  
Continuing with the example of the orange and pineapple juice producer, let us now 
consider that the EU producer of orange juice imports sugar from CARIFORUM and 
pineapple juice from Brazil and has decided to change the taste into an almost pure orange 
juice with a slight pineapple touch. The ex-works price of the product is $1.00, of which $0.20 
is sugar and $0.15 pineapple juice and the rest is orange juice. The mixture of juices does not 
become originating in the EU because it has not met the required CTH for the pineapple 
juice. However, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA tolerance rule states that non-originating 
materials may nevertheless be used if their total value does not exceed 15 percent of the ex-
works price of the product. In this example, it does not, so the mixture of juices can be 
granted originating status.  
3.4.3 Absorption principle 
It is common that a non-originating material is combined with another material (originating 
or not), transforming in an intermediate good that is in turn used in the final good. The 
absorption principle (or roll-up) allows the intermediate good to be counted as fully 
originating, not considering the non-originating component it has from the first non-
originating material.  
The above examples on cumulation assume the existence of the absorption principle. When 
this provision is allowed, the originating pineapple juice is considered fully originating, and 
no account is taken for the non-originating sugar contained therein. Once a good is 
considered originating, it is regarded as a whole. In the absence of the roll-up principle, all 
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the non-originating materials contained in the product (sugar in this example) would have to 
pass the test again in the EU. 
Example 21: 
 Consider now a situation in which the pineapple juice manufacturer imports sugar from 
Cuba in such way that the ex-works price of the pineapple juice is $0.50 and sugar accounts 
for $0.15. The pineapple juice meets the specific RoO because sugar represents less than 30 
percent of the value. This juice is then exported to the EU where the manufacturer combines 
it with orange juice and another substantial amount of sugar imported from Brazil. The ex-
works price of the product is $1.00, of which $0.50 is the pineapple juice, $0.20 the orange 
juice and $0.30 the Brazilian sugar. The mixture still retains its originating status again 
because non-originating sugar does not represent more than 30 percent of the final price. In 
the absence of cumulation, the value of Brazilian sugar would have to be added to the value 
of Cuban sugar, which would raise the value of non-originating sugar beyond 30 percent of 
the ex-works price, failing to achieve EU origin.  
The three regime-wide provisions described above are generally considered to provide 
leniency to origin regimes (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2006), as they add flexibility to the 
choices that exporters can make.  
3.4.4 Certification procedures 
A regime-wide discipline that has been attracting some attention in recent times is that of 
certification.57 It refers to the different ways an exporter/importer can certify the origin of his 
product. In essence, there are four types of certification: self-certification, public-private 
certification, public certification on the side of the exporting country and public certification 
on the side of the importing country. 
Under self-certification, the exporter himself declares that the good is originating without 
further checks by the authorities. Under public-private certification, the authorities grant 
some exporters the capacity to make their own declarations, after meeting certain 
requirements. The less involvement of public authorities, the easier it becomes for 
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exporters/importers. Of course, in these two cases, authorities still take on random 
examinations of the consignments, to verify the information. This is indeed a problem that 
has been raised by Cornejo and Harris (2007). They argue that while private certification is 
seen as much more efficient, there needs to be enough resources to check the veracity of the 
declarations, which often involves investigating factories in the country of origin by the 
authorities. Most South American countries do not have enough resources for such 
investigations and are thus exposed to fraudulent action.  
The remaining two options require the intervention of customs authorities, who must certify 
the origin of the products themselves. Customs authorities are often perceived as inefficient 
and corrupt, leading to delays in the certification.  
An intermediate approach, which has been used by several Latin American countries is to 
delegate public certification on private entities that usually have exclusive rights 
(Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2006) 
Certification procedures is not a restrictive or facilitating provision per se, rather, it varies 
widely according to its drafting. The next two disciplines described below are, on the other 
hand, trade restrictive a priori. While Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) estimate self-
certification to have positive effects on trade, Steele (2010) defends it would reduce African 
exports into the EU. The author argues that European importers would beware African 
exporters with no experience on self-certification.  
3.4.5 Minimal operations 
Several origin protocols describe a number of manufacturing operations that are not enough 
to confer origin even if by undertaking them, the product fulfills the specific rule of origin. 
They are called insufficient working or processing or list of minimal operations i.e. beyond 
which the product needs to go. Operations within this category vary from agreement to 
agreement but typically, they include cutting, printing, washing, painting, etc. In fact, in 
several protocols, simple mixing, as used in the examples above is included in the list of 
minimal operations. The more exhaustive this article is, i.e. the more operations it prohibits, 
the more restrictive it becomes. Another characteristic of this provision is that it prevails over 
other origin granting provisions. No matter how the good achieves origin (whether a CTC, a 
percentage rule or in application of the de minimis rule), if the operation that granted origin is 
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included in the list of insufficient working and processing, the good does not obtain origin 
certification. There is high potential for this article to follow protectionist interests, for the 
same reasoning as the TT rule described above. Industry representatives are the ones who 
better know the production chain and can mislead authorities on the inclusion of operations 
that do not confer origin, remaining highly discretional.  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA includes among its insufficient working and processing: (m) 
´VLPSOH PL[LQJ RI SURGXFWV ZKHWKHU RU QRW RI GLIIHUHQW NLQGV PL[LQJ RI VXJDU ZLWK DQ\
other matHULDOµ7KLVZRXOGEHWKHFDVHRIWKHH[DPSOHVDERYHVRIRULQVWDQFHLQH[DPSOH
of the de minimis rule, under the presence of an article requiring to go beyond minimal 
operations, origin would have not been conferred because the product only became 
originating after mixing the juices.  
3.4.6 Prohibition of duty drawback 
This provision refers to the refusal, in some FTAs, to reimburse to the producers the duties 
paid by them on those non-originating materials that are contained in goods destined for 
export. This prohibition has a protectionist bias. By removing the benefit of a duty break on 
imported materials, it encourages producers of the final good to source from regional 
materials.. However, Cadot et al. (2002) note that duty drawback itself may have a 
protectionist bias as it reduces the incentive of producers to lobby for lower tariffs on their 
intermediate goods. 
This provision is however not directly related to origin itself although it is usually included 
in origin protocols. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Rules of origin are very complex trade policy mechanisms that lay down a series of 
conditions a product needs to meet in order to be considered originating in a particular 
geographical area.  
A first distinction of RoO families must be done between preferential and multilateral, or 
non-preferential, RoO. Often, the general public is mistaken by thinking that the types of 
rules used in these two groups are different, while they are not. The distinction between 
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them relates then to whether they are used in a multilateral or preferential context. In the 
context of the present analysis, the focus will concentrate on preferential RoO.  
A second clarification between RoO refers to whether a condition applies to the entire 
spectrum of products or it details the characteristics a specific product must meet. The 
former are known as regime-wide provisions and although subject to variation, they 
estipulate the provisions regarding the procedural requirements needed to demonstrate 
origin, the possibility to accumulate production in other countries or de minimis rules, among 
others. By its part, the rules that apply to a specific product are called product-specific rules 
of origin, which are traditionally the main focus of study when RoO are considered. 
Product-specific rules of origin lay down the conditions a product must meet to become 
originating.  They can be broadly divided into Wholly Obtained (WO) rules and Substantial 
Transformation criteria. WO rules require a product to be originating in a particular area to 
achieve originating status. Substantial transformation rules refers to those rules that require 
WKH SURGXFW WR XQGHUJR ´VXEVWDQWLDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQµ LQ RUGHU WR EHFRPH RULJLQDWLQJ 7KH\
are divided in three main groups: i) Change in Tariff Classification (CTC), when the rule 
requires the product to change its HS tariff classification to become originating. Depending 
on the level at which the change is required (chapter, heading or subheading), the change in 
tariff classification is called change in chapter, change in tariff heading or change in tariff 
subheading; ii) percentage rules, which require the product incorporate a certain percentage 
of local content in its total value; and iii) technical test (TT) rules, which set any particular 
action in order to confer originating status. The WO rules together with the groups of 
VXEVWDQWLDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQUXOHVDUHWKHPDLQIRXU´IDPLOLHVµRI5R2 
These four families are usually subsequently combined among themselves in origin 
protocols. One or more rules can be provided as either alternatives or as a supplementary 
requirement for a good to obtain originating status. A further type of rule relates to 
exceptions added to the CTC rule, whereby the rule allows an exception to main required 
change in tariff classification. 
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Chapter 4. Estimating the Economic Impact of Rules of 
Origin: Methodology and Data 
 
4.1. Methodology 
This thesis attempts to provide an estimate of the impact on trade of product specific rules of 
origin (RoO) and regime-wide provisions, as well as to construct an ex-post restrictiveness 
index on the basis of the results found in the estimations. Therefore, the driving force behind 
the choice of methodology is how to assess the ex-post trade impact of RoO, as opposed to 
forecasting. This places econometric analysis above other usual methods, like Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) models.58 The framework chosen for such analysis is the gravity 
equation, which has been widely used in order to assess different policy variables. 
The gravity model constructed for this study explores the determinants of trade flows (total 
trade, exports and imports taken at the 6-digit level) of four reporting countries and their 
respective FTA partners (up to 28 different country pairs). Product-specific RoO and regime-
wide provisions directly obtained from the legal texts of the FTA protocols of origin are 
coded and introduced exogenously in the gravity equation, along the usual gravity variables. 
This set-up allows obtaining the impact on trade of the different RoO, which can be 
subsequently grouped in order to obtain an ex-post restrictiveness index.  
This chapter explains and justifies the methodology used as well as describes the data nature 
and sources. The restrictiveness index is constructed in Chapter 6 on the basis of the results 
obtained from the estimations of Chapter 5.  
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 Additionally, to our knowledge, no product-specific RoO elasticities are available at present. 
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4.1.1 The Gravity Equation  
 
The gravity equation has become in the last decades one of the most popular empirical 
devices to analyze trade flows. In words of Anderson (2010) it has become one of the most 
successful empirical models in economics, ordering remarkably well the enormous observed 
variation in economic interaction across space in both trade and factor movements. 
Consequently, it has been used to control for practically any factor potentially influencing 
trade flows.  
In its EDVLF IRUP WKH JUDYLW\ PRGHO SUHGLFWV ELODWHUDO WUDGHDV D IXQFWLRQ RI WZR FRXQWULHV·
mass and distance. The economic mass of the countries reflects potential supply and demand 
whereas distance reflects resistance to trade. Since economic mass and distance cannot be 
alone considered to explain bilateral trade flows, the gravity model has been completed by a 
myriad of factors that are thought to influence bilateral trade. These factors can range from 
policy decisions to natural forces. Among others, the literature includes studies about the use 
of a common currency, formation of regional trade agreements, language, presence of 
networks and many more. 59   
The original gravity equation, work of Timbergen (1962), was challenged for its weak 
theoretical foundation. 60  Many authors have since provided the necessary theoretical 
support to the gravity equation. The best known works are those of Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Deardorff (1995). However, still today virtually every variable 
included in the gravity model is subject to discussion.  
Two main reasons stand out to place the gravity model as the preferred method of 
estimation in the context of this study. First, the gravity equation provides a relatively 
acceptable theoretical framework for the use of RoO. In virtually every theoretical 
contribution to the gravity equation, distance is introduced as a proxy for costs.61 In other 
words, the gravity equation explains bilateral trade based on the potential supply and 
GHPDQG FRXQWULHV· *'3V DV ZHOO as on the restriction to trade between both countries. 
Though distance may be a good proxy for costs, it is not necessarily the only one. Factors like 
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 See Greenaway and Milner (2002) for a review of different applications of the gravity model in the context of 
FTAs. 
60
 Anderson (1979) 
61
 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for an extended discussion on this topic. 
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sharing a common currency or speaking the same language are usually included in the 
gravity equation in this spirit (Anderson, 2010). The implications of this theoretical 
observation is that virtually any factor into the gravity equation, as long as it has the 
potential to affect the costs of trading between both countries. Several authors have found 
the connection of policy variables with trade costs sufficiently sound, such as Linemann and 
Verbruggen (2002), who analyze the impact of tariffs on trade, Frankel et al. (1995), who look 
at the effect of RTAs or Wagner et al. (2002), for whom common language influences trade 
volumes. 
While some of the factors included in the literature may have had weak implications 
regarding the trade costs between to countries, the potential effect of RoO on costs has been 
extensively documented in the theory, as described in Chapter 2.62 The impact of RoO on 
costs seems to guarantee sufficient theoretical support for the use of a gravity model in this 
context. 
A second crucial reason for choosing gravity modeling as the preferred framework is its 
good empirical fit, as has been documented extensively in the past.63 Such good empirical 
performance led economists, such as Anderson (2010) WR´EHOLHYH WKDW WKHJUDYLW\HTXDWLRQ
PXVW KDYH VRPH XQGHUO\LQJ WKHRU\µ :KLOH WUDFLQJ WKH OLQN ZLWK WKHRU\ LV LPSRUWDQW WR
ensure the validity of the results, the main contribution of this study is essentially empirical, 
which prompts the use of one the most well adapted empirical tools.  
Once the gravity model has been indicated as the preferred methodological framework, there 
are a number of issues that need careful theoretical consideration. First, one of the main goals 
of this thesis is to establish a generalized result with regards to the impact of RoO on trade. It 
therefore needs to look at a representative sample of trade, which includes both North-South 
as well as North-North trade flows. The composition and the determinants of trade between 
both types of flows are likely to be different. On one hand, North-South trade is thought of 
consisting mostly of homogeneous goods, driven by comparative advantage factors between 
countries; on the other hand, North-North trade is made up mainly of intra-industry 
heterogeneous goods. Considering the different nature of trade object of the present study, it 
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 See Yamarik and Gosh (2005) for a robustness check of some of the usual variables included in gravity 
models. 
63
 Feenstra (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Evenett and Keller (1998) are among the examples of 
well-known works that have acknowledged the good fit of the gravity equation. 
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needs to be asserted whether the gravity model provides a correct theoretical framework for 
such analysis.  
Second, by definition, it is imperative that in order to conduct a study on product-specific, 
the model is evaluated at disaggregated level, in particular at the same level as the rules of 
origin are set. The theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model ought to be analyzed so as 
to confirm whether it is suitable for disaggregate data analysis.  
Third, in order to expand the scope of the study, the intention is to look at the impact of the 
rules both for the exporter and the importer. Again, theory behind the determinants of 
gravity modeling is explored to assess if such analysis can be undertaken on a theoretical 
sound manner. 
Finally, the theoretical justification of the model build-up concludes with a discussion about 
the unobserved determinants of trade included in the gravity model which need to be taken 
into account in order to correctly specify the equation. It turns out that such a discussion 
prompts the use of panel data as opposed to cross-section as the correct way of conducting 
the analysis. 
This section provides a close look to the gravity equation in order to confirm the theoretical 
validity of an analysis under such parameters.  
 
4.1.1.1.  Gravity for North-South and North-North trade 
Puzzled by the good fit of an econometric device that had no theoretical underpinnings, 
trade economists started an attempt to link this success to different theories of trade; their 
intention being to explain what the main forces behind the gravity equation were. Once this 
question is established, it can be assessed whether the gravity equation is better equipped to 
predict North-South trade, more consistent with trade in homogeneous goods or North-
North trade in differentiated products. The implication is that if just one theory is found to 
be responsible for the success of the gravity equation, the use of this device to calculate trade 
flows that are not consistent with such theory can be potentially flawed.  
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Early theoretical work on the gravity relied purely on product differentiation, which was 
assumed, as in Anderson (1979) or Bergstrand (1985), where products were consumed based 
on country differences (i.e. Armington assumption). Further theoretical work, exemplified by 
the contributions of Helpman (1987) and more particularly Bergstrand (1989) continued to 
trace the derivation of the gravity model to other sources of product differentiation, this time 
caused by increasing returns to scale. Whatever the determinant of the differentiation, this 
leads countries to perfectly specialize in the production of one good (or variety). When 
production is perfectly specialized, countries are the only suppliers of each good, which 
means that the share of imports of country i from country j of product k equals total imports 
of country i of product k from the world. When production is added to all sectors, this leads 
to countries to import its share of world income: 
w
ji
ij Y
YY
M      (4.1) 
which is the general form of the gravity equation, or the frictionless gravity model.64 It has 
been argued that this equation has nothing to say about factor proportion or comparative 
advantage, as noted by Augier et al. (2004). However, Evenett and Keller (1998) point out 
that the driving force behind equation (4.1) is not product differentiation per se but complete 
specialization; large differences in factor proportions could also lead to perfect specialization 
and hence to the gravity equation above. This finding was exploited by Deardorff (1995), 
who derived the gravity equation after a Hecksher-Ohlin model of differences in factor 
SURSRUWLRQV IRUKRPRJHQHRXVJRRGV+LVPRGHO FRQVLGHUVD´SRROµRIH[SRUWV IURPZKHUH
consumers randomly obtain their imports. If consumers have identical and homothetic 
preferences then equation (4.1) above holds as they all consume the same share of each 
product. If preferences are dissimilar, then countries with larger capital endowments will 
over consume (and overproduce) capital abundant goods. The key to his explanation is that 
´H[SRUWVµ WR LWVHOI PXVW be considered and hence any export above the value predicted in 
equation (4.1) would be absorbed by each country itself. In fact, Bergstrand (1989) had 
previously attempted to reconcile both inter and intra-industry determinants of trade by 
incorporating increasing returns to scale into a two model two factor two good economy, 
where each industry had different factors of production. His link to the H-O came with the 
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 The derivation of the proper gravity equation with the presence of distance is dealt with in several ways which are not 
relevant for the discussion at hand. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a survey of such methods.  
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introduction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita into the equation which he viewed 
as a proxy of the capital to labor ratio.  
Feenstra et al (1998) note that most theoretical explanations of the gravity model arise from 
specialization which is consistent for differentiated goods but not for homogeneous goods. 
The authors generate a gravity equation that motivates trade in homogeneous goods using a 
PRGHO RI ´UHFLSURFDO GXPSLQJµ ZKHUH WKH ILUPV VHOO WKH &RXUQRW³Nash homogeneous 
JRRGVLQHDFKRWKHU·VPDUNHWVZKHQPDUJLQDOUHYHQXHH[FHHGVPDUJLQDOFRVW 7KHDXWKRUV
conclude that the theoretical foundations to the gravity equation are actually quite general 
and can also be used to derive the model for homogeneous goods. The theoretical 
opaqueness of homogeneous goods in the gravity equation is further cleared by Eaton and 
Kortum (2002), who develop a gravity model for trade in homogeneous goods under 
Ricardian comparative advantage. In their model, goods are defined independently of the 
countries, with specialization being governed by comparative advantage. The importing 
country will buy depending on price, which in turn depends on technology and distance. 
(DFK FRXQWU\·V HIILFLHQF\ RQ JRRG g LV UDQGRPO\ REWDLQHG IURP HDFK FRXQWU\·V VSHFLILF
Frechet distribution function. This depends on the state of technology and the dispersion of 
productivity within goods, which measures the relative efficiency within that country. Hence 
the extent of the of the comparative advantage. On this model, Harrigan (2001) comments 
that the authors had elegantly generated the gravity equation for trade in homogeneous 
goods and that it worked for trade between developing countries.  
Further contributions to the theoretical readiness of the gravity equation to predict actual 
WUDGHIORZVLQWRGD\·VZRUOGFRPHVZLWKWKHwork of Evenett and Keller (1998) and Haveman 
and Hummels (2004), who obtain and test the validity of the equation for models of 
imperfect specialization trade in both differentiated and homogeneous goods. Evenett and 
Keller (1998) derive what they call an Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS)/unicone H-O model 
of imperfect specialization in which each country produces both a differentiated and a 
homogeneous good. In their model, iJ UHSUHVHQWVFRXQWU\·Vi share of the homogeneous good 
on GDP, )/( iixii ZXpZ  J , where Z is the homogeneous good and X the differentiated 
one. With homothetic preferences country j will import from i LWVVKDUHRIWKHZRUOG·V*'3
which, together with balanced trade means that country  i·VLPSRUWVIURPj are given by: 
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M )1(      (4.2) 
where O is the share of the trade homogeneous goods and is common to all countries. The 
authors then test the data on differently generated gravity models in order to assess which 
theory can be accounted responsible for the success of the equation and find support for the 
imperfect specialization model due to differences in factor proportions. Haveman and 
Hummels (2004) derive a model of imperfect specialization (although they do so after what 
they call a statistical relationship and not as a specific prediction about bilateral trade). They 
test their model on disaggregated trade data and conclude that they are not inclined to 
consider imperfect specialization as the only determinant of the gravity equation. However, 
they recognize its important contribution to its success, in particular due to the presence of 
zeroes in the data, which complete specialization models have difficulties in justifying.  
As mentioned above, it has been proven that virtually any trade theory, and even 
combinations thereof can generate the gravity equation. Empirically, the results also provide 
evidence that the gravity equation can be used to explain different motivations for trade. 
Other than the contributions mentioned in the paragraph above, two other widely-quoted 
studies throw light in this respect. The first one is that of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) 
who find that the gravity model based on IRS worked as well on trade flows between 
countries with low shares of intra-industry trade as it did on flows between countries with 
high shares, which implies that the gravity equation can be well-suited not only for North-
North trade with high levels of Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) but also for North-South trade on 
heterogeneous goods. The second one is that of Rauch (1999), who tested the gravity 
equation on three different sets of commodities, organized exchange, referenced price (both 
of which are homogeneous goods) and differentiated products. The author finds that the 
gravity coefficients are different for the three groups although this difference is small in 
absolute magnitude, lending support to the fact that the gravity equation is consistent with 
different trade theories. Finally, Feenstra et al (2001) undertake a study of the entry barriers 
for different types of goods. They use the same product classification as Rauch (1999) and 
like him, they find evidence for differences in the three product categories but again, they 
conclude by stating that the gravity equation is consistent for both types of goods.  
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To sum up, although there may be some differences in the coefficients of different types of 
products, both theory and practice agree on the good fit of the gravity equation as a tool to 
examine trade flows motivated by alternative trade theories and compatible with either 
North-North and North-South trade. At the same time, differences in the coefficients for both 
homogeneous and differentiated products suggest an interesting avenue for possible 
disparities of the impact of rules of origin on them. 
4.1.1.2. Gravity for disaggregate trade 
Most econometric studies exploring the issue of RoO are performed at an aggregate level. 
There are a number of reasons that account for this circumstance. On the empirical side, the 
majority of the work involving RoO has been predominantly interested on the effect of a 
particular RoO regime as a whole on aggregate trade, or on the impact that a particular 
regime-wide provision, such as cumulation, may have on a given set of products. 
Theoretically, early justifications for the gravity model, such as Anderson (1979), involved 
WKH XVH RI ´$UPLQJWRQµ W\SH DVVXPSWLRQV ZKHUHE\ SURGXFWV ZKHUH GLIIHUHQWLDWHG E\
country of origin only, consistent with aggregate trade. More recently, it has been argued 
that the gravity model is not suited for sectoral-level analysis because on its standard form it 
does not take into account the determinants of comparative advantage, which are needed to 
explain trade at the sectoral level (Augier et al. 2004). Also Molinari (2003) notes that it is 
reasonable to expect that a country will export more of the good intense in the factor which 
the country is relatively abundant on. This may in principle cause an endogeneity problem 
when measuring trade at disaggregated levels. Finally, North-South trade has traditionally 
been thought of consisting basically of inter-industry trade on perfectly specialized 
homogenous goods, thus better grasped by aggregate variables.  
 However, as shown in the section above, the myriad of theoretical studies behind the 
gravity model provide enough justification for different trade theories to be behind the 
success of the gravity equation and hence, for a comfortable use of disaggregated variables. 
The conviction highlighted above that the determinants of comparative advantage are not 
included in the standard gravity model is refuted by Eaton and Kortum (2002). As long as 
product differentiation comes as a result of other factors than country of origin, the gravity 
equation becomes compatible with the disaggregated data, and such is the case in the 
theoretical formulations of Deardorff (1995) or Bergstrand (1989), described earlier. 
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In fact, virtually every theory-based gravity model is generated from sectoral (or product) 
level and then aggregated to total trade, independently of the theory they are obtained from. 
,Q'HDUGRUII·V 5) model of perfect specialization of factor proportions, countries spend 
fraction kE of their incomes on good k DQGFRXQWU\·Vj consumption of this good is given by 
kjkjk pYc /E . Matching j·VFRQVXPStion with country i·VFRQWULEXWLRQWRZRUOGRXWSXWRI
good k ikJ leads to total j·VLPSRUWVIURPi to be given by:  
¦ ¦  
k k
jkikijkkij YcpT EJ ,    (4.3) 
which includes the share of j·VWRWDO*'3VSHQWRQHDFKJRRGk. Only when aggregating over 
all goods, the share kE = 1 and total GDP is reached.  
7KHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQFDQEHUHDFKHGORRNLQJDW$QGHUVRQ·VGHULYDWLRQRIWKHJUDYLW\
model under the assumptions of trade separability and Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) preferences, the total exports from i to j are given by: 65   
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where kG is the elasticity of substitution among brands, kijp is the price charged in i for 
exports to j and kjP is a CES price index. From here, the author derives the gravity equation 
to be: 
(...)k
k
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k
jk
ij Y
YE
X  66    (4.5) 
where as in the example of Deardorff (1995) the relevant output variable is the sectoral 
output. Again, it only matches total GDP when aggregated over all ks.  As Anderson  and 
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 Trade separability refers to the fact that the allocation of production and consumption within a country ikY and ikE is 
separable from the allocation of trade across countries. This assumption is obtained from separable preferences and 
technology. According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) under this assumption, the gravity model can be obtained no 
matter what further assumptions are made about the production function, technology, competition or specialization.  
66
 The term in brackets is not relevant for the present discussion. 
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van Wincoop (2004) note, only when considering a one-sector economy can the subscript for 
the good be dropped. This assumption has been made in several gravity derivations, such as 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989) or Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) although it is clearly an unreal 
one.  
The implication of this aspect of the gravity equation is that at the moment of considering the 
estimation of sectoral exports/imports, the proper specification of the gravity model requires 
sectoral size variables. Therefore, one point of concern must be drawn here with regards to 
the size variables incorporated in gravity models on disaggregated trade. Usually, total 
importer or exporter GDP are the gravity variables which stand in the gravity equation as a 
SUR[\RIWKHFRXQWULHV·VL]HYet, when performing the study at the industry level, it may be 
advisable to proxy industry size, rather than country. The economic issue behind this 
concern is exemplified by Baldwin et al (2005) who says that:  
´:KHQ XVLQJ VHFWRUDO WUDGH GDWD KRZHYHU WKH PDSSLQJ EHWZHHQ / >HQGRZPHQW RI IDFWRUV@ DQG (
>H[SHQGLWXUHRQLPSRUWV@DQG*'3VLV OHVVFOHDU2QWKHLPSRUWHU·VVLGHRQHFDQWKLQNRIXVLQJWKH
FRUUHVSRQGLQJVHFWRU·VJURVVYDOXHDGGHG+RZHYHU, the import demand for, say, chemicals arises from 
many sectors other than the chemicals sector. On the export side, one can think of using sectoral 
production as a proxy for the number of varieties, but sector production data is difficult to get for long 
time periods and a broad sample of countries. Moreover, such sectoral value added measures are 
W\SLFDOO\IUDXJKWZLWKPDQ\PHDVXUHPHQWSUREOHPVµ 
However, for convenience, or under the assumption that total GDP could be a good proxy of 
sectoral GDP, several authors have used total GDP. For instance, Rauch (1999) estimates the 
impact of proximity and common language on different types of commodities using the 
classical aggregate proxies, such as GDP both for the importer and the exporter, as his study 
looks at bilateral trade, rather than just exports or imports. Feenstra et al. (1998), Evenett and 
Keller (1998) and Portugal-Pérez (2008) also use aggregate size variables on sectoral trade 
flows in the usual gravity specification.  
Examples of sectoral data are less common in the literature. Augier et al (2004) make use of 
sectoral variables when establishing a model to assess the effect of cumulation on the textile 
sector. They use total production of textiles in the exporting country as the proxy of the 
supply variables and they use total apparent consumption of textiles in the demanding 
country, represented by: 
jjjl XMQE      (4.6) 
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where jQ  is total production in textiles, jM is textile imports and jX  is textile exports. 
Baldwin et al. (2005) perform an exercise using both aggregate and sectoral variables. For the 
sectoral variables, they use value added per sector deflated by overall manufacturing 
producer prices for the exporter, and the same measure of apparent consumption described 
above for the importer. 
It can then be concluded that the use of disaggregated trade data on gravity models is not 
only possible, but ensures a more solid theoretical foundation. However, its use comes at the 
price of complicating the size variables, which should be also taken at sectoral level.  
4.1.1.3. Exports, imports and total trade 
A final point must be made regarding the use of exports, imports or total trade. Theoretical 
gravity models have been derived for both exports and imports, as well as for total trade. In 
fact, this issue has not seemed to spark strong debate in the literature. Examples of gravity 
models generated for exports are those of Bergstrand (1985, 1989) or Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004). For imports, Anderson (1979) or Deardorff (1995) are among the most 
quoted examples, whereas Rauch (1999) derives it for bilateral total trade. Indeed, as it 
should be the case both theoretically and in practice, the accounting identity of balanced 
trade guarantees the equality of both flows.  
One of the few concerns about possible differences in the treatment of either flow is 
presented by Baldwin et al (2005), for whom import data is more reliable due to exporter 
incentives to under-calculate their figures for tax purposes.  However, being the intention of 
this study to calculate the impact of rules of origin, it seems reasonable to perform the study 
IURPERWKWKHLPSRUWHU·VDQGWKHH[SRUWHU·VVLGHDVZHOODVRQWRWDOWUDGH 
4.1.1.4. A Justification for Panel Data 
A final consideration about the theoretical aspects of the gravity equation involves the 
treatment of prices in the model. Intuitively, it may seem logical that prices can influence 
trade flows between countries. Nevertheless, economists tended to disregard them due to 
data constraints, for the sake of simplicity or based on arguable assumptions. Among those 
assumptions which neglect the introduction of prices there is perfect substitutability, no 
transport costs or no tariffs. In summary, free trade.  
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Therefore, early years of gravity modeling did not take into account the introduction of 
prices in the equation. The paper that all of a sudden triggered the discussion on prices was 
McCallum (1995) on the trade between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. The author 
estimates the border effects for Canada and the U.S. in their bilateral trade. His results are 
striking since he estimates a border effect 22 times larger for Canada than for the U.S. In the 
light of this, many economists challenged the results observed by McCallum67.  
7KHLUPDLQFULWLFLVPZDVPDGHRQWKHJURXQGVRI0F&DOOXP·VHTXDWLRQZKLFKGLGQRWWDNH
into account price differentials between both countries. He assumed free trade, implying no 
costs for trade. Yet, selling in another country must necessarily be more expensive if we bear 
in mind, among other elements, tariffs and transport costs. When these variables are 
included, trade is no longer costless, so prices between countries differ. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) intensely defend the use of prices. They argue that  prices 
are one of the building blocks of the supply and demand functions of the gravity equation. 
Consequently, they introduce a multilateral resistance term which depends on trade barriers 
with all the partner countries. These barriers are based on transport costs and other ones, 
such as information costs, that cause domestic prices to be cheaper than imports and these, in 
turn, to differ between themselves. When a model that includes price variables is estimated, 
the border effect, though still large, is greatly reduced. When including this multilateral 
trade resistance index, the gravity equation proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) 
takes the form 
> @ ijjiijij
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   (4.7) 
where V is the elasticity of substitution between all goods. It enters the equation in a 
multiplicative form with the trade cost parameters U and b and is therefore not 
identified. ijd is the distance between trading partners. ijG is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one when trade is intra-region/country trade and zero when takes place inter 
regional/country. iP  and jP  are the multilateral trade resistance indices of the importer and 
the exporter. They are equal to 
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 See Feenstra (2002), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Anderson and van Wincoop (2001), Havemann  and Hummels (2004) 
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where ip is the consumer price index in country i , ijt is the trade cost between countries 
i and j  
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) offer another way of addressing the price issue. They also reckon 
that prices play a role for exporters and importers. Consumers buy from the cheapest source 
and the producer does not face the same costs when exporting to every country. The 
difference of their approach and that of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) is the 
introduction of a price variable using price indices. As a result, their equation introduces 
GDP deflators to proxy the barriers to trade for both the demand and the supply side.  
Feenstra (2002) builds on the approaches of previous studies. He presents a very similar 
criticism to McCallum (1995) as that of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) (he even considers 
their way of solving the problem as almost the ideal). Feenstra (2002) argues that the 
conclusions attained by McCallum (1995) are highly biased because of the omission of price 
variables in the equation. He asserts that in the presence of border effects (this is, always in 
international trade), prices are not anymore the same across countries. This conviction makes 
clear the fact that he must introduce prices in the equation. His problem then is not whether 
to include prices or not but how to do so. He compares the approaches of Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2001) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and introduces a new one with fixed effects, 
which account for unobserved effects, including the price effects. He concludes that the best 
way to do it is by introducing fixed effects because even though Anderson and van 
:LQFRRS·V(2001) approach may be slightly more accurate, the gain is marginal compared to 
the computational easiness of the fixed effects method. Hence, his proposed gravity looks 
like 
    ijiiiiijijji ij dYYX HVGEGEGJD  11 2211     (4.9) 
where i1G takes the value of one if region i is the exporter and zero otherwise, whereas 
i
2G takes the value of one if region i is the importer and zero otherwise. Both variables 
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account then for the exporter and importer fixed effects. This takes Feenstra to interpret the 
coefficients on these variables as   11  VE ii P  and   12  VE ji P , the same as the multilateral 
trade resistance terms of Anderson and van Wincoop.  
This procedure seems to have gained popularity among economists and many others have 
proposed a similar equation including fixed effects. 68 It can be considered that this way of 
dealing with price effects is probably the most recommendable one. 
The problem arises now in how to estimate a fixed effects model in the presence of time-
invariant variables. Several authors have addressed this issue in recent times and they 
propose a number of different solutions.  
Wagner, Head and Ries (2002) estimate the impact of migration on trade flows using a model 
in which they account for fixed effects by introducing country dummies. In a similar way 
Matyas (1997), follows a three-way fixed effects estimation method, assigning a specific effect 
to time, exporter and importer. These dummy variables should capture all the unobservable 
fixed effects that are specific to each exporting and importing country and which, in its 
absence, will bias the results. Price variations affecting trade are comprised in these 
unobservable effects. 
Cheng and Wall (2004) propose a two-stage regression by which they keep the within-
residuals from the first regression and run them on the time-invariant variables in a second 
step. The authors present a two-way fixed effect model (importer and exporter), allowing 
bilateral flows to differ depending on the direction. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman 
(2003) use the same approach when looking at MERCOSUR-EU trade flows.  
4.2. The equation 
Four main issues stem from the discussion in the previous section: i) the gravity equation can 
be the benchmark for different patterns of trade; ii) its good fit in the presence of 
disaggregated data; iii) its equivalence for exports, imports and total trade; and iv), the 
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 See Hillberry and Hummels (2003), Haveman and Hummels (2004) and Redding and Venables (2000) 
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desirability to use panel data. In view of these, the basic gravity equation (1.2) is transformed 
and augmented by the policy variables of interest to take the following general form: 
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 (4.10) 
where kijtTF  are the flows (total trade, exports or imports, as the case may be) between 
reporter i and partner j in product k and period t; kitX are kjtX DUHWRWDOUHSRUWHU·VDQGWRWDO
SDUWQHU·VH[SRUWVWRWKHZRUOGRISURGXFWk in time t; kitM  and kjtM  are total reporWHU·VDQG
WRWDOUHSRUWHU·VLPSRUWVIURPWKHZRUOGRISURGXFWk in time t; ijd is the geographical distance 
between reporter i and partner j; ijD are the gravity-type variables for specific circumstances 
between reporter and partner, in this case common language and contiguity; kijJ and ij] are 
the key variables of interest, kijJ representing the product specific rules of origin and ij] , the 
regime-wide provisions;¦
 
I
i
i
1
G and ¦
 
J
j
j
1
I are the reporter and partner country specific fixed 
effects, respectively and ¦
 
T
t
t
1
F are the time effects; and ijtH  is the error term.69 
4.2.1 Variable Specific Issues 
In light of the discussion in section 4.1.1 about the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity 
equation, two crucial clarifications on the variables introduced in equation (4.10) ought to be 
done.  
First, as explained in the theory, the correct specification of a gravity model using 
disaggregated data should not consider GDP as size variable. Indeed, considering the 
dependant variables are product-level trade flows, adding an aggregate measure as size 
variable, such as GDP does not necessarily provide useful information, as one country may 
not produce at all any given product due to several factors other than its size. Consequently, 
                                                     
 
69
 A detailed explanation of the issues incidental to each variable is provided in Section IV.3.1 below 
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one needs to substitute GDP for other size variables at product level. Two strategies were 
considered to control for size. First, adding a sector specific dummy variable, for each 
Harmonized System (HS) chapter. However, as discussed below, collinearity is a recurrent 
concern throughout the study and adding more dummy variables increased substantially the 
problems related to it. In addition, although section variables may add more information 
than aggregate GDP, they still lay at a superior level compared to products. The second 
strategy was to substitute GDP by total exports to the world of a specific product and total 
imports from the world of that same product. The reasoning is simple, instead of trade 
between two countries being a function of their aggregate size and their distance, trade 
between two countries in a specific product must be a function of their total exports and total 
LPSRUWV RI WKDW SURGXFW DQG WKH GLVWDQFH EHWZHHQ WKHP ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH ´SXVKµ DQG
´SXOOµPHDVXUHVDUHWRWDOH[SRUWVDQGWRWDO LPSRUWVWRDQGIURPWKHZRUOGRIHDFKSURGXFW
respectively. Therefore, instead of the usual GDP variable for proxying size, total exports 
kitX ( kjtX ) and total imports kitM .( kjtM ) of product k are included. This specification is in 
line with that of Cadot and de Melo (2007).  
Secondly, the purpose of this study is to contribute with as much information as possible 
about rules of origin, i.e. assessing whether the rules affect in the same way exports and 
imports, as well as showing in which way they promote or hamper global trade. Therefore, 
the study is conducted for total trade, exports and imports. In the present context, trade 
flows ( kijtTF ) in equation (4.10) is substituted by either total trade, exports or imports. 
Numerically, kijtkijtkijtkijt IETTTF   , where kijtE is exports of product k between reporter 
i and partner j in time t , kijtI  is the equivalent for imports and kijtTT for total trade. 
Consequently, equation (4.10) is transformed in three different equations, one for total trade, 
one for imports, and one for exports. When the analysis includes total exports (when looking 
either at total trade or at exports), K takes the value of 1 and zero otherwise, whereas in the 
case of imports, O  takes the value of 1 and zero otherwise. 
Therefore, when total trade is the subject of study equation (4.10) becomes:  
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   (4.10-a) 
when only exports are considered, equation (4.10) becomes 
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 (4.10-b) 
and, in the case of just imports,  
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  (4.10-c) 
As exemplified in equations (4.10-a) through (4.10-c), total exports and total imports vary 
depending on whether the focus lies on exports, or imports, or both. The change in the order 
of the subscripts i and j in equations (4.10-b) and (4.10-c) is not coincidental. The explanation 
demands particular attention. Take the case where only exports are considered (equation 
4.10-b). In this scenario, the size variable, total exports kitX  and total imports kjtM are 
respectively, total exports to the world of reporting country i for product k, and total imports 
from the world of the partner country j for that same product k. However, when imports are 
the dependant variable (equation 4.10-c), total exports kjtX are total exports to the world of 
partner country j of product k, and total imports kitM are total imports from the world of 
reporting country i of product k.  
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4.2.2 Modeling Rules of Origin 
The main goal of this thesis is to grasp the trade effects of rules of origin. The way in which 
RoO are modeled is thus of crucial importance, more so in view of the intrinsic complexity of 
the rules. The preferred way to obtain the impact on trade of the rules in this study is to code 
each product specific RoO and then introduce through a dummy variable in the gravity 
equation for which the value of the coefficient can subsequently be estimated. 
Additional clarifications about the methodology used to estimate the trade effect of the rules 
relate to the type of approach used. In view of the complexity of the rules, four different 
approaches are considered in order to ensure their complete analysis. As detailed in Chapter 
3, product-specific RoO may adopt many different forms. The four PDLQ ´IDPLOLHVµ RI
existing RoO (Regional Value Content (RVC), Change in Tariff Classification (CTC), 
Technical Test (TT) and Wholly Obtained (WO)) are often combined among themselves, 
either providing an alternative between two or more rules or demanding the fulfillment of 
more than one. In addition, exceptions to the specific rule applicable to one product are 
commonplace. When more than one rule is combined for a single product, it becomes 
impossible to identify which of them was fulfilled. Therefore, devising the proper method of 
estimation becomes one of the single most important contributions of this study.  
Four different methods are considered, each of them with its own strengths and weaknesses, 
as described below. In the context of the estimated equations (4.10-a) through (4.10-c) specific 
rules of origin are represented by kijJ  and regime-wide provisions by ij] . 
One important consideration is that each method of estimation requires different type of 
information regarding RoO and hence, the way of coding the rules differs, although they all 
begin from the same starting point. Specific rules of origin are combinations of the different 
types of RoO (CC, CTH, CTS, RVC, RVCEU, TT and WO). Therefore, every rule can be split 
into each of these components.70 Exceptions to the general rule are sometimes found (EXC). 
Additionally, rules can either complement (COMB) each other or be provided as an 
alternative (ALT). In view of these considerations, every rule includes one or more of the 
following ten aspects: CC, CTH, CTS, RVC, RVCEU, TT, WO, COMB, ALT, EXC. A random 
number from one (CC) to zero (EXC) is then assigned to each of them, as shown in Table 4.9. 
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 CC, CTH and CTS are usually considered to be part of the Change in Tariff Classification family (CTC), 
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Table 4.1. Variables modeling Specific Rules of Origin 
 
Rule Code Number Assigned Description 
CC 1 Change in Chapter 
CTH 2 Change in Tariff Heading 
CTS 3 Change in Tariff Subheading 
RVC 4 Regional Value Content 
RVCEU 5 Specific case of Regional Value Content 
TT 6 Technical Test 
WO 7 Wholly Obtained 
COMB 8 Combination of Rules 
ALT 9 Alternative Rules 
EXC 
0 Exception to a change in tariff 
classification 
The four different methods of estimation are explained as follows: 
Method 1: In this first approach, kijJ  includes all possible interactions of rules that may occur 
in the flow of product k between countries i and j. This means that kijJ  is decomposed in 
Change in Chapter (CC), Change in Tariff Heading (CTH), Change in Tariff Subheading 
(CTS), Regional Value Content, Regional Value Content ² Paneuro Type (RVCEU), Technical 
Test, Wholly Obtained (WO), Combination of Rules (COMB), Alternative between rules 
(ALT) and Exceptions to any type of Tariff Classification (EXC). Numerically, it means that:  
kijkijkijkijkijkijkijkijkijkijkij EXCALTCOMBWOTTRVCEURVCCTSCTHCC  J
    (4.11) 
Each of the ten variables in equation (4.11) (the same as in Table 4.9) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one when they are present and zero otherwise.  
The different types of specific rules of origin have been described in Chapter 3. However, 
some clarifications must be made. The category RVC includes both rules that are defined as a 
requisite for a minimum amount of value being incorporated nationally into a product as 
well as rules that set a maximum limit of foreign value in a product. These two rules are 
spelled reversely, although the spirit of the rule remains the same, i.e. requiring a certain 
percentage of the total value of the product to be included in the country of origin. The rule 
tagged RVCEU is a particular case of RVC used exclusively in EU agreements whereby they 
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request a particular material included in a product not to surpass a certain threshold. 
Therefore, it is an RVC-type of rule as it sets a maximum limit in terms of value but it differs 
from traditional RVC in that it does not apply to the entire product but to part of it.  
An important aspect of equation (4.11) is that a specific rule may require a product to comply 
with a combination of two or more rules in order to confer origin. In such cases, the variable 
COMB is included. Accordingly, if the rule offers the possibility to choose between two 
different rules, ALT takes the value of one. Finally, EXC refers to the instances when a 
change of tariff classification with exceptions is required. The inclusion of these three 
variables represents an attempt to grasp the implication of including more than one specific 
rule of origin in the requirements to confer origin.  
The fact that rules are combined among themselves, or provided as alternative, allows that 
the sum of these dummy variables does not necessarily add to one. In fact, it is more 
common to find alternative/combinations of rules than to find product which are subject to 
exclusively one rule. The following example shows how rules are modeled using this 
approach. Take the following rule for tariff subheading 2810.10 in the US-Chile Agreement. 
Example 1 
 
This type of rule provides an alternative between a change in chapter with exception, or a 
change in subheading with exception combined with a regional value content requirement. 
In other words, the elements that are present in this rule are: CC, CTS, RVC, COMB, ALT 
and EXC. Consequently, the specific rule for such product would be coded with CC=1, 
CTS=1, RVC=1, COMB=1, ALT=1 and EXC=1, and zero the remainder variables.  
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The strengths of this method rely on its comprehensiveness, as it takes into account each 
possible combination of rules. Thus, it offers information about the interactions between 
every type. However, it presents the problem of identifying under which rule the product 
gains originating status, which is impossible with the data available.  
Method 2: The second approach used to assess the impact of the specific rules relies on those 
products that are only subject to one type of rule, without combinations, alternatives or 
exceptions. In such way, CC, CTS, CTH, RVC, RVCEU, TT and WO are mutually exclusive 
and hence kijJ¦ = 1. Numerically:  
1  kijkijkijkijkijkijkijkij WOTTRVCEURVCCTSCTHCCJ     (4.12) 
Note that COMB, ALT and EXC have been dropped as these three variables only come into 
play when there are combinations of rules, which are, by choice discarded from this method. 
Hence, for this approach, only products with one individual rule are considered, while all 
other products are dropped from the sample. Consequently, the rule presented in Example 1 
above is not considered in this method, as it involves interaction of more than one rule. 
Instead, only rules of the following type are considered:  
Example 2 
 
Example 3 
 
The rule listed in Example 2 is taken to be a change in chapter (CC) and the rule in Example 3 
a wholly obtained rule (WO). As it can be seen, these rules are individual and are not 
combined/given as alternative with any other rule. As such, CC would equal one in 
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Example 2, and all other types of rules would equal zero whereas in Example 3, WO would 
be the only that would take the value of one.  
The main strength of this method is that it allows direct comparison between the types of 
rules subject of study as it individualizes the effect of each of them. On the other hand, it fails 
to provide information about interactions of rules and cannot be used to answer questions 
relating the trade impact of providing an alternative rule, for instance.  
Method 3: The third approach is an extension of the second in which the specific rules are 
JURXSHGLQ´IDPLOLHVµ7KHPDLQIRXUIDPLOLHVRIUXOHVDUHWKRVHUHTXLULQJDFKDQJHLQWDULII
classification, value content requirement, a technical test or the product being wholly 
obtained. Therefore, CC, CTS and CTH are grouped in one category, Change in Tariff 
Classification (CTC). Hence, the variables now become CTC, RVC, TT and WO, and again 
kijJ¦ = 1. Equation 4.12 is now transformed into: 
1  kijkijkijkijkij WOTTRVCCTCJ     (4.13) 
The motivation to group the rules in families is to follow traditional literature on rules of 
origin, which usually classifies rules in those four families. The rule presented in Example 2 
above is now considered CTC and the rule in Example 3 retains its WO classification.  
Method 3 presents the same strengths and limitations as Method 2, i.e. it has the advantage 
of isolating the effect of individual rules but it ignores the effect of including combinations, 
alternatives or exceptions. 
Method 4: Finally, the fourth approach assigns a different value to each possible combination 
of rules found in origin protocols. Interactions of the four main families of rules described 
above result in 37 different types of rules. In other words, protocols of origin are studied and 
each possible combination of rule is assigned a different dummy variable. In this manner, 
kijJ QRZEHFRPHV55«5DVWKHUHDUHSRVVLEOHFRPELQDWLRQVRI rules. Numerically: 
¦
 
 
37
1f
fkij RJ ,     (4.14) 
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and again kijJ¦ =1. The 37 different types of rules are described in Table 4.2 
Codification of rules according to this method requires additional transformations, as 
follows. According to the random numbers assigned in Table 4.1, if a rule requires a simple 
&7+WKDWUXOHLVFRGHGZLWK´µ,IDUXOHUHTXLUHVD&76FRPELQHGZLWKD59&
WKDWUXOHLVFRGHGZLWK´µ2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLIWKHUXOHSURYLGHGWKH59&UHTXLrement 
DVDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKH&76WKHUXOHZRXOGKDYHEHHQFRGHGDV´µ2QFHWKHZULWWHQ
rules are translated into numbers, introducing them into the equation is straightforward. The 
scrutiny of the origin protocols showed 79 different combinations of rules. These rules are 
then numbered from 1 to 79, and a dummy variable is easily created for each of them. 71 
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 It must be noted that CC, CTH and CTS are all three grouped as CTC. When considered independently, the 
number of possible combinations of rules raises from 37 to 79. This increased the problem of outliers as there 
were many rules with very low frequencies.  
 102 
Table 4.2. Description of the different combination of RoO 
 
Rule Number Description 
R1 CTC 
R2 RVC 
R3 TT 
R4 WO 
R5 CTCex 
R6 CTC OR CTC 
R7 RVC OR RVC 
R8 RVC & RVC 
R9 TT OR TT 
R10 TT & TT 
R11 WO & WO 
R12 CTC OR RVC 
R13 CTC OR TT 
R14 CTC & RVC 
R15 CTC & TT 
R16 CTC & WO 
R17 RVC OR TT 
R18 RVC & TT 
R19 TT OR WO 
R20 TT & RVC 
R21 TT & WO 
R22 WO & RVC 
R23 CTCex OR RVC 
R24 CTCex OR TT 
R25 CTCex & RVC 
R26 CTCex & TT 
R27 CTCex & WO 
R28 CTC OR (CTC & RVC) 
R29 CTC & WO & RVC 
R30 CTCex OR (CTC & RVC) 
R31 CTCex OR (CTC & TT) 
R32 CTCex & WO & RVC 
R33 CTC OR (CTC & TT) 
R34 (CTC & RVC) OR RVC 
R35 (CTC & TT) OR RVC 
R36 (RVC & RVC) OR RVC 
R37 WO OR (TT&RVC) 
Note:  OR stands for an alternative rule 
  & stands for a combination 
  ex stands for exception in CTC 
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Reverting to the examples provided above, the rule in Example 1 is coded as R31 under this 
method. The rule in Example 2, as R1 and the one in Example 3 as R4.   
Again, this approach has advantages and drawbacks. On the positive side, this method can 
be thought of being the most comprehensive because it allows estimating the impact of each 
possible rule included in origin protocols. On the negative side, dividing into 37 the number 
of observations reveals an econometric problem, as many of them become insignificant and 
are therefore taken away from the equation. In what follows, the rules created in this method 
(rules R1 through R37) ZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRDV´XQLTXHUXOHVµDVHDFKRIWKHPGHILQHVDXQLTXH
interaction of rules.  
Analyzing the impact of the rules under these four methods implies estimating equations 
(4.10-a) through (4.10-c) four different times, each accounting for the four different 
specifications of  kijJ .  
Finally, modeling the regime-wide provisions ij]  showed two unsurpassable problems. 
First, every agreement shared most of the provisions. Five different provisions were object of 
study: cumulation, tolerance rule (de minimis), absorption principle, minimal operations and 
certification procedures. It turned out that all the agreements had provisions to allowing a 
tolerance rule, the absorption principle and they all included a list of minimal operations that 
did not confer origin. Therefore, the analysis could only be limited to those provisions that 
did differ from agreement to agreement, i.e. cumulation and certification. However, again 
collinearity became an issue so both of them could not be modeled. The choice was made to 
model certification procedures, as the impact of allowing self-certification as opposed to 
public certification might be much easier to grasp than cumulating production between 
countries, which entails a degree of vertical integration among those countries which may 
depend on many other factors than stating the provision in the agreement. Consequently, 
ijij icationSelfcertif ] .  
One implication of this specification is that rules are assumed to be determined exogenously. 
Rules of origin are sometimes perceived as alternative means of protection when countries 
lose the capacity to impose tariff measures. 72  In particular, Cadot et al (2002) and 
                                                     
 
72
 See Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) or Estevadeordal (2000) for illustrations of such situations. 
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Estevadeordal (2000) find evidence of increased RoO restrictiveness in the presence of lower 
tariffs. If RoO are used as a protectionist means if can be argued that they are endogenous to 
trade. However, in the case of RoO this is not a plausible situation as most protocols on rules 
of origin are usually highly rigid documents, particularly those of the EU and US. Only 
minor changes are negotiated from FTA to FTA and modifications over time occur very 
rarely. Whereas changes in trade do happen, RoO remain fixed over time and to some extent 
across partners for each reporting country. In view of this, it can hardly be the case, as 
expressed by Cadot et al (2002) that future trade patterns can be behind the design of RoO. 
The few studies identified in the literature that attempt to estimate the trade impact of RoO 
treat them exogenously as well, as is the case in Portugal-Pérez (2008) and Cadot et al 
(2002).73  
Despite their use in the literature as exogenous variables, the risk of encountering factors that 
may cause endogeneity bias cannot be completely ruled out, as they may exist some 
unobserved factors that can influence simultaneously the adoption of a given type of rule 
and the volume of trade. Such a factor could be the presence of powerful lobbies that 
advocate, for instance, for trade-conducive RoO to favor their already large volume of 
exports. If this were the case, this omitted variable would induce coefficients to be biased, as 
no correction is performed in this study to account for this problem.74  
4.3. Data and Statistics 
The study comprises bilateral trade flows (total trade, imports and exports) between four 
reporting countries and 16 Free Trade Area (FTA) partner countries, accounting for 28 
different combinations of country pairs. The purpose of the analysis is to be as 
comprehensive as possible with regards to the validity of the results. The selection of the 
reporting countries is hence performed according to the following criteria: First, the main 
condition is the number of active FTAs. The precision about the word active is important 
here as there are many FTAs in force which have become inactive, as is the case of an 
important number of FTAs in the Arab world. Similarly, only broad FTAs are considered, 
this is those that liberalize close to 100 percent of products. Most FTAs in the Latin American 
                                                     
 
73
 RoO are considered to be endogenous to tariff preferences in Estevadeordal (2000) and Cadot et al (2006), but 
not to exports.  
74
 One notable way to solve the endogeneity bias is to use fixed effects estimation at the product-level. This 
would rule out all information about RoO, which is a solution that the present study cannot afford. 
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Integration Association (LAIA) cover just one or few sectors and have hence not been 
included.  
Second, the choice of the reporting as well as the partner countries intends to include 
developed and developing economies, so as to ensure a larger scope of the analysis. For 
instance, EFTA countries have more agreements than the US, but their choice of FTA 
partners, as well as the structure of the RoO, replicates those of the EU to a large extent. 
Third, FTAs in order to conduct a representative panel analysis, data needs to be available 
for at least four periods. The last across-the-board year of available data is 2008, implying 
that FTAs needed to be active in 2005 at the latest.  
In view of these considerations, the best combination of reporting countries is given by Chile, 
the EU, the US and Mexico.75 Table 4.3 shows the combination of reporters and partners: 
Table 4.3. Reporter and Partner Countries 
 
  Reporter 
  Chile EU Mexico USA 
Partner 
CANADA SWITZERLAND CANADA AUS 
SWITZERLAND CHILE SWITZERLAND CANADA 
EU EGYPT CHILE CHILE 
ICELAND ICELAND EU ISRAEL 
KOREA MEXICO ICELAND JORDAN 
MEXICO NORWAY ISRAEL MEXICO 
NORWAY TUNISIA JAPAN   
USA 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
NORWAY   
    USA   
 
4.3.1 Trade Data 
All trade data was obtained from COMTRADE. The data is captured at the six-digit level, 
which is the most disaggregated level available and is also the lowest level at which rules of 
origin are reported. 76  Both export and import data were directly obtained from the 
                                                     
 
75
 The number of reporting countries was limited to four in view of the size of the data set, already with over 
1,200,000 observations. 
76
 On very rare occasions rules can be reported at the 8-digit level. Those instances have not been considered.  
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COMTRADE database, whereas total flows were calculated just as the sum of both exports 
and imports.  
Data sets were compiled for trade in all goods for the 28 country-pairs. Thus, there are 28 
different sets of bilateral data. Data is taken yearly between 2005 and 2008. The resulting 112 
combinations of data yield a total of 1,224,833 observations. 
Data for total exports and total imports represents exports to the world and imports from the 
world for every reporting and partner country for each six-digit product. As mentioned in 
WKHSUHFHGLQJFKDSWHUWKHVHWZRYDULDEOHVVHUYHDVSUR[LHVIRUWKHFRXQWU\·VZHLJKWRUPRre 
precisely, for the weight of each product traded by each country. When a reporting country 
is recorded to be exporting, the total exports variable represents total exports of this country 
to the world for each product whereas the total import variable represents total 
imports of the partner country from the world for that product; vice-versa when the 
reporting country is importing. Take the following example given in Table 4.4: 
Table 4.4. Illustration of the use of size variables 
 
Chile exports to Canada of 
product 01.06.90 
Chile imports from Canada 
product 01.06.90 
Value (Dependant variable) 
Chilean exports to Canada of 
product 01.06.90 
Chilean imports from 
Canada of product 01.06.90 
Total exports (size variable) 
Total Chilean exports to the 
world of product 01.06.90 
Total Canadian exports to 
the world of product 01.06.90 
Total imports 
Total Canadian imports from 
the world of product 01.06.90 
Total Chilean imports from 
the world of product 01.06.90 
 
COMTRADE does not report zero values. However, using matching procedures between 
total exports/imports to/from world and recorded figures allows generating zero values, 
which represent a large proportion of the sample, i.e. 56 percent of the entire sample.77 
Equally, products enter and exit the sample, resulting in an unbalanced panel.  
                                                     
 
77
 The details concerning estimating the model in the presence of zero values are discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Data is obtained using the Harmonized System 2002 version, which is available for the 
widest range of countries in recent years. The choice for Harmonized System as opposed to 
other classifications such as the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is 
straightforward since most origin protocols are spelled using this system and therefore 
allows for direct comparison. All reporting and partner countries report data for the selected 
years in HS 2002 except Egypt, which used HS 96 until 2008. Data is reported in thousands of 
US dollars at constant prices.  
4.3.2 Gravity Data 
Distance data as well as the variables on common language and contiguity are obtained from 
the publicly available DIST_cepii.xls file by CEPII. Distance data is calculated using the great 
circle formula.  
Distance in gravity models has traditionally measured distance between capital cities or most 
important cities in the reporting and partner country. However, as part of the attempts to 
VROYHWKH´ERUGHUSX]]OHµIRXQGE\0F&DOOXPDQGGLVFXVVHGDERYHVHYHUDODuthors 
such as Head and Mayer (DQG+HOOLZHOO DQG9HUGLHU VXJJHVW WKDW WKH´ERUGHU
HIIHFWµPLJKWEHDFRQVHTXHQFHRIPHDVXUHPHQWHUURUVLQWKHGLVWDQFHYDULDEOH,QZRUGVRI
+HDG DQG 0D\HU  FRUUHFWLQJ IRU GLVWDQFH GRHV QRW VROYH WKH ´ERUGHU SX]]OHµ EXW
shrinks it. The authors find that existing measures in the literature overestimate closer 
distances hence augmenting the border effect. They suggest a distance measure which is 
calculated on the basis of the bilateral distance between the two most important cities in a 
country in terms of population, and weighted by the share each city represents in the total 
population of its country. In such way, distance takes the following form: 
¦¦ 
jl
kljl
ik
ikij dpoppoppoppopd
¼¼
))/()/((      (4.15) 
where k and l are the largest agglomerations in countries i  and j. Following Head and Mayer 
(2002), their measure of distance equals the one used in equation (4.10) and throughout.   
Common language and contiguity are usually incorporated into gravity equations to account 
for specific conditions of each bilateral pair of countries. Examples of studies using these 
variables are Feenstra et al. (1998) or Cheng and Wall (2004). Common language indicates 
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whether two countries share a common official language. Contiguity distinguishes between 
countries sharing a common land border or not. 
4.3.3 Data on Rules of Origin 
Data on rules of origin is GLUHFWO\REWDLQHGIURPWKH)7$V·SURWRFROVRIRULJLQZKLFKDUHDOO
available at the countries responsible trade ministry/agency. Except for marginal exceptions, 
product-specific rules of origin can be spelled at the HS Chapter, 4-digit or at the 6-digit 
level. EU-based origin protocols usually contain about 800 different product-specific rules, 
whereas US-based account to over 2,000. Some of the 28 country pairs included in the sample 
share agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), shared by both 
Mexico and the US, or they are both reporters and partners, such as EU and Chile, EU and 
Mexico or Chile and Mexico. The total number of origin protocols is hence reduced to 16. At 
an average of 1,400 data entries by origin protocol, it yields a total of close to 24,000 product-
specific rules. Each of these entries is a short sentence specifying the corresponding rule. The 
coding procedure of these rules is explained in the methodological section above. 
Data on regime-wide provisions which, in view of the issues discussed above turned out to 
be reduced to self certification procedures is also obtained from the protocols attached to 
FTAs.     
4.3.4 Summary Statistics 
Tables 4.5-4.8 provide information about the data used in the model, for overall trade, by 
reporter. The tables show how the logarithmic transformation reduces the skewness of the 
data, as total trade, total imports and total exports report comparable figures for all four 
reporters. Dispersion in total trade is greater for Mexico than the remainder reporters, who 
show similar figures. Total imports and total exports combine imports from the world and 
exports to the world both from the reporter and partner country. Consequently, the fact that 
EU figures show a larger dispersion suggests that EU partners display greater variation in 
their figures which is a plausible explanation considering the difference in the development 
level of EU partners.   
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Table 4.5. Summary Statistics ² CHL 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
LVAL 71898 10,417 3,044 
LIMP 71898 15,368 2,729 
LEXP 71898 16,077 3,071 
DIST 71898 9,231 0,275 
SELFCER 71898 0,615 0,487 
LANG 71898 0,141 0,348 
CONTIG 71898 0,000 0,000 
CC 71898 0,197 0,398 
CTH 71898 0,559 0,497 
CTS 71898 0,196 0,397 
RVC 71898 0,402 0,490 
RVCEU 71898 0,024 0,153 
TT 71898 0,098 0,297 
WO 71898 0,028 0,166 
COMB 71898 0,264 0,441 
ALT 71898 0,300 0,458 
EXC 71898 0,174 0,379 
 
 
Table 4.6. Summary Statistics ² EU 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
LVAL 207089 12,579 2,933 
LIMP 207089 15,892 3,201 
LEXP 207089 16,306 3,338 
DIST 207089 7,890 1,129 
SELFCER 207089 0,000 0,000 
LANG 207089 0,181 0,385 
CONTIG 207089 0,341 0,474 
CC 207089 0,001 0,037 
CTH 207089 0,498 0,500 
CTS 207089 0,028 0,164 
RVC 207089 0,464 0,499 
RVCEU 207089 0,061 0,239 
TT 207089 0,237 0,425 
WO 207089 0,078 0,268 
COMB 207089 0,222 0,415 
ALT 207089 0,353 0,478 
EXC 207089 0,022 0,146 
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Table 4.7. Summary Statistics ² MEX 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
LVAL 126399 11,454 3,783 
LIMP 126399 16,581 2,343 
LEXP 126399 15,875 2,978 
DIST 126399 8,643 0,631 
SELFCER 126399 0,547 0,498 
LANG 126399 0,082 0,274 
CONTIG 126399 0,275 0,446 
CC 126399 0,253 0,435 
CTH 126399 0,559 0,497 
CTS 126399 0,214 0,410 
RVC 126399 0,405 0,491 
RVCEU 126399 0,014 0,119 
TT 126399 0,114 0,318 
WO 126399 0,016 0,125 
COMB 126399 0,296 0,457 
ALT 126399 0,347 0,476 
EXC 126399 0,237 0,425 
 
 
Table 4.8. Summary Statistics ² USA 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
LVAL 133343 13,168 2,959 
LIMP 133343 16,240 2,755 
LEXP 133343 16,170 2,980 
DIST 133343 8,511 0,823 
SELFCER 133343 1,000 0,000 
LANG 133343 0,591 0,492 
CONTIG 133343 0,509 0,500 
CC 133343 0,312 0,463 
CTH 133343 0,371 0,483 
CTS 133343 0,249 0,433 
RVC 133343 0,371 0,483 
RVCEU 133343 0,000 0,000 
TT 133343 0,123 0,328 
WO 133343 0,191 0,393 
COMB 133343 0,415 0,493 
ALT 133343 0,215 0,411 
EXC 133343 0,271 0,444 
The different interactions among the variables are provided in Table 4.9, which provides the 
correlations among them.  
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Table 4.9. Correlation matrix among variables 
 
  LVAL LIMP LEXP DIST SELFCER LANG CONTIG CC CTH CTS RVC RVCEU TT WO COMB ALT EXC 
LVAL 1,00                 
LIMP 0,33 1,00                
LEXP 0,54 -0,02 1,00               
DIST -0,30 -0,01 0,05 1,00              
SELFCER 0,03 0,02 -0,06 0,12 1,00             
LANG 0,14 0,05 -0,05 -0,22 0,31 1,00            
CONTIG 0,37 0,07 -0,07 -0,78 0,18 0,26 1,00           
CC -0,03 -0,02 -0,10 0,01 0,41 0,07 0,15 1,00          
CTH 0,02 0,06 0,04 0,00 -0,06 -0,06 0,00 -0,37 1,00         
CTS 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,04 0,32 0,06 0,07 -0,12 -0,06 1,00        
RVC 0,06 0,10 0,11 0,06 -0,13 0,02 -0,10 -0,25 0,18 0,14 1,00       
RVCEU 0,04 0,03 0,04 -0,03 -0,16 -0,04 -0,02 -0,07 -0,12 -0,07 0,07 1,00      
TT -0,07 -0,09 -0,06 -0,05 -0,15 -0,08 -0,01 0,02 -0,38 -0,16 -0,28 -0,07 1,00     
WO -0,04 -0,06 0,00 0,11 0,06 0,16 -0,11 -0,13 -0,27 -0,12 0,08 0,05 0,00 1,00    
COMB 0,04 0,07 0,03 0,05 0,17 0,11 -0,01 -0,01 0,15 0,24 0,57 0,11 -0,02 0,26 1,00   
ALT 0,03 0,05 0,06 0,01 -0,14 -0,08 -0,02 -0,14 0,27 0,26 0,62 0,12 0,01 -0,10 0,37 1,00  
EXC -0,02 0,01 -0,08 -0,01 0,34 0,04 0,14 0,23 0,03 0,08 -0,18 -0,06 0,01 -0,11 0,03 -0,10 1,00 
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The correlation matrix shows no worrying signals in terms of interactions between variables 
except contiguity and distance, which is obvious as contiguity disappears with higher 
distances. Correlations between total value and the independent variables are in line with 
the predictions formulated in the previous chapter. The values on CTH, CTS, RVC and 
RVCEU suggest a positive impact on total trade, whereas CC, TT and WO show a negative 
RQH 3UREDEO\ WKH RQH VXUSULVH FRPHV ZLWK ´&20%µ ZKLFK VXJJHVWV D SRVVLEOH SRVLWLYH
impact on total trade. Other interesting features of this table are tKHKLJKYDOXHVIRU´&20%µ
DQG´$/7µRQ´59&µZKLFKLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKLVW\SHRIUXOHDSSHDUVPRVWO\DVDFRPELQDWLRQ
or as an alternative rather than as an individual rule. Finally, total exports indicates a higher 
possible impact on total trade than total LPSRUWVZKLFKLVDQLQGLFDWLRQWKDW´SXVKµIRUFHV
DUHPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQ´SXOOµIRUFHVLQGHWHUPLQLQJWUDGHIORZV 
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides information for a better understanding of the data. Figures 4.1-4.10 
indicate the frequency and total trade observed under each specific rule for all the 
agreements in the sample.78  They are useful to compare the relative importance of the 
different types of rule for each agreement in terms of the percentage of all products that are 
traded under that rule and the percentage volume that trade represents. All Figures have 
been computed for one particular rule except Figure 4.4 which combines information on 
CTC, which is the sum of CC, CTH and CTS, and EXC. By definition, exceptions are can only 
take place with CTC, whether a CC, CTH or CTS.  
Frequencies reveal how CTH is the most common type of rule across agreements, followed 
by RVC. Figure 4.4 indicates that several agreements rely entirely on CTC based rules, 
although reading together with the rest of the Figures confirms that in most cases, those rules 
are used in combination or as an alternative to other rules. This is more prominently in US-
based agreements. EU-based agreements, on the other hand only marginally rely on CC 
rules. The latter are the only ones to use RVCEU because as explained in the previous 
chapter, this type of rule is a variation from the RVC used in EU agreements. Alternative 
rules are more common in EU-based agreements whereas combinations occur more 
frequently in US-based. This, in principle adds restrictiveness to US agreements as opposed 
                                                     
 
78
 Frequencies in Figures 5.1-5.9 do not necessarily add up to a total of 100% because of the interactions 
between the different rules through combinations and alternatives. Similarly, values recorded in the Figures 
surpass total trade as volumes are counted double when there is an alternative or a combination in the rules.  
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to EU. On the other hand, EU-based agreements rely more on TT rules which have the 
potential for being more restrictive.  
With regards to trade conducted under each rule, one of the prominent features is that most 
agreements seem to trade more in relative terms than the relative frequency for CTH and 
59&ZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI&KLOH,QWXUQLQ&KLOH·VDJUHHPHQWVUHODWLYHWUDGHYROXPHVDUH
higher than frequencies for CC. In terms of the rest of the rules, no clear pattern emerges. In 
general Chile conducts a larger share of its trade under CTS than the relative frequency of 
this rule reveals whereas the rest of the countries have mixed results. As for TT, it is the EU 
the only reporter that indicates a larger share of trade than proportion of rules. On the 
contrary, the records less relative trade than percentage of rules in WO. Lastly, all countries 
except Chile conduct a larger share of their trade under ALT than its frequency.  
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Figure 4.1. Freq. and Value of Change in Tariff Chapter (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.2. Frequency and Value of Change in Tariff Heading (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.3. Freq. and Value of Change in Tariff Subheading (% of Total Rules) 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
CTC Frequency in %
CTC Value in %
EXC Frequency in %
EXC Value in %
 Source: Origin Protocols, own calculations 
 
Figure 4.4. Frequency and Value of CTC and Exceptions (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.5. Frequency and Value of Regional Value Content (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.6. Freq. and Value of Regional Value Content-EU(% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.7. Frequency and Value of Technical Test (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.8. Frequency of Wholly Obtained (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.9. Frequency and Value of Combinations of Rules (% of Total Rules) 
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Figure 4.10. Frequency and Value of Alternative Rules (% of Total Rules) 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 FRPSDUH D VLPLODU DVSHFW DOEHLW IRFXVHG RQ ´XQLTXHµ UXOHV 5HODWLYH
frequencies are provided in Figure 4.11 and relative trade in Figure 4.12. The main difference 
with previous Figures is that 4.11 and 4.12 look at aggregate trade and frequencies for all 
agreements, rather than by individual ones. Also, because these rules are unique, the sum of 
the proportions of frequencies and trade does add up to one. Dividing origin protocols in 37 
different rules implies that the frequency of each of them is greatly diminished. As a result, 
only seven rules are present in more than five percent of the total. By far, the rule that is 
more present is R1 (CTC), with over 30% of the total.79 The other rules surpassing 5 percent 
are R2 (RVC), R3 (TT), R5 (CTC with exception), R12 (alternative between CTC or RVC), R14 
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 It must be noted that CTC is the sum of CC, CTH and CTS 
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(combination of CTC and RVC) and R28 (alternative between CTC or CTC combined with 
RVC). This Figure confirms the prevalence of CTC rules over other type of rules. Another 
implication of this Figure is that simple rules, i.e. those that are not presented in combination 
or as an alternative to other rules, are predominant in origin protocols. A similar trend is 
shown in Figure 4.12 although there exist some notable aspects. R12 (combination of CTC 
and RVC) increases its share in total trade from its share in total frequency and R14 
(alternative between CTC and RVC), diminishes it. These observations are counterintuitive; 
an alternative should promote trade and a combination, reduce it. Equally, R28 (alternative 
between CTC or CTC combined with RVC) also shows a higher percentage in terms of trade, 
ZKHUHDV5·V77LVORZHU.  
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Source: Origin Protocols, own calculations 
 
Figure 4.11. Frequency of Each Combination of Rule 
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Figure 4.12. Percentage of Total Trade by Type of Rule 
The last set of Figures, from Figure 4.13 to Figure 4.16 illustrates trade volumes between 
reporters and their partners and their evolution over time. The key aspect in these Figures is 
the existence of very important differences in total trade with their partners for all reporting 
countries, all having one predominant partner except Chile. Another interesting feature of 
these Figures is that with the exception of the EU, all countries present considerable 
differences in their trade balances from one agreement to another. This suggests that there 
could be additional circumstances affecting their exporting capacity from one market to 
another, i.e. rules of origin.  
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Figure 4.13. Chile's Total Trade with Partners 
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Figure 4.14. EU's Total Trade with Partners 
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Figure 4.15. Mexico's Total Trade with Partners 
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Figure 4.16. USA's Total Trade with Partners 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This thesis attempts to provide an estimate of the impact on trade of product specific rules of 
origin (RoO) and regime-wide provisions, as well as to construct an ex-post restrictiveness 
index on the basis of the results found in the estimations. Therefore, the driving force behind 
the choice of methodology is how to assess the ex-post trade impact of RoO, as opposed to 
forecasting. The framework chosen for such analysis is the gravity equation, which has been 
widely used in order to assess different policy variables. 
The gravity equation has become in the last decades one of the most popular empirical 
devices to analyze trade flows, having been used to control for practically any factor 
potentially influencing trade flows. Two main reasons stand out to place the gravity model 
as the preferred method of estimation in the context of this study. First, the gravity equation 
provides a relatively acceptable theoretical framework for the use of RoO. A second crucial 
reason for choosing gravity modeling as the preferred framework is its good empirical fit. 
Additionally, a number of theoretical considerations are explored in order to correctly: i) 
whether the gravity equation suits the desired data sample, consisting of North-North and 
North-South trade flows; ii) whether the model can evaluated at the disaggregated level; iii) 
which trade flow can be theoretically sound to be explored. These three questions are looked 
into by reviewing the theory about the gravity model, which confirms each of the issues. A 
final theoretical consideration provides a justification to perform the analysis using panel 
data.  
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Under the conditions provided for the theoretical aspects, the general equation to be 
estimated is laid down: 
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which will be estimated for total trade, exports and imports.   
Subsequently, the approach for modeling the RoO is described. The underlying logic beneath 
it is to transform the product-specific RoO in dummy variables that can be plugged into the 
equation and their coefficients estimated. However, the intrinsic complexity of rules the rules 
of origin calls for the elaboration of four different types of analysis in order to ensure their 
correct study, each of them requiring its own way of introducing the product-specific RoO. 
The first method considers all possible interactions of the four families of rules, including 
combinations, alternatives and exceptions to the main rule; the second method attempts to 
identify the individual impact of each of the main four families; the third method is an 
extension of the second, with the difference that divides the main CTC family into its 
subcomponents (CC, CTH and CTS); and the fourth method assigns an individual value to 
every possible combination of rules, classifying each of them as a different dummy variable.  
One implication of this methodology is that it considers RoO as being exogenous, which may 
give rise to potential endogeneity bias. The usual way to correct this bias is the use of fixed 
effects at the individual level. This option is discarded regarding the time-invariant nature of 
the key variables of interest.  
The study analyzes total trade, exports and imports at the 6-digit level for four reporting 
countries and 16 partner countries for the period between 2005 and 2008, yielding 1,224,833 
observations. Trade data is obtained from COMTRADE. Data for rules of origin is obtained 
directly from the protocols of origin of each FTA. Considering that EU-based protocols 
amount to around 800 product specific rules and US-based to around 2,000, it yields a total of 
close to 24,000 rules that need to be coded.  
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The most frequent rule in origin protocols is CTH, followed by RVC, although these two 
rules are less commonly used individually and rather are combined or supplemented with 
other rules. Additionally, these two rules are, on average, represent a higher proportion of 
total rules present in origin protocols than the trade channeled through them on total trade. 
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Chapter 5. Estimation and Results 
 
5.1. Estimation 
Equations (4.10-a) through (4.10-c) are subject to a number of clarifications from its main 
form before being estimated, determined either by the choice of the analysis to be performed 
on the rules of origin or by the type of estimation required, as explained below. The first 
question is if it is econometrically feasible to estimate equation (4.10-a) through (4.10-c) using 
panel data, as suggested in the discussion above.  
However, before deciding to use panel data, it needs to assessed whether it is possible to add 
data pertaining to diIIHUHQW SHULRGV 7KHUHIRUH D ´SRRODELOLW\µ WHVW LV FRQGXFWHG 7KLV WHVW
consists on performing a Wald test on the time coefficients. Specifically, it tests the null 
hypothesis of time coefficients being jointly zero. 
Table 5.1. Poolability Test 
 
The test rejects the null, so it can be concluded that the different period data is relevant and 
pertain to the model.  
Once it has been confirmed the appropriateness of using panel data, the next question is 
whether to use fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE). In a RE model it is assumed that 
( 1)  time1 = 0 
( 2)  time2 = 0 
( 3)  time3 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
 
       F(  2,455598) =   14.49 
            Prob > F =    0.0000  
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heterogeneity of observations is random and does not correlate with any of the independent 
variables.80 The consequence is that the individual effect is included in the constant, through 
the interaction of the random component iu . Numerically, this means that a general panel 
specification: 
ititiit XY HED  11     (5.1) 
transforms into 
itiitit uXY HED  11 ,    (5.2) 
as the intercept now becomes ii u DD . In the case where 02  uV , there is no difference 
between equations (5.1) and (5.2). Therefore a suitable test to assess the benefit of using an 
RE over a pooled equation is given by the Breusch-Pagan test. The null hypothesis is that 
02  uV , therefore, rejecting the null implies that there is a difference between (5.1) and (5.2) 
and hence the RE model should be used.  
Table 5.2. Breusch-Pagan Test for Random Effects 
 
The tests clearly rejects the null, so the RE is superior to the pooled estimation. On the other 
spectrum, an FE model assumes that individual heterogeneity (in this case, country 
heterogeneity), is constant over time and specific to each individual, but uncorrelated to the 
                                                     
 
80
 The discussion about fixed and random effects is largely based upon Aparicio and Marquez (2005) 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects: 
 
        lvalue[idp,t] = Xb + u[idp] + e[idp,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                  lvalue |   11.94447       3.456077 
                       e |   4.576555       2.139288 
                       u |          0              0 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(4.1) =  2.5e+07 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
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error term. Hence, the difference within individuals is captured by the constant iD , which 
varies from individual to individual.  In FE specification, (5.1) maintains its form, since the 
unobserved heterogeneity is kept by the intercept, which now varies across countries.  The 
test to evaluate the presence of fixed effects, as opposed to the pooled specification is equally 
an F-test, based on the joint significance of the individual effects.  
Table 5.3. Fixed Effects Test 
 
Again, the null is rejected so the inclusion of fixed effects in the model is well justified. This 
leaves the question as to what model is preferred, RE or FE. The first decision rule is 
theoretical. Using RE requires the assumption of the observations being randomly drawn 
from a population and that the individual effects are not correlated with the regressors. This, 
in principle is a hard assumption to maintain in trade settings, where the characteristics of 
trade patterns are inherent to each country. In addition, a further argument, based on Baier 
and Bergstrand (2005) encourages the use of fixed effects. This argument refers to the fact 
tKDWWKHUHPD\EH´UDQGRPµIDFWRUVLQIOXHQFLQJERWKWKHVWULQJHQF\RI5R2DQGWKHYROXPH
of trade, for instance large trading companies could have important lobbies. Although these 
IDFWRUVDUH´UDQGRPµ)(DOORZDUELWUDU\FRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHPDQGWKH5oO.  
An additional way to decide between RE and FE is based on econometric grounds and is 
given by the Hausman test. This test is based on the idea of no correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors, both FE and RE coefficients should be similar. If this is 
the case, it can be assumed that the individual effects are not correlated to the regressors. 
( 1)  idpdum1 = 0 
( 2)  idpdum2 = 0 
( 3)  idpdum3 = 0 
( 4)  idpdum4 = 0 
( 5)  idpdum5 = 0 
( 6)  idpdum6 = 0 
( 7)  idpdum7 = 0 
( 8)  idpdum8 = 0 
( 9)  idpdum9 = 0 
(4.10)  idpdum10 = 0 
(4.11)  idpdum12 = 0 
(4.12)  idpdum13 = 0 
(4.13)  idpdum14 = 0 
       Constraint 5 dropped 
 
       F( 12,455598) = 2265.63 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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However, if the null is rejected, there is evidence for such correlation and hence FE is 
preferred. 
Table 5.4. Hausman Test 
 
The test rejects the null of systematic difference of the coefficients, which confirms the 
theoretical argument in favor of FE rather than RE.81   
Other benefits arise from the introduction of country fixed-effects, which account for the 
unobserved price effects, as shown in the theoretical discussion. Also, the inclusion of the 
fixed effects solves the heterogeneity bias encountered in cross-section estimation. This bias 
refers to the bias induced82 in OLS due to omitted heterogeneity. In other words, certain 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals may influence the dependant variable despite 
not being observed, and it can lead to omitted variable bias. Cheng and Wall (2004) note this 
problem arises because standard cross-section does not allow countries to differ from each 
other. Hence, two countries with similar size and distance from a third country should 
experience a similar level of trade with that third country. According to Wall (2000), the 
consequence of this bias is that unless accounted for, heterogeneity tends to overpredict 
trade between low-volume traders and underpredict trade between low-volume traders. 
Similarly, Baier and Bergstrand (2005) find that heterogeneity bias may cause flows to be 
underestimated by as much as 75 percent. Other than adding more information to the 
sample, the use of panel data seems therefore appropriate in order to include fixed effects 
that can correct the heterogeneity bias.   
                                                     
 
81
 Although the preferred choice is the FE model, RE estimation was also performed for robustness. Results are 
reported in Appendix 5.1 
82
 Hutchinson (2002) notes that introducing country fixed effects in a disaggregated trade setting will not solve 
heterogeneity bias, as heterogeneity relates to the commodity level. Introducing fixed effects at the product level 
would sweep away all time-invariant information, including that pertaining to RoO and this study would hence 
lose all its purpose. The extent to which heterogeneity bias may be present remains therefore a possible caveat of 
the present estimation.  
 b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained 
from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(4.17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)=    21526.82 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Fixed effects are introduced into the equation as ¦
 
I
i
i
1
G for the reporter (I=4)  and ¦
 
J
j
j
1
I for the 
partner country (J=16). In both cases they are dummy variables which take the value of one 
for each reporting and partner country, with their summatory adding up to one. However, 
adding a country specific variable for each of the reporting and partner countries highly 
increased the collinearity of the variables in the equation, putting in the danger the 
robustness of the results. Therefore, two transformations are made in order to reduce 
collinearity. First, reporter specific country effects are grouped into two groups, developed 
and developing countries. Therefore, ¦
 
I
i
i
1
G becomes an individual dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for the EU and the US and zero for Chile and Mexico. Secondly, a 
further transformation was needed in the partner country dummies. The solution was to 
cluster Switzerland, Norway and Iceland into one group as European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) members, hence reducing J from 16 to 14. Table 5.5 shows the collinearity diagnostic 
before and after the transformations mentioned, i.e. dropping cumulation, combining 
developed country reporters and merging EFTA countries.  
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Table 5.5. Collinearity Diagnostic 
 
Variable  
Before Transformation After Transformation 
VIF Tolerance  Tolerance 
Limp 1.15 0.8709 1.13 0.8874 
Lexp 1.18 0.8468 1.13 0.8818 
Ldist 77.25 0.0129 7.24 0.1382 
Contig 30.01 0.0333 4.23 0.2364 
Lang 2.90 0.3442 2.16 0.4626 
Fullcum 30.68 0.0326 NA NA 
Selfcer 243.29 0.0041 9.97 0.1003 
Cc 4.62 0.2166 4.60 0.2174 
Cth 5.96 0.1677 5.94 0.1682 
Cts 3.57 0.2805 3.56 0.2812 
Rvc 6.25 0.1599 6.21 0.1610 
Rvceu 1.47 0.6825 1.46 0.6831 
Tt 4.66 0.2146 4.64 0.2157 
Wo 3.92 0.2554 3.85 0.2595 
Comb 4.34 0.2306 4.32 0.2316 
Alt 4.19 0.2386 4.18 0.2391 
Exc 1.22 0.8178 1.22 0.8188 
Note: Collinearity diagnostics for reporting and partner country as well as time 
effects are omitted.  
 
Once the decision is made as to estimate equation (4.10) using FE, the estimation technique 
needs to be specified. One common approach is to use the within-groups fixed effects. This 
method calculates the average for each variable and subtracts them from the data, yielding: 
itiii XY
*
1
*
1
* HED  ,    (5.3) 
where the asterisk denotes the mean value. Subtracting (5.3) from (5.4), gives 
ititiitiit XXYY
*
1
*
11
* )( HHE       (5.4) 
which sweeps away the individual effects. The one drawback of this method is that it 
eliminates all the information about time-invariant variables, which become part of the 
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unobserved. This caveat eliminates this method as a possible path for the present study, as 
its main outcome is to estimate the impact of time-invariant RoO.83 The solution is then to 
estimate the model using Least Square Dummy Variables, which consists of assigning one 
dummy variable to each of the different group fixed effects. These dummies account for all 
the unobserved group effects, which are then brought into the equation.    
There are three major sources of concern regarding the use of the Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) model. First, LSDV may raise problems as the number of individuals tends 
to infinity. The consistency of the dummy variables coefficients suffers as N increases, as the 
number of dummy variables increases alongside, leading to inefficient parameters.84 This is 
not the case in this sample, where N(=J)= 16. Second, as the number of variables increases, 
the degrees of freedom may be severely reduced. Once again, this is not a major issue in this 
sample where J is limited to 14. Third, a problem which is regularly linked to LSDV is that it 
cannot be used to estimate time-invariant variables since dummies are perfectly collinear 
with constant or quasi constant variables. This is true when there is no variation within-
group, as the dummy variable absorbs all the variation across groups, leaving just within 
group information. This is the case when a different fixed effect is computed for each 
individual in a sample. In the present study, however, fixed effects (dummies) are allocated 
to countries, while observations are conducted at the product level. The problem highlighted 
here would be relevant if observations took place at aggregate level or if the fixed effects 
where assigned to each product instead of to each country. 85   In such case and assuming 
Gauss-Markov assumptions and non-stochastic regressors, LSDV estimator is unbiased, 
consistent and linear efficient, as noted by Kunst (2010).  
Having specified the estimation technique, variables ¦
 
I
i
i
1
G and ¦
 
J
j
j
1
I in equation (4.10), are  
introduced in the equation as dummy variables, such that 
¦
 
I
i
i
1
G =1 with I=4  
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 There is nothing preventing specific rules of origin from varying over time. Indeed, it is not uncommon to 
renegotiate the rules and change them. However, the degree of variation for the selected sample is neglegible.  
84
 This is kQRZQDVWKH³LQFLGHQWDOSDUDPHWHUSUREOHP´ILUVWIRXQGE\1H\PDQDQG6FRWWLQ 
85
 See Matyas (1997), Aiello et al (2008)  or Pastore et al. (2009) for examples of this type of framework.  
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and 
 ¦
 
J
j
j
1
I =1 with J=16 
Table 5.6. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 
In connection with the discussion above, the bias of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is likely to 
be higher in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, I conduct a Breusch-Pagan test to 
test for the homogeneity of the variance of the residuals. The results are very conclusive in 
rejecting the null that the residuals have constant variance: 
Thus, in order to correct heteroscedasticity problems and, in turn, minimize the extent of the 
bias highlighted above, the White heteroscedasticity-consistent (HC1) covariance matrix 
estimator of standard errors is used.  
A final concern with panel data is its tendency to show autocorrelation. Autocorrelation 
refers to the fact of the error term in one period being correlated to the error term in previous 
periods. Under the strict exogeneity assumption of FE, 0)(  isituxE , which implies that the 
error term cannot be correlated to previous errors. This translates into ttt uu HU  1 , where 
U is the coefficient of autocorrelation. In such case, the variance of the parameter is affected 
and the OLS estimator is no longer efficient, hence affecting the t-values. Autocorrelation is a 
common problem in trade panel data as it is usually the case that trade flows in one period 
are influenced by trade flows in previous periods. It therefore becomes necessary to test its 
existence.  
 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lvalue 
 
         chi2(4.1)      = 54468.77 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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The method used to test the prevalence of autocorrelation is the Breusch-Godfrey test. This 
test builds on the assumption that if no autocorrelation is present, the residuals from the 
estimated equation should not be correlated with their lagged residuals. In order to do this, a 
second regression is run on the residuals from the first equation over the lagged residuals 
under the null that the lagged residuals are zero. If the null is rejected, the lagged residuals 
are different from zero and there is autocorrelation.  
Table 5.7. Results from the second regression running the residuals over the lagged residuals 
And the test on the coefficients of e1 and e2 
 Residuals 
E1 0.012 
 (14.06)** 
E2 0.011 
 (11.86)** 
Constant 0.019 
 (0.15) 
Observations 455629 
R-squared 0.00 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Output for all other variables is omitted 
 
 
 
Table 5.8. Significance of Lagged Residuals 
 
which confirms the presence of autocorrelation. 
One solution to circumvent this issue is to estimate an alternative equation that accounts for 
U . In such equation, all the variables are transformed, yielding: 
ititit XY
*** HE   ,    (5.5) 
where  the asterisk denotes the following transformation  
test e1 e2 
 
 ( 1)  e1 = 0 
 ( 2)  e2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,455594) =  171.16 
            Prob > F =  0.0000 
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)( 1*  ititit XXX U     (5.6) 
and equivalently for the dependant variable. Equation (5.5) is derived in such way so as to 
yield Iit
2*var VH  , therefore implying that the error terms in the equation are uncorrelated 
with equal variance. This process is known as Generalized Least Squares and it is equivalent 
to applying OLS to a linear transformation of the data. According to Greene (2003), if we 
assume that the errors of the transformed equation are uncorrelated to the regressors ,i.e. 
0]/[ **  itit XE H , the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator is unbiased, consistent 
efficient and asymptotically normally distributed. 
The capacity of this method to solve autocorrelation while accounting for heteroscedasticity, 
makes it the preferred estimator to perform the regressions. Wooldridge (2002) states that 
this estimator is a natural way to follow when there is evidence of serial correlation.  Hence, 
GLS is used throughout the analysis. This GLS estimation with fixed effects is in line with the 
work of Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) and Antonucci and Manzocchi (2006).  
A final concern regarding model specification regards the transformation of the variables 
into logarithms. This transformation is not strictly needed for the regression. 86  However, it 
greatly helps reducing the dispersion of the data. Even more when the study concentrates of 
disaggregated trade data between 28 country pairs. A further benefit of the log-
transformation is that it provides a useful interpretation of the coefficients. This approach 
has been widely used for empirical research in the gravity setting and has also been used to 
derive the theoretical gravity equation in contributions such as those of Feenstra et al. (2001), 
Haveman and Hummels (2004) or Head and Mayer (2002).  
However, the log-transformation brings along one consequence, this is, it discards all zero-
trade in the sample, as the logarithm of zero is undefined. Three possibilities can be used to 
deal with zero values: i) discard those observations; ii) add a small value to each of them; 
and iii) more refined estimation techniques, such as Santos and Tenreyro (2006), who suggest 
an alternative specification for the gravity model based on a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood estimation technique. This approach has been followed and extended by other 
studies such as Burger et al.  ZKR KLJKOLJKWV 3RLVVRQ·V PRGHO SUREOHPV RI RYHU-
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 In fact, as pointed out in the previous paragraphs, GLS estimator is already asymptotically normally distributed.  
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dispertion and suggests a modified Poisson fixed-effects estimation (negative binomial, zero-
inflated). Other contributions include Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) who use a Gamma 
Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood estimation technique. According to Van Bergerijk and 
Brakman (2010) using the first two procedures is correct as long as the zeroes are randomly 
distributed along the sample. If they are not, as is usually the case, they induce selection bias. 
However, despite the possibility of the bias and the new techniques mentioned above, this 
discussion is still unsettled. Authors such as Linders and Groot (2006) or Martin and Pahm 
(2008) or Baier and Bergstrand (2005), who compare a wide range of estimation techniques 
suggest that truncated OLS may result in the preferred option for estimation.87 Accordingly, 
throughout this study, and in view of the advantages of a log-linearized model, truncated 
zero trade will be used, which may, however induce selection bias as mentioned above. 
5.1.1 Model Predictions 
In view of the literature discussed in previous chapters, the following are the predictions for 
each of the variables of interest. 
CTC: All rules based on changes in tariff classification are thought to be relatively lenient. 
However, its dispersion should vary widely from the more restrictive change in tariff 
chapter to the more lenient change in tariff subheading. The reason is that a change in tariff 
chapter eliminates all other components from the same chapter, while the change in tariff 
subheading does so only for the other components of the subheading, hence limiting a 
smaller number of materials. 
Prediction 1: CC > CTH > CTS 
RVC: Rules that have a regional value content requirement or an import limitation depend 
widely on the extent of the requirement, i.e. it usually goes from 25 percent to 50 percent of 
local value. Therefore, the extent of the rule itself is not easy to predict. Estevadeordal (2000) 
establishes it half-way in its restrictiveness index (4 out of 7) albeit always in combination 
with a different rule. Likewise Cadot et al. (2006) sets it at 4 out of 7 if the requirement is to 
add less than 40 percent of local content and 5 out of 7 if it is more than that. Therefore: 
                                                     
 
87
 Martin and Pahm points out that while the Poisson Pseudo-Likelihood Model does react better in presence of 
heteroskedasticity, it is found to be strongly susceptible to limited-dependant variable bias when a substantial fraction of the 
observations are censored, which is likely to be the case in international trade.  
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Prediction 2: CC>RVC=CTH>CTS 
Prediction 3: CTC=RVC 
RVCEU: This sort of rule sets a threshold on the limit of a given product that can be used. It 
targets certain materials that are commonly used in the manufacturing of a product.  
Prediction 4: RVCEU>RVC 
Technical Test: These type of rules offer the widest range of discretion by legislators as they 
require a specific transformation to be made on the product. The motivation behind this 
requirement offers many interpretations, but a very plausible one is that powerful pressure 
groups lobby legislators to strengthen the rules and act as potential barriers. However, 
authors differ on this point; while Estevadeordal (2000) sets it in the most restrictive layer 
(although in combination with another rule), Cadot et al. (2006) assign the second least 
restrictive value.  
Prediction 5: TT>RVC 
Prediction 6: TT>CTC 
Prediction 7: TT=CC 
Wholly obtained: Rules that require all materials used to be wholly obtained in the country 
of origin are usually more commonly used in agricultural products. While unprocessed 
agricultural products in general would typically comply easily with this rule, processed 
products may find in it a daunting barrier. Given its more common use in lower levels of 
processing, it is reasonable to assume that it is a trade-conducive rule. 
Prediction 8: WO<Any other rule 
Exception: Adding an exception to a CTC can unmistakably be prejudicial for trade, as it 
restricts the number of products that prevent conferring originating status.  
 
 135 
Prediction 9: Exception has negative coefficient 
Combination: Likewise, requesting to comply with two rules instead of one necessarily adds 
complications to the manufacturer. Thus: 
Prediction 10: Combination has a negative coefficient 
Alternative: On the contrary, allowing to choose between two different rules relaxes the 
restrictiveness of the rule, as the manufacturer can comply with either of them in order to 
gain originating status.  
Prediction 11: Alternative has a positive coefficient. 
´8QLTXH UXOHVµ 7KH ODUJH DPRXQW RI UXOHV LQFOXGHG LQ WKLV VHW SUHFOXGHV WKH SUHGLFWLRQ RI
each of them. However, in line with previous predictions, any rule that includes an 
alternative between two or more rules should be trade facilitating. Similarly, any rule that 
requires any combination of rules should be trade obstructing. In parallel, part of the 
criticism about rules of origin lies not only on the restrictiveness of the rules but on their 
complexity. It is not only a matter of adapting production to the requirements of the rule but 
it may also become a complicated process to understand.  
Prediction 12: Rules that include and alternative are more facilitating than rules that require 
a combination of two or more criteria. 
Prediction 13: Simple rules (i.e., those defined in the lower numbers of the scale) are more 
trade-conducive than complex rules 
Selfcertification: This provision allows the manufacturer to issue his own proof of origin 
without having to be inspected by public authorities. In line with the argument of the 
previous paragraph, part of the restrictiveness of the rules resides on the difficulty to comply 
with the process rather than with the rule itself. Permitting the manufacturer to 
independently produce its proof of origin should invariably be trade promoting as it 
represents a way of removing red tape.  
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Prediction 14: Selfcertification has a positive impact on trade flows.  
Lastly, in line with gravity literature, coefficients of the reminder variables should take the 
following sign: 
Table 5.9. Expected Gravity Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Sign 
LEXP (+) 
LIMP (+) 
DIST (-) 
LANG (+) 
CONTIG (+) 
 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1 Presentation of the Results 
Estimation results are provided in Tables 5.10 through 5.12. The dependant variable in all 
three tables is total trade in column one, total exports in column two and total imports in 
column three.88  
Table 5.10 corresponds to estimation method 1, explained in Chapter 4. It illustrates the 
results for all combinations of rules. It can be thought as being the most general of the three 
as it observes trade in all goods, accounting for every type of rule of origin, including 
combinations, alternatives and exceptions.  
The results in Column (1) indicate that this model specification explains 72 percent of total 
trade. All variables are significant at the one percent level except RVCEU and COMB. Size 
                                                     
 
88
 Exports and Imports from Mexico and Chile to the EU and the US, and from Mexico to Chile are excluded 
from the sample. The opposite flows are recorded for the EU, the US and Chile, respectively. Adding them 
implies including the same information to measure two different things, exports to one country and imports from 
the other. All the equations have been estimated with partner fixed effects and development dummy for reporters 
EU and US, as well as time dummies. Coefficients on those variables are not shown.  
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variables (total imports and total exports) both have the expected sign. The magnitude of 
their coefficients is .481 for the total exports and .301 for total imports.  
The distance coefficient is negative although smaller than negative one, as the standard 
gravity model predicts (-.542). The coefficient on CONTIG is positive, as expected (1.25). 
Finally, the coefficient on common language also shows the expected positive sign (.50).  
The coefficients on the specific rules of origin reveal interesting results. All rules cause 
overall trade to diminish except regional content rules (RVC). Inclusion of this rule increases 
trade by 8 percent. The most trade restrictive rule is wholly obtained (WO); products with a 
WO rule are traded 36 percent less holding everything else constant. Technical tests (TT) are 
almost as trade-restrictive, diminishing trade by 34.7 percent. Equally, rules adopting a 
change in tariff chapter do so by 33.8 percent; adding the possibility to choose between two 
or more rules (ALT) increases trade by 13.1 percent. Combining two rules and the special 
case of European value content are not significant at the 10 percent level. CTH also has a 
negative impact on total trade (-.146), which is smaller than the impact of CC, but larger than 
the hampering effect of CTS (-.115) 
Finally, allowing exporters to produce their own proof of origin (SELFCER) increases total 
trade by 40 percent.  
Results for exports are displayed in Column (2). Now, a larger proportion of the dependant 
variable is explained by the model (R-squared = 0.79). Again, most variables are significant 
at the one percent level. In terms of variable significance, COMB is now significant at the one 
percent level; RVC loses significance although it still is at the 10 percent level; and ALT in 
only significant at the five percent level.  
All variables are significant at the one percent level with the exception of COMB, and 
RVCEU, which is significant at the five percent level.  
The coefficients on the standard gravity variables are comparable to the previous case, 
although they show some variation in VL]H7KHJDSEHWZHHQH[SRUWHU·VDQGLPSRUWHU·VVL]H
coefficient is now widened (.621 and .244, respectively); since the dependant variable is now 
exports, the argument put forward by Marchetti (2009) seems to be reinforced. The 
importance of distance decreases, although this is done in approximately the same 
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proportion as the CONTIG coefficient increases, i.e. distance is reduced from -.542 to -.419 
while CONTIG increases from 1.25 to 1.43. Additionally, the coefficient on language 
increases to .89. Taken together, these variables suggest that exporters may have well 
established markets to which they direct their products.  
The coefficients on the specific rules of origin show some relevant variations from those for 
total trade. Namely, all rules increase their negative impact on trade, with the exception of 
CC (-.335). Surprisingly, COMB now becomes positive; this result is counterintuitive. At the 
same time, ALT reduces its positive impact (.048) and adding an exception to a CTC is not as 
trade damaging (-.148). Likewise, self-certification, though still favoring trade, diminishes its 
importance (.34).  
 Estimates for imports as dependant variable are provided in Column (3). The model fit is 
now slightly lower (R-squared = .69). The size of the coefficients moves in the opposite 
GLUHFWLRQ WKDQ IRU H[SRUWV 7KH JDS EHWZHHQ WKH UHODWLYH LPSRUWDQFH RI H[SRUWHU·V DQG
LPSRUWHU·VVL]HSUDFWLFDOO\GLVDSSHDUVWKHLUFRHIILFLHQWVQRZEHLQJIRUWKHH[SRUWHUDQG
.431 for the importer. Imports reveal being more sensitive to distance than exports, i.e. the 
distance coefficient is now -.616. Both the impact of having a common border and sharing a 
common language is diminished (1.205 and .369, respectively).  
Regarding specific rules of origin, all rules are now significant except CTH. Their impact on 
imports is as follows: the most restrictive rule is now TT (-.21), while WO, which was the 
most restrictive rule before, now shows a positive impact on imports (.211). RVC is again the 
most trade conducive rule; including it raises imports by 22.9 percent. The negative impact of 
CC is reduced to -18 percent, while that of CTS is -14.3 percent. RVCEU is significant at the 
five percent level, as opposed to the two previous instances; it has a negative coefficient of -
.131. Adding an exception to a rule reduces imports by -24 percent. The coefficient for ALT is 
now significant at the one percent level and increases its size to -178. COMB, is again 
negative and highly damaging, reducing imports by 22.1 percent. Finally, SELFCER greatly 
augments its size to .828.  
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Table 5.10. Combination of Rules 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Trade Exports Imports 
LIMP 0.301 0.244 0.431 
 (154.43)*** (85.89)*** (100.33)*** 
LEXP 0.481 0.621 0.436 
 (240.19)*** (164.12)*** (141.08)*** 
DIST -0.542 -0.419 -0.616 
 (31.17)*** (12.41)*** (28.97)*** 
LANG 0.503 0.890 0.369 
 (25.84)*** (37.08)*** (16.30)*** 
CONTIG 1.251 1.430 1.205 
 (41.47)*** (36.06)*** (25.43)*** 
SELFCER 0.404 0.340 0.828 
 (12.09)*** (10.56)*** (17.09)*** 
CC -0.338 -0.335 -0.180 
 (11.31)*** (10.11)*** (4.45)*** 
CTH -0.146 -0.298 -0.039 
 (6.12)*** (11.50)*** (1.11) 
CTS -0.115 -0.299 -0.143 
 (4.20)*** (9.88)*** (3.76)*** 
RVC 0.085 -0.045 0.229 
 (3.41)*** (1.68)* (6.20)*** 
RVCEU -0.002 -0.057 -0.131 
 (0.06) (1.39) (2.22)** 
TT -0.347 -0.394 -0.210 
 (12.83)*** (13.25)*** (5.29)*** 
WO -0.360 -0.568 0.211 
 (10.55)*** (14.55)*** (3.98)*** 
COMB 0.005 0.263 -0.221 
 (0.22) (10.91)*** (6.63)*** 
ALT 0.131 0.048 0.178 
 (6.50)*** (2.27)** (5.76)*** 
EXC -0.244 -0.148 -0.242 
 (13.20)*** (7.11)*** (10.53)*** 
Constant 1.360 -0.675 1.629 
 (7.03)*** (2.50)** (6.17)*** 
Observations 437101 240193 196908 
R-squared 0.72 0.79 0.68 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The results for the grouped rules (Methods 2 and 3) are displayed in Tables 5.11 and 5.12. 
The analysis of these two tables diverges from the previous one in that in order to isolate the 
effect of individual rules; it does not take into account any product which is subject to more 
than one of them. The implication of this is that the rules are now a linear combination of the 
RWKHUVVRRQHYDULDEOHQHHGVWREHGURSSHGWRDYRLGWKH´GXPP\YDULDEOHWUDSµ7KURXJKRXW
both tables, RVC is the rule that has been dropped so it acts as a benchmark for the 
remaining rules.  There is only one difference between Tables 5.11 and 5.12: CC, CTH and 
CTS are recorded individually in Table 5.11 and combined into CTC in Table 5.12. 89 
Therefore, both tables illustrate the same results for all the remaining variables.  
With some slight differences, the fit of the models is the same as in Table 5.10 for total trade, 
exports and imports. All variables are significant at the one percent level in both tables with 
the exception of CC, which is significant at the five percent level when exports is the 
GHSHQGDQWYDULDEOH/LNHZLVH´JUDYLW\YDULDEOHVµVKRZFRPSDUDEOHFRHIILFLHQWVERWKLQVLJQ
and size. 
In terms of total trade (Column (1)), RVC is by far the least restrictive rule; all others 
diminishing trade by at least 30 percent (29.6 percent in the case of CC). WO is confirmed as 
the most restrictive for overall trade reducing it by 60.8 percent compared to RVC. The 
coefficient on TT is -.351 that of RVC. When combined into one single rule as a change in 
tariff classification (CTC, Table 5.12), this rule is -30.3 percent more restrictive than RVC. 
Interestingly, the disaggregation of these three rules seems at odds with the predictions. CC 
appears as the least damaging (-.296), followed by CTH (-.301) and then CTS (-.377). Again, 
the coefficient on SELFCER indicates a large and positive reaction of total trade to this policy 
(.581).  
In terms of exports (Column (2) in Tables 5.11 and 5.12), RVC remains as the most trade 
facilitating rule, although the difference with the rest of the rules is less pronounced than for 
total trade. WO remains considerably negative (-.613); the coefficient of TT is now -.26; and 
CTC -.210. When observed individually, CTH becomes now the most prejudicial for exports 
of the three (-.211), followed by CTH (-.152) and CC (-.110). The impact of self certification for 
exports is, as in Table 5.10 above, somewhat dampened compared to total trade (.350). 
                                                     
 
89
 RVCEU is not considered in either table as it cannot be considered part of any of the four standard families of 
rules. 
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Regarding imports (Column (3) in Tables 5.11 and 5.12), RVC continues to be the most trade 
conducive rule, with TT as the most restrictive (-.306). WO goes from being the most 
restrictive for exports to follow RVC in terms of promoting trade (-.240). CTC reduces 
imports by 28.2 percent compared by RVC. When observing its three components in Table 
5.11, CC and CTH show a similar impact -.275 and -.274 respectively; CTS exhibits a 
surprisingly damaging effect (-.577). Lastly, the coefficient on self-certification attains its 
highest value (1.041).  
Table 5.11. Grouped Rules 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  All Trade Exports Imports 
LIMP 0.293 0.240 0.407 
  (113.77)*** (59.68)*** (63.10)*** 
LEXP 0.508 0.644 0.441 
  (191.33)*** (114.92)*** (96.94)*** 
DIST -0.530 -0.401 -0.548 
  (18.05)*** (7.44)*** (15.47)*** 
LANG 0.579 0.962 0.432 
  (22.77)*** (25.08)*** (12.15)*** 
CONTIG 1.222 1.407 1.225 
  (31.34)*** (24.03)*** (17.43)*** 
SELFCER 0.581 0.350 1.041 
  (14.64)*** (7.34)*** (13.99)*** 
CC -0.296 -0.110 -0.275 
  (8.22)*** (2.40)** (4.97)*** 
CTH -0.301 -0.211 -0.274 
  (12.93)*** (7.81)*** (7.05)*** 
CTS -0.377 -0.152 -0.577 
  (9.89)*** (3.28)*** (9.49)*** 
TT -0.351 -0.260 -0.305 
  (14.23)*** (9.00)*** (7.32)*** 
WO -0.608 -0.613 -0.240 
  (16.20)*** (13.86)*** (3.59)*** 
Constant 1.604 -2.792 1.931 
  (6.49)*** (4.91)*** (5.47)*** 
Observations 204294 114524 89770 
R-squared 0.73 0.79 0.67 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: RVC dropped from regression, hence used as benchmark rule 
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Table 5.12. Grouped Rules by Family 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  All Trade Exports Imports 
LIMP 0.293 0.240 0.406 
  (113.97)*** (59.60)*** (63.32)*** 
LEXP 0.508 0.644 0.442 
  (191.45)*** (114.97)*** (97.09)*** 
DIST -0.532 -0.399 -0.553 
  (18.14)*** (7.41)*** (15.60)*** 
LANG 0.582 0.962 0.442 
  (22.85)*** (25.03)*** (12.43)*** 
CONTIG 1.222 1.414 1.222 
  (31.40)*** (24.16)*** (17.39)*** 
SELFCER 0.565 0.404 0.985 
  (15.57)*** (9.48)*** (13.89)*** 
CTC -0.303 -0.210 -0.282 
  (13.02)*** (7.76)*** (7.24)*** 
TT -0.351 -0.260 -0.306 
  (14.25)*** (9.02)*** (7.36)*** 
WO -0.609 -0.614 -0.241 
  (16.21)*** (13.89)*** (3.61)*** 
Constant 1.635 -2.895 1.573 
  (6.62)*** (5.10)*** (4.98)*** 
Observations 204294 114524 89770 
R-squared 0.73 0.79 0.67 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: RVC dropped from regression, hence used as benchmark rule 
The results for Method 4 are illustrated in Table 5.13. This method observes every possible 
combination of rules that occurs in origin protocols, assigning to each of them a different 
value. This method has the advantage of allowing the estimation of all possible interaction of 
rules, being certain of the impact of each of them, as opposed to Method 1, where it is 
impossible to observe under what rule trade is actually conducted. The drawback is that a 
large number of rules lose significance. Thirty seven different rules where identified and 
introduced in the equation; 17 are reported to be significant in one of the three equations; of 
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those, only five are significant throughout the three equations. Not significant variables in 
any of the equations have been omitted.90  
The explanatory power of the model is similar to previous methods (R-squared = .73, .78 and 
.67, for total trade, exports and imports, respectively). Correspondingly, all the gravity 
variables show analogous sign and magnitude for all three dependant variables than before.  
In terms of total trade, (Column (1)), rule is R37 (WO OR (TT & RVC)), is the most restrictive, 
with a coefficient of -1.075. Also showing a negative effect and in order of more restrictive to 
less restrictive are R26 (CTCex & TT), R25 (CTCex & RVC), R4 (WO), R13 (CTC OR TT) and 
R5 (CTCex), which marks the lower bound of the rules with a negative coefficient (-.039).  
On the trade-facilitating rules, R23 (CTCex OR RVC) has the largest coefficient (.474), 
followed by R2 (RVC), R12(CTC OR RVC), R14 (CTC & RVC) and R28 (CTC OR (CTC & 
RVC)).  
In terms of exports, roughly the same hierarchy as before is maintained for restrictive rules. 
Some rules that were not significant for total trade become significant (and negative) now. 
These are R21 (TT & WO) and R30 (CTCex OR (CTC & RVC)). In addition, R28, which had a 
positive for total trade, turns negative for exports. Only three rules show a significant and 
positive coefficient: R36 ((RVC & RVC) OR RVC), R2 (RVC) and R14 (CTC & RVC).  
The picture varies considerably for imports. Now, only three variables show a negative and 
significant coefficient, these being R26 (CTCex & TT), R25 (CTCex & RVC) and R5 (CTCex). 
However, several variables become positive and significant: R23 (CTCex OR RVC), R22 
(RVC & WO), R17 (RVC OR TT), R12 (CTC OR RVC), R2 (RVC), R4 (WO), R28 (CTC OR 
(CTC & RVC)), R14 (CTC & RVC) and R1 (CTC).   
Lastly, self-certification shows the same results as in previous methods.  
 
 
                                                     
 
90
 Several variables are omitted due to collinearity. Although this does not preclude the comparison among the 
rules included in the sample, the interpretation of the dummy variable coefficients is not straightforward.  
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Table 5.13. Unique Rules 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Trade Exports Imports 
LIMP 0.307 0.250 0.425 
 (162.77)*** (82.83)*** (96.42)*** 
LEXP 0.495 0.606 0.444 
 (254.30)*** (153.37)*** (137.83)*** 
DIST -0.528 -0.454 -0.607 
 (29.38)*** (13.23)*** (27.37)*** 
CONTIG 1.294 1.340 1.271 
 (45.96)*** (32.63)*** (24.26)*** 
LANG 0.456 0.904 0.314 
 (27.05)*** (36.41)*** (13.09)*** 
SELFCER 0.507 0.419 0.790 
 (18.40)*** (13.09)*** (14.68)*** 
R1 0.013 -0.010 0.075 
 (0.48) (0.35) (1.70)* 
R2 0.323 0.256 0.338 
 (11.09)*** (7.70)*** (6.90)*** 
R4 -0.237 -0.369 0.169 
 (6.00)*** (8.11)*** (2.40)** 
R5 -0.141 -0.135 -0.115 
 (4.48)*** (3.61)*** (2.25)** 
R12 0.249 -0.051 0.521 
 (8.43)*** (1.45) (10.81)*** 
R13 -0.210 -0.383 -0.118 
 (3.60)*** (5.34)*** (1.27) 
R14 0.152 0.186 0.133 
 (4.49)*** (4.67)*** (2.44)** 
R17 0.192 0.052 0.525 
 (0.93) (0.19) (1.72)* 
R21 -0.125 -0.380 0.278 
 (1.05) (2.96)*** (1.12) 
R22 -0.073 -0.057 0.601 
 (1.31) (0.72) (6.93)*** 
R23 0.474 0.013 0.736 
 (7.33)*** (0.15) (8.28)*** 
R25 -0.624 -0.192 -0.888 
 (5.97)*** (1.35) (5.74)*** 
R26 -0.924 -0.630 -0.963 
 (22.04)*** (11.61)*** (15.22)*** 
R28 0.063 -0.088 0.164 
 (1.89)* (2.13)** (3.13)*** 
R30 -0.039 -0.179 -0.001 
 (0.85) (2.90)*** (0.01) 
R36 0.150 0.384 -0.051 
 (1.53) (4.17)*** (0.31) 
R37 -1.075 -0.655 -0.411 
 (3.57)*** (2.70)*** (0.77) 
Constant 1.165 -0.295 0.526 
 (6.43)*** (0.90) (2.26)** 
Observations 437101 240193 196908 
R-squared 0.73 0.78 0.67 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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5.2.2 Discussion  
The results of the estimations prove to be very encouraging with regards the main purpose 
of this study, i.e. to assess the impact on trade of the different types of product-specific rules 
of origin. Most of the variables are significant throughout the estimations and show 
coefficients in line with the expected outcomes and, when available, with previous studies. 
In line with the results above it becomes evident that the precise specification of the RoO 
does indeed matter. An RVC type of rule can increase trade by 22.9 percent whereas a TT can 
reduce it by 21 percent. 
One note of attention must be drawn here with regards to the interpretation of the 
coefficients in the different methods. Method 1 is the only one which allows direct inference 
on the impact on trade of the specific rules because it is the only method where the dummies 
included therein are not mutually exclusive. The results for this method suggest that setting 
a different type of RoO can have more than 45 percent impact on trade (positive eight 
percent for RVC against negative 36 percent for WO). Another trade facilitating aspect 
shown in this method is the fact that an alternative between rules may increase total trade by 
13 percent.  
The reminder methods offer a different interpretation. Since one variable is dropped in each 
of them, the coefficients presented therein are taken in comparison to the dropped variable, 
which is an encouraging way of confirming the hierarchy of the rules presented in Method 1. 
Across the methods, it is confirmed the relative trade-conduciveness of the RVC rule, which 
may increase trade by as much as 30 percent compared to CTC rules (Table 5.12), or 60 
percent compared to WO rules (Tables 5.11 and 5.12) 
Despite the positive results, there are a number of counterintuitive results which may 
through important light to the understanding of the RoO. Most of them relate mainly to 
differences between exports and imports. The explanation for the differences in the 
estimation coefficients for the different types of rules between both flows are in line with the 
findings of Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) and Portugal-Pérez (2009). These authors find 
a political economy explanation for setting up a system of RoO. Their argument is essentially 
comparable in its main points. Exporters of final goods have an incentive to enter an FTA in 
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the expectation of reaching to other markets. At the same time, intermediate good producers 
are at risk, since they now face competition from other export-competing intermediate good 
producers. Therefore, in order to accept a Free Trade Area (FTA), they will lobby their 
government in order to ensure a captive market for their goods. According to Portugal-Pérez 
(2009), intermediate good producers are normally located in Northern countries, i.e. 
powerful countries. It follows that powerful countries will try to establish stringent rules to 
satisfy their intermediate producers while not harming their exporters. These lines of 
argument provide some hints to solve the exporter-importer dichotomy in some of the 
variables observed in the previous chapter.  
,PSRUWHG SURGXFWV DSSHDU WR EH PRUH VHQVLWLYH WR GLVWDQFH DQG SDUWQHU·V FRXQWU\ VL]H LH
compared to exports these two characteristics suggest that imports are more sensitive to 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRWKHUWKDQWKHSURGXFWLWVHOI%\FRPSDULVRQH[SRUWV·PDUNHWVUHDFWOHVVWRVL]H
and distance variables, so they can be thought as relying more on the specific conditions of 
the product itself.  
This observation, coupled with some of the counterintuitive results, i.e. a positive effect for 
Combination of Rules (COMB) for exports or a much larger negative impact of CTS than CC 
for imports, leads to the following argument: rules of origin tend to be set by the exporting, 
hegemonic, country. Their exporters have fewer problems in complying with the rules, while 
local intermediate producers receive extra protection. In other words, rules are primarily 
designed to protect local producers. A number of authors agree with this observation. Cadot 
et al. (2005) find empirical support to affirm that rules of origin serve as a subsidy to 
intermediate good producers in the powerful country, transferring rents from taxpayers. 
Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) show theoretically how the political viability of FTAs 
referred above is only achieved after the producers in the local market receive extra 
protection. Garay and De Lombaerde (2004) find a similar conclusion from a different 
perspective: based on the participation on a survey organized by the European Commission, 
WKH\REVHUYHKRZ(XURSHDQSUHIHUHQWLDOUXOHV´UHIOHFWWKHREMHFWLYHVRI(XURSHDQLQGXVWULDO
SROLF\UDWKHUWKDQWUDGHRUGHYHORSPHQWSROLF\µ The results find herein seem to reinforce 
this argument. 
The results explained above are in accordance to some extent with the predictions made in 
the previous chapter: 
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Prediction 1: CC > CTH > CTSZLWK´!µPHDQLQJ´PRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQµ 
The results regarding this prediction are mixed. On the one hand this prediction holds in the 
first method, when these rules interact with other rules. On the other hand, it does not when 
the rules are analyzed independently. In this case the order is actually the opposite 
(CC<CTH<CTS). These findings parallel those of Cadot et al (2002) regarding Mexican 
exports to the US. In their estimation they find that the most restrictive rule is the Change in 
Tariff Item (not considered in the present study), which is meant to be less restrictive than a 
CTS. 
The reason for this may reside on the fact that CTS rules are in fact very precise rules. 
Whereas CC and CTH may consist of more general rules that are applied a larger spectrum 
of products, CTS are instead targeted against particular products for which they forbid the 
use of the particular element that is key in manufacturing a product.  
Prediction 2: CC>RVC=CTH>CTS 
Prediction 3: CTC=RVC 
The clear-cut positive effect of RVC is potentially the key finding of this study. 
Consequently, these two predictions, based on the observation rules of Cadot et al. (2006) 
and Estevadeordal (2000), have shown to be far away from the results.  
RVC is consistently throughout all the methods the most lenient type of rule. SHYHUDO´ROG
JHQHUDWLRQµ DJUHHPHQWV VXFK DV 6$'& XVHG WKLV W\SH RI UXOH DV D JHQHUDO UXOH across all 
SURGXFWV5HIRUPXODWLQJWKHPWRD´PRGHUQµDSSURDFKZLWKDVSHFLILFUXOHIRUHDFKSURGXFW
was perceived as a restrictive move. In the words of Flatters (2002):  
´7KH UHJLRQDO FRQWHQW UXOHV RULJLQDOO\ DJUHHG IRU >WKH 6RXWKHUQ $IULFDQ 'HYHORSPHQW 
Community] (SADC) were simple, general and consistent with those in other developing 
FRXQWU\37$VLQFOXGLQJWKH&RPPRQ0DUNHWRI(DVWHUQDQG6RXWKHUQ$IULFD&20(6$>«
@&HUWDLQ 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WKHQ SUHVVHG IRU H[FHSWLRQV WR WKHVH UXOHV 7KLV OHG WR ¶PDGH-to-
PHDVXUH·VHFWRU-VSHFLILFUXOHVWKDWDUHIDUPRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQRULJLQDOO\DJUHHGµ
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Pelzman and Shoham (2010) note a number of problems regarding RVC. They argue that it is 
unsatisfactory because it generates substantial compliance costs; it is subject to price 
fluctuations of the raw materials and exchange rate volatility. However, it is also recognized 
that the value added method is praised for its simplicity.  
Theory on RoO tends to support the view that content requirements are trade-deterring.91 In 
its very basic form, any content requirement alters the optimal combination of factors, hence 
reflecting in an increase in price, as noted by Krishna (2005). However, all these theoretical 
contributions were made in comparison to not facing RoO, unlike the present study, which is 
undertaken in the context of a sub-optimal situation, i.e. the rules of origin are not compared 
to not having rules of origin but against other type of rules.92  
The results highlighted here are in line with Portugal-Pérez (2008), who finds evidence of a 
45 percent increase in exports of textile products associated to the inclusion of an RVC 
alternative rule.  
The results of these estimations suggest that simplicity is valued extremely high by exporters 
when it comes to rules of origin.  
Prediction 4: RVCEU>RVC 
This prediction is confirmed in the sole comparison available, i.e. Table 5.10. In fact, RVCEU 
rule turns out to be prejudicial for imports only, as it is not significant when the dependant 
variable is total trade or exports. The logic behind its estimated negative impact may reside 
in the fact that, as noted above, alters the optimal composition of factors of production as 
occurs with local content rules but it fails to provide the simplicity of standard RVC. To my 
knowledge, there are no studies available to verify these findings based on this type of rule. 
Prediction 5: TT>RVC 
Prediction 6: TT>CTC 
Prediction 7: TT=CC 
                                                     
 
91
 See the Literature Review Chapter for a discussion of the different effects of this type of rule. 
92
 An in-depth discussion about the pros and cons of RVC-type of rule is provided in Chapter 7 
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These three predictions are confirmed by the results of the analysis to a certain extent. Its 
impact is higher to that of CTC (Table 4.19). According to the results of Table 5.10, its impact 
is comparable to that of CC. However, prediction 7 is built on the expectation that CC lies on 
the upper bound of restrictiveness within the CTC family. Results in Table 5.11 provide 
evidence that the opposite is true.  
Whatever the restrictiveness of the CC rule, the technical test is confirmed to be restrictive 
throughout the analysis, in accordance with the observation rule of both Estevadeordal 
(2000) and Cadot et al. (2006).  These authors are of the view that TT are the most obscure of 
the entire spectrum of RoO, as they are made ad-hoc for specific purposes, which normally 
entail protecting ones market.  
Prediction 8: WO<Any other rule 
The impact of this rule varies widely from exports to imports. It is the most restrictive rule 
for exports and the second least restrictive for imports. In fact, it is the only one that suggests 
any positive impact on trade (imports) other than RVC, as indicated in Column (3) of Table 
5.10. Cadot et al. (2006) places it at the lowest restriction level.  
Being as it is generally applied to agricultural products, this rule can be largely lenient, if the 
product is grown locally, but it can be the most stringent deterrent if it is not, as there is no 
way of adapting production processes.  
Prediction 9: Exception has a negative coefficient 
Exceptions to the general Change in Tariff Classification rule can only be assessed in Table 
5.10. As expected, it is recorded negative in all three instances, fulfilling the expectations that 
adding just another twist to the general rule provides additional complications. In fact, 
exceptions to CTC are potentially extremely trade obstructing, as they can be designed so as 
to limit the use of the exact good that is needed in a particular country to manufacture any 
given product. As such, it displays the highest negative coefficient in the Imports column. 
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Prediction 10: Combination has a negative coefficient 
Combinations of rules can only be assessed independently in Table 5.10 (results in Table 5.13 
must be taken cautiously, as explained below). There, it is shown that this prediction holds 
for overall trade and imports, but it does not for exports. This result is extremely 
counterintuitive, as demanding to comply with more than one rule can only be thought as 
being overly restrictive. Its implications have been analyzed in detail above and throw 
important light about the definition of RoO. 
Prediction 11: Alternative has a positive coefficient. 
Prediction 12: Rules that include and alternative are more facilitating than rules that require 
a combination of two or more criteria. 
Likewise, predictions 11 and 12 can only be checked against Table 5.10. The findings therein 
confirm this prediction. In all three instances, providing an alternative represents a way of 
facilitating trade. This result is indeed certainly intuitive, as setting two possible ways of 
complying with a rule instead of one is necessarily easier. A different scenario could arise in 
the case that an alternative was offered only when two very restrictive rules were in place. 
However, this study has not analyzed the frequency of alternatives with respect to other 
types of rules. 
Prediction 13: Simple rules (i.e., those defined in the lower numbers of the scale) are more 
trade conducive than complex rules 
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI´XQLTXHµUXOHVPXVWEHWDNHQFDXWLRXVO\2QO\ILYHRXWRIDUHVLJQLILFDQW
throughout the three equations. However, there are some valid results. First, RVC is 
confirmed to be the most lenient type of rule. It is the only one that is trade-conducive for 
total trade, exports and imports. Other simple rules are not necessarily beneficial for trade: 
CTC only turns slightly positive for imports; WO follows, although its positive impact is 
larger than that of CTC, confirming the results shown in Tables 5.10-5.12. In general, complex 
rules appear to be more restrictive. In fact, only two rules that involve more than two rules 
(R28 ² CTC OR (CTC & RVC) for global trade and R36 ((RVC & RVC) OR RVC) for exports 
have a positive impact.  
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With regards to combinations and alternatives of rules, there is some evidence in favor of 
Prediction 12, although this is not definitive. Five out of twelve trade restricting rules (across 
the three columns) require a combination; rules allowing an alternative are found to be 
negative in four instances. On the positive side, combinations of rules appear in three four 
occasions (out of a total of 17 instances in which a rule is found to be positive across the three 
estimations). Eight rules involving an alternative are found to have a positive impact.  
Prediction 14: Selfcertification has a positive impact on trade flows.  
This prediction is clearly confirmed in all nine columns. In every case, self certification is 
positive and significant. Both exporters and importers (although more in the case of 
importers) appreciate policy decisions alleviating their administrative burden. Cadot et al 
(2004) estimate at 45 percent of the entire preference margin the cost of complying with the 
rules themselves. Any step removing red tape has the potential to greatly increase 
preferential trade within Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) members, as it is shown here.  
5.2.2.1. Gravity Variables 
Despite the difference in the size variable with traditional variables in gravity literature, i.e. 
GDP, GDP per capita, population, the magnitude of the coefficients on total exports and total 
imports lies within the expected range. Usually, GDP is expected to increase directly 
proportionally with trade. However, lower estimates are common in the literature.93 Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that in fact, coefficients on GDP are not close to one in the 
traditional gravity which may help the gravity equation reconcile with the fact that the trade-
to-GDP ratio decreases with size. If the gravity prediction of one-to-one GDP and trade, this 
ratio would not hold. Specific fixed effects absorb part of the of the impact of each variable, 
as noted by DeRosa (2007). Throughout the equations, total exports has a higher impact on 
WUDGHIORZVWKDQWRWDOLPSRUWVUHYHDOLQJVWURQJHU´SXVKµUDWKHUWKDQ´SXOOµIRUFHV0DUFKHWWL
 LQWHUSUHWV WKLVDVDQ LQGLFDWLRQRI WKH´KRPHPDUNHWµHIIHFW ,Q WKHSUHVHQFHRIKLJK
transport costs and economies of scale, manufacturers tend to concentrate production in 
countries that have strong internal demand. Those products are subsequently exported, 
hence establishing the link between market size and exports.   
                                                     
 
93
 See Kisu (2010) and Rahman et al. (2006) 
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As regards to distance, although the prediction is to be indirectly proportional to trade, 
several authors have found it to be considerably lower. The reported coefficient in table 5.10 
(-.542) lies well within the limits reported in the literature.94 Additionally, distance tends to 
have a smaller impact when combined with an adjacency measure. The coefficient on this 
variable illustrates a large tendency of countries to trade with their neighbors. Adding an 
DGMDFHQF\FRQWUROYDULDEOH´FRUUHFWVµ WKH LQFOLQDWLRQ WR WUDGHZLWKFORVH-by countries. In its 
absence, distance would show more sensitivity to trade that takes with border countries (i.e. 
within close distances) and display a higher coefficient. The positive impact of sharing a 
common language is explained by two factors. Speaking the same language facilitates 
communication and hence trade but is also normally the consequence of some common 
cultural or historical traits that may have helped establishing a commercial relation. Its 
impact on total trade (50%) is in line with the literature.95 
5.3. Conclusion 
Prior to estimating the equations, a number of clarifications need to be made. First, a 
poolability tests performing a Wald test on the coefficients of the estimated equation 
confirms the validity of pooling the data. Second, a choice has to be made between the use of 
fixed effects and random effects. Theoretically, fixed effects are preferred because using 
random effects requires the assumption of the observations being randomly drawn from a 
population and that the individual effects are not correlated with the regressors. This, in 
principle is a hard assumption to maintain in trade settings. This decision is confirmed 
econometrically by the Hausman test and country fixed effects are included, which help 
solve an eventual heterogeneity problem; this positive outcome is however likely to be 
jeopardized by the fact that fixed effects are not included at the individual level but a 
country level. Third, collinearity diagnosis reveals a problem of multicollinearity, which is 
solved after some transformations in the data, notably combining EFTA countries into one 
unique country and grouping reporting country fixed effects in two groups, developed (EU 
and US) and developing (Mexico and Chile).  
                                                     
 
94
 See Frankel et al. (1995) provides several specifications; the largest one in size is -.68. Ogueldo and MacPhee 
(1994) estimate distance to have an effect between -.25 to -.76  
95
 See Linders (2006) 
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Subsequently, a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) method is chosen to perform the 
regressions. However, the Breusch-Pagan and the Breusch-Godfrey test reveal the presence 
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, respectively, inducing estimation by Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS), which yields unbiased estimators. Lastly, the variables are transformed 
in logarithms in order to reduce the dispersion of the data. This comes at the price of 
dropping zero values, which, although the way of dealing with them has still not been 
properly settled in the theory, may lead to selection bias.  
The regressions show very interesting results, with most variables being significant across 
each method of estimation and showing the expected sign of the coefficients. The 
specification of the RoO does matter. An RVC type of rule can increase trade by 22.9 percent 
whereas a TT can reduce it by 21 percent. Each of the methods of estimation show interesting 
results, except method four, where most variables are insignificant. The one clear-cut fact 
about the regressions is that RVC type of rule is by and large the most trade-conducive rule. 
Two a priori counterintuitive results ² the fact that a combination of rules favors export trade 
and that CTS reveals clearly more trade-obstructing than CC for imports ² lead to the 
argument that rules of origin are clearly devised by importing hegemonic countries. Their 
H[SRUWHUVGRQRWUHDOO\´FDUHµDERXWWKHPEXWWKHLPSRUWHUVHQVXUHWKDWSURWHFWLRQLVJUDQWHG
to the home market. Lastly, gravity variables show the expected sign and coefficient. 
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Chapter 6. Restrictiveness Index for RoO 
6.1. Motivation 
At present, empirical literature on RoO relies entirely on ex-ante indices, first developed in 
Estevadeordal (2000) and subsequently followed and augmented in a series of studies. The 
VHFRQGPDLQJRDORIWKLVVWXG\LVWRSURYLGHD´UHDOµLQGH[RI5R2UHstrictiveness.  
The main motivation that led economists to create a restrictiveness index for RoO addressed 
in Estevadeordal (2007). This was to compare RoO regimes around the world. Being obscure 
as they are, until the development of the indices, different RoO regimes did not have any 
means of being assessed against each other and the development of the indices helped bridge 
this gap. In words of Estevadeordal (2007), the development of the restrictiveness indices 
became especially useful in order to analyze RoO-regimes in terms of their characteristics, 
rather than their effects. In other words, they are not good means of assessing the effective 
restrictiveness of the regimes. 
Despite this self-criticism of the indices, they have been used as exogenous explanatory 
variables in virtually every subsequent empirical analysis involving RoO. Examples of such 
applications are Estevadeordal et al (2004bis) and Anson et al (2005), who model trade flows 
on the basis of RoO restrictiveness or Cadot et al, (2002) who explore to the cost of complying 
with the RoO of NAFTA for Mexican exporters.  
Therefore, the indices are being used in an unintended way for the main reason that at 
present there exists no other alternative. This is probably encouraged by the fact that its 
simplicity overcomes the problems of using the indices, in view of the alternative complex 
codification process of RoO.  This gap in the literature is therefore intended to be bridged in 
this chapter.  
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6.2. Criticism of ex-ante indices of restrictiveness 
One RIWKHPDLQREMHFWLYHVRIWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\LVWREXLOGD´WUXHµUHVWULFWLYHQHVVLQGH[IRU
specific rules of origin. The reason for doing so is that the most quoted ex-ante indices in the 
literature on rules of origin present several caveats, namely:96 
a) Being an ex-DQWH REVHUYDWLRQ UXOH WKH\ DUH EDVHG RQ WKH DXWKRU·V VXEMHFWLYLW\ WKHUHIRUH YDU\LQJ
from author to author: 
Each of the indices is based on certain assumptions by the authors. For instance, in 
Estevadeordal (2000), the lowest value of restrictiveness corresponds to a Change in Tariff 
Item (CTI). For Cadot et al. (2006), this level would be shared by WO and Change in Tariff 
Subheading (CTS) with exception. Because of this inherent subjectivity, it is practically 
impossible to establish a clear decision as to the restrictiveness of different FTAs. Figure 5.1 
presents some evidence of the difficulty to rely purely on any of these measures. It compares 
the level of restrictiveness provided by three ex-ante indices for selected FTAs. While the 
three of them share some of the results, like finding the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) as the most restrictive regime, there is wide divergence on every other agreement. 
For instance, MERCOSUR is the most lenient for Estevadeordal (2000) while it is the second 
most restrictive for Gretton and Gali (2005). The Southern Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), 
which is the most lenient for Harris (2007) is the second most restrictive for Estevadeordal 
(2000). Further, adding the facilitation index developed by Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(2004bis) would not reconcile the results of the indices, as it for instance ranks NAFTA as the 
most facilitating. 
 
 
                                                     
 
96
 See the Literature Review Chapter for a description of each of the indices. 
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Figure 6.1 Comparison of ex-ante indices 
b) Ex ante indices are based on unchecked premises: 
One consequence of the ex-ante nature of these indices is that authors classify each type of 
rule of origin based on their own logical assumptions. Indeed it does seem reasonable to 
think that a rule is more restrictive the more components it forbids from being used in the 
final product. This is the reason why all of them set Change in Chapter (CC) at a stringer 
level than Change in Tariff Heading (CTH) or Change in Tariff Subheading (CTS). For 
instance, tomato juice of heading Harmonized System (HS) 20.09.50 is made out of tomato 
(HS Chapter 7). However, setting a CC or a CTS would have the same impact here so there 
would be no justification for a difference in their restrictiveness level. In addition, classifying 
content rules, technical tests or wholly obtained rules is less straightforward. Regional Value 
Content (RVC), which is taken to be as relatively restrictive in most indices, turns out to be 
the most lenient, according to the estimations in the previous chapter. Similarly, combining 
two types of rules seems more trade-restrictive than using just one. But the second rule could 
be neutral and hence have no reason to be classified as more stringent, at least a priori. 
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c) Imports are more relevant than exports: 
In view of the results presented in the previous chapter it becomes evident that it is not 
trivial who sets the RoO. Exporters to the hegemonic market struggle to meet the RoO. In 
turn, they are very sensitive to facilitating measures, such as alternative rules or self-
certification procedures. On the contrary, local (hegemonic country) exporters are well able 
to meet the rules so they are insensitive to additional requirements, such as combinations or 
exceptions.  
It therefore seems that rules of origin really become decisive trade-policy devices when 
applied to imports entering powerful countries. It is there where the true shape of rules of 
origin comes into effect. All four reporting countries in the estimation in the previous chapter 
can be considered hegemonic, at least to a certain extent. The EU and the US are of course, 
the paradigm of negotiating power. By their part, although Chile and Mexico are developing 
countries, tKH\DUHERWK´)7$FKDPSLRQVµ7KHLUH[SHUWLVHLQSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ)7$VVXJJHVWV
that they are in a position to exert considerable leverage when negotiating their rules of 
origin.97  
6.3. Building an Ex-Post Restrictiveness Index 
The caveats about the restrictiveness indices highlighted in the previous section suggest that 
in order to build a true index, it is necessary to do so using an ex-post observation rule, as 
opposed to an ex-ante. The methodology used for the construction of an ex-post 
restrictiveness index is explained hereafter:  
The main logic behind an ex-post index it to build it according to the data. This is done so 
using the estimates obtained from equation (4.10-c) ran for Method 1, as reported in the 
previous chapter. This equation takes imports as the dependant variable and it allows 
combinations of each type of rule with secondary rules. Choosing equation (4.10-c) responds 
to the findings obtained in the results which seem to suggest that rules of origin are set by 
protectionist hegemonic countries. The fact of obtaining the estimates from Method 1 is less 
subjective, as it obeys to the fact that this method is the only one that can shed light about the 
                                                     
 
97
 Except, of course, in their FTAs with the US and the EU, which have not been considered in the estimation 
sample as it would provide the same information for different variables.  
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hierarchy of each type of rule, as well as about the combinations, alternatives and exceptions 
to the rules. 0HWKRG  ´XQLTXHµ UXOHV FRXOG DOVR VHUYH WKLV SXUSRVH EXW LWV YDOLGLW\ LV
limited in this context as many of the combined rules are found to be insignificant. The index 
could have been constructed from the estimates of methods 2 and 3 but they would have 
lacked vital information about the interactions among rules, not included in these two 
methods.   
Once the appropriate benchmark for the index is chosen, it is built using the reported 
coefficients, as shown in Table 5.10, as follows: 
))(242.())(178(.))(211(.))(210.(
))(131.(.229)(RVC)()-.143)(CTS()-.039)(CTH(-.180)(CC)(
EXCALTWOTT
RVCEURI k

 
             
    (6.1) 
where kRI is the restrictiveness index, which is defined as the combination of all possible 
rules. Equation (6.1) sets a different stringency level for each product, according to the rules 
that affect it. When combined over all the RoO present in origin protocols, kRI results in 70 
possible different values, i.e. 70 different combinations of rules.98 These 70 rules can now be 
ordered from 1 to 70 and an index would already be obtained. However, having 70 different 
values restricts the workability of the index, as there are many of these levels which rarely 
take place in protocols of origin. In order to develop a more verifiable index, one 
transformation is performed and these 70 instances are grouped into 20 by dividing them by 
3.5.99 The resulting outcome is shown in Table 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
98
 See Appendix 6.1 for a list of these rules.  
99
 7ZHQW\LVDUELWUDU\LWUHSUHVHQWVDFRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYLW\´DQG³ZRUNDELOLW\´ 
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Table 6.1. Decomposition of the Restrictiveness Index 
 
RI Level Type of Rule 
1 
CCex&TT 
CTSex&TT 
CC&TT 
2 
CTS&TT 
TT&RVCEU 
CCex OR CC&RVC 
CTH&TT 
3 
CCex OR TT 
CTH OR CTS&TT 
TT&TT 
4 
CCex 
CTHex&RVCEU&WO 
CTSex OR TT 
CTH&RVCEU 
5 
CTSex 
CCex OR CTS&RVC 
CTSex&RVC 
6 
TT&RVCEU 
CTHex OR TT 
CCex OR CC&RVC 
CTHex&WO 
7 
CTHex 
CCex OR CTH&RVC 
CTHex&RVC 
8 
CTHex OR CTS&RVC 
TT&WO 
CC OR TT 
TT 
9 
RVC&TT 
CTSex OR CTS&RVC 
CC 
10 
CTH&WO&RVCEU 
CTS OR TT 
CC&RVC 
CTS&WO 
11 
CC OR CTS 
CTS 
WO&RVCEU 
12 
CC OR CTS&RVC 
CTS&RVC 
RVCEU 
RVC&RVCEU 
13 
CTH OR TT 
CTH&TT OR RVC 
CTH&WO 
14 
CTH 
CC OR CTH&RVC 
TT OR TT 
CTH&RVC 
15 
CCex OR RVC 
WO&WO 
CTH OR TT 
16 
CTH OR CTS&RVC 
CTSex OR RVC 
CTS OR CTS&RVC 
RVC&RVCEU OR RVC 
17 
CTHex OR RVC 
CTH&RVC OR RVC 
TT OR WO 
18 
WO OR TT&RVC 
RVC OR TT 
WO 
WO&RVC 
19 
CC OR RVC 
RVC 
CC&WO 
20 
CTS OR RVC 
RVC OR RVCEU 
CTH OR RVC 
RVC OR RVC 
Table 6.1 contains the entire spectrum of specific RoO.100 The order is from more restrictive to 
less restrictive, i.e. a score of 20 is the least stringent type of rule. Individual classical rules 
are highlighted in bold. As it was predicted from the estimates in the previous chapter, RVC 
scores at the second highest level of facilitation, followed by Wholly Obtained (WO). The 
most restrictive rule is Technical Test (TT), followed by CC. It stands out that CTH ranks 
better in the index than CTS.  
                                                     
 
100
 With the excpetion of Change in Tariff Items. This type of rule is of limited importance in origin protocols 
and has thus been disregarded in recent literature about rules of origin. 
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There are other notable characteristics. There is a concentration of alternative rules towards 
WKHKLJKHUHQGRIWKHLQGH[ZKLFKLVLQOLQHZLWKORJLF+RZHYHU´QRUPDOµSUHGLFWLRQVDUH
not an absolute rule for the entire index. While the top end is filled with alternative rules, 
some combinations of rules, like CC & WO, also rank high. Conversely, the lower range 
concentrates more combinations, although there are some alternative rules, such as 
Exception to Change in Chapter (CCex) OR TT. Exceptions to CC, CTH and CTS tend to be 
quite restrictive. It follows that an exception to any of these three rules ranks always lower 
than the rule itself, i.e. Exception to Change in Tariff Heading (CTHex)<CTH. In sum, this 
index is in line with traditional assumptions in its general lines, but it presents some notable 
exceptions. As such, it has some common points with previous indices but diverges in some 
others. 
6.4. Comparison with ex-ante indices 
The restrictiveness index presented here is broader in scope than previous indices. This one 
covers the entire spectrum of possible combinations of rules, while ex-ante indices compare 
what their authors consider as being representative. The individual differences are as 
follows:  
6.4.1 Estevadeordal (2000) 
The only rules that are considered individually in this index are those belonging to the 
change in tariff classification family. CTS ranks the least restrictive, followed by CTH and 
CC. This order is altered in the ex-post index, as noted above. Estevadeordal (2000) does not 
take into account the leniency (expected) provided by alternative rules; it refers just to 
combinations.  
On the similarities, his most restrictive rule is CC&TT, which is also in bottom category in 
the index above. Combinations of Change of Tariff Classification (CTC) and RVC lie in the 
middle of his index, as it does here.  
6.4.2 Cadot et al. (2006) 
Their index takes TT as the second most lenient rule, while above it ranks as the most 
restrictive single rule. The order of CTC-family rules is the same as in Estevadeordal (2000), 
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hence differing with the classification presented here. RVC as a single rule ranks in the 
middle of his classification; in the ex-post index it appears as the most conducive.101 In the 
same line, any combination involving RVC is regarded by the authors as very restrictive. 
This is not necessarily the case above. In fact, of those rules that include combinations, the 
ones that are coupled with RVC rank relatively high. Finally, as in Estevadeordal (2000), 
their index does not compute alternatives.  
On the common aspects, WO is ranked at the lowest range of restrictiveness in their index 
and very close to it above. Also, as before, CC & RVC is taken as the most stringent rule. 
Their classification takes into account several combinations and, those coupled with TT 
appear towards the most restrictive layer, as it does above.  
6.5. Classification of agreements in terms of restrictiveness 
In view of the differences, there is a potential for a different classification of the agreements 
in terms of restrictiveness. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 present the classification of the agreements 
considered in this study; Figure 6.2 provides the simple average and Figure 6.3 the weighted 
average in terms of trade volumes.  
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Figure 6.2. Restrictiveness of Agreements 
                                                     
 
101
 Cadot et al. (2006) split the RVC rule in two, one for a requirement of more 40% of local content and one for 
less. In that aspect, it is more complete than the ex-post index, which does not introduce that distinction.  
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Figure 6.3. Restrictiveness of Agreements 
Figure 6.2 signals NAFTA as the most restrictive agreement, followed by other US-based 
agreements. EU-family agreements rank higher, in particular those of the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) with Mexico and Chile. Not surprisingly, both US agreements and EU 
agreements do not differ much in their overall restrictiveness within agreements. Both 
countries rely on one set of rules of origin and with few exceptions, impose it to their 
partners. Chilean and Mexican agreements lie in some middle ground between US-based 
and EU-based, although their restrictiveness resembles more that of the US. This is in line 
with the findings of Garay and Cornejo (2001) who note that Mexico and Chile are 
SURPLQHQW VLJQDWRULHV RI ´QHZ JHQHUDWLRQµ DJUHHPHQWV LH WKRVH WKDW VWDUWHG LQ WKH ODWHU
years of the 90s, where RoO are heavily influenced by NAFTA. Finally, on the other side of 
the spectrum are US-Israel and US-Jordan. US-,VUDHO LV DQ ´ROG-generaWLRQµ DJUHHPHQW
(signed in 1985). US-Jordan was completed much later, in 2000. However, oddly enough, the 
86RQO\HQWHUHGWKH´QHZJHQHUDWLRQµDJUHHPHQWVZKLFKKDGYHU\PXFKEHHQVSDUNHGE\
the signature of NAFTA, until the Bush Administration took office in 2001. Cooper (2006) 
DFNQRZOHGJHV WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI WKHVH DJUHHPHQWV E\ UHIHUULQJ WR WKHP DV ´EDVLFµ $V D
consequence, their rules of origin are not very developed. They consist of general across-the-
board provisions with a few exceptions for limited products, namely textiles.  
Interestingly, despite the differences highlighted above with ex-ante indices, the ex-post 
restrictiveness of the agreements is very much in line with the calculations presented in 
Figure 5.1. In their view, NAFTA is too the most restrictive, with the EU family presenting 
more facilitating rules and other US-based FTAs standing in between. No comparison can be 
made on the agreements where the authors above disagree, i.e. SAFTA and MERCOSUR, as 
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they are not part of the present study. Lázaro and Medalla (2006), citing the Australian 
Productivity Commission, note that the US-Australia FTA is estimated to trade under the 
most restrictive RoO in the world. This finding is in support of the results obtained by the ex-
post index that classifies the US-Australia RoO as the second most restrictive ones after 
NAFTA.  
In terms of the weighted average, the hierarchy of the agreements is maintained overall, 
although there are a few differences with the simple DYHUDJH 1DPHO\ &KLOH·V DJUHHPHQWV 
with Canada and Mexico drop to the last position. This may come as a consequence of 
Chilean manufacturers targeting exports which may have a difficulty in complying with the 
RoO to the much larger US market rather than to its NAFTA counterparts.  
6.6. Sectoral Restrictiveness 
As it has been explained, RoO are likely to be the result of industrial policies in hegemonic 
countries. However industry has many faces, from fruit juice producers to car 
manufacturers, going through electronics, each of them having its own agenda. The likely 
result is that rules of origin diverge considerably from one sector to the next. This is explored 
in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.2. Both of them take into account data from selected agreements in 
the sample, namely EU-EFTA, Mexico-EFTA, NAFTA, US-Chile and US-Korea. The reason 
of this sample is to provide further comparison with past indices. In this case, the 
comparison is based on Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis), who perform the same 
exercise on those agreements. Figure 5.4 shows the average restrictiveness for each sector 
across these agreements; Table 6.2 disaggregates further the data by looking at each sector 
(by HS Section) in each agreement individually.102  
                                                     
 
102
 The index used in Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004 bis) is based on a scale of one tos even, being seven the most 
restrictive, i.e. the higher value the more restrictive. This is opposite to the ex-post index. In order to render both indices 
comparable, a transformation has been performed on Estevadeoradal and Suominen (2004 bis). The formula used was the 
following 114/2019]6)1()1[(exp xxxRIRI SuoEstost    
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Figure 6.4. Sectoral Restrictiveness Across Selected Agreements 
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Table 6.2. Restrictiveness Index by HS Section ² Comparison of Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) and Ex-post Index 
 
  EU-EFTA EFTA-MEX NAFTA US-CHILE CHILE-KOREA 
HS Section 
E-S 
Index 
Ex-post 
Index 
E-S 
Index 
Ex-post 
Index 
E-S 
Index 
Ex-post 
Index E-S Index 
Ex-post 
Index Est. Index 
Ex-post 
Index 
Live Animals 0.00 17.85 5.67 18.00 3.33 8.09 3.33 8.01 3.33 7.84 
Vegetable Products 1.33 15.88 10.00 16.40 3.33 8.80 3.33 9.03 3.00 9.03 
Fats and Oils 7.67 13.45 10.00 14.00 3.33 4.47 3.33 4.44 0.00 10.00 
Food, Bev. & Tobacco 6.67 10.62 8.67 10.65 7.67 9.01 4.33 8.64 6.00 13.10 
Mineral Products 11.67 13.41 11.67 13.52 3.33 9.96 10.33 12.02 5.33 10.06 
Chemicals 10.33 18.90 10.67 18.67 5.67 10.68 14.67 10.14 10.00 16.55 
Plastics 7.00 15.96 7.00 17.69 7.33 11.37 11.00 12.94 9.67 17.64 
Leather Goods 12.33 12.23 11.67 13.81 4.67 8.24 6.67 9.94 7.00 9.11 
Wood Products 13.67 10.94 13.67 11.89 10.00 13.76 9.67 13.96 9.67 13.78 
Pulp and Paper  8.67 13.51 8.00 12.85 7.33 8.45 7.00 8.88 9.00 12.90 
Textile and App. 3.00 9.86 3.00 8.93 0.33 3.59 3.67 2.82 5.00 4.61 
Footwear 14.00 9.88 9.67 11.65 7.00 8.44 7.33 9.39 7.67 9.10 
Stone and Glass 11.00 12.62 11.00 12.64 7.00 8.34 8.67 9.91 6.67 7.99 
Jewelry 11.00 12.13 11.00 12.23 5.67 8.30 6.00 8.84 5.33 7.10 
Base Metals 9.33 12.74 9.33 13.83 8.00 9.59 8.00 10.21 8.33 11.44 
Mac. & Elec. Eq. 7.33 17.49 10.00 19.37 12.67 13.12 13.67 12.07 10.67 13.72 
Transportation 7.67 18.91 9.33 18.36 7.33 14.22 9.33 13.48 9.00 19.01 
Optics 6.67 18.43 8.67 19.58 10.00 14.00 8.33 14.49 9.00 13.99 
Arms 10.00 19.00 10.00 19.00 7.67 12.23 5.00 12.33 7.33 na 
Miscellaneous 9.67 14.97 9.67 15.31 6.33 13.75 5.67 12.26 7.67 13.73 
Source: Own calculations and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004 bis) 
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Figure 6.4 signals Transportation, Optics, Arms, Machinery, Chemicals and Plastics as 
the sectors with most lenient rules. This comes as no surprise, as these sectors tend to 
include the higher value-added, high-level processing, as noted by Low (1998). These 
sectors concentrate in developed countries, i.e., those setting the rules.  
The sector with the highest level of stringency is textiles, by a considerable difference 
(scoring just six out of 20). This sector has attracted the largest deal of attention by 
researchers exploring rules of origin, who have shown the negative impact of rules of 
origin on them.103 Brenton and Manchin (2003) defend that restrictive technical rules of 
origin ensure that clothing products produced in partners from third countries do not 
qualify for preferential treatment. In fact, this sector is filled with TT requirements 
demanding a two or three-stage transformation on the final product to be considered 
originating. These rules are perceived as being highly restrictive, which has been 
confirmed by the large negative impact of TT. It therefore comes as no surprise its low 
ranking in the index. 
The one surprise in terms of sectoral restrictiveness is agriculture, being as it is a highly 
protected sector.104 The World Trade Organization (WTO) (2007) shows that EFTA 
countries liberalized virtually all trade in industrial products vis a vis Chile while they 
maintained protection on roughly 50 percent of agricultural products. Cheong and Cho 
(2006) find that on average, Western countries liberalize close to 80 percent of their 
agricultural products in their FTAs, compared to free trade in industrial products. This, 
LQWXUQFRPHVDVWKHPDLQGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ(VWHYDGHRUGDODQG6XRPLQHQ·VELV) 
calculations and the ex-post index. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) indicate that the 
high level of restrictiveness in agricultural products may suggest that RoO in this 
sector are driven by the same political economy variables that arbitrate the level of 
tariffs, particularly in the EU and the US. This is very possible, and so it is the fact that 
agriculture remains the most protected sector. However, the low restrictiveness of the 
ex-post index suggests that agriculture may still be benefitting from tariff protection 
and hence there is no need to use RoO as a trade policy. Thus, once a tariff line is 
liberalized, there is a true intention to trade. At the same time, a relatively high 
                                                     
 
103
 See Brenton and Manchin (2003), Portugal-Pérez (2008) or Augier et al. (2004) for different studies 
about textiles and rules of origin. 
104
 To my knowledge, no empirical estimation on the effects of rules of origin on agriculture has been 
done. 
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classification of the agricultural sector is less surprising when observing that WO type 
of rules rank high in the index and EU agreements rely on this type of rule for 
agricultural products. 
Regarding Table 6.2, there is a clear difference between the European family (EU-EFTA 
and EFTA-Mexico) and the NAFTA family (NAFTA and US-Chile). European rules are 
more lenient than Americans across the board, except in wood products. For both 
families, textiles is in the lowest rank, while high-value added products (the same as 
mentioned above) classify at the top of the list. By its part, restrictiveness of RoO in the 
Chile-Korea agreement resembles more that in NAFTA than in European agreements. 
The main differences with NAFTA appear in plastics and transport equipment. The 
first one comes probably as a result of Chile attaining the levels of plastics exports 
typical of a developed country.105 The second one, lenient rules in transport equipment, 
may have been one of the key objectives by the part of the Korean government when 
signing the agreement, in account of their pushing automobile industry. 
6.7. Empirical Applications 
Ex-ante indices are usually used in order to control for the restrictiveness of the rules of 
origin or to assess the impact on trade of the rules themselves. Examples of the first 
case are Cadot et al. (2004) who analyze the impact on the utilization of preferences or 
Estevadeordal et al. (2006) who look at the impact of rules of origin on investment 
flows.  In the second group, some notable examples are Anson et al (2005) who 
examine the trade effects on NAFTA, or Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis), who 
do so for imports between 155 trading partners.  
As a way to test the validity of the ex-post index, a similar study is performed here. The 
index is plugged in the place of the rules of origin in equations 4.10-a through 4.10-c. In 
order to obtain a better assessment of its performance, the analysis is done on a subset 
of the sample, i.e. North-South partners. Probably acknowledging the relative ease of 
Northern producers in complying with rules of origin, the literature on this subject 
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http://www.bnamericas.com/news/petroquimicos/Exportaciones_de_plasticos_llegarian_a_US*900mn_es
te_ano 
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usually concentrates on North-South trade, with particular interest on imports from 
Southern countries into Northern countries. A similar line is pursued here. Equations 
(4.10-a) through (4.10-c) take practically the same form as before: 
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and,  
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  (6.4) 
Variables are defined the same way as in equations (4.10-a) to (4.10-c), with a few 
exceptions. First, the dependant variable, whether total trade, exports or imports only 
takes place now between developed and developing countries.106 Third, subscripts are 
modified from i and j to n and s, in account of Northern reporter and Southern partner. 
As a consequence of the collinearity problems reported in the previous chapter that 
prompted the modification of reporter countries fixed effects into developed and 
developing reporters, there are now no reporter fixed effects. LANG is dropped from 
all the equations for the same reason. The third and crucial difference involves the use 
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 See Appendix 6.2 for a list of developed reporters and developing partners  
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of the restrictiveness index. The variable for rules of origin, kijJ , which was earlier 
composed by CC, CTH, CTS, RVC, Regional Value Content - PANEURO Type (RVCEU), 
TT, WO, COMB, ALT and Exception to any type of Change in Tariff Classification (EXC), 
changes now to model the restrictiveness index kijR . As explained above, this variable 
is now an ordered categorical value that can take values from one (most restrictive) to 
20 (least restrictive). Each product has its own restrictiveness level, based on the 
combination of rules applicable to it. Hence, it varies from product to product as well 
as from agreement to agreement.   
Further, a second set of regressions is run at sectoral level. In the previous chapter it 
was noted how the impact of the rules differs from exports to imports. In the same 
fashion, it is reasonable to think that the type of rule may have a different impact on 
different type of products. Clearly, a WO rule would be more restrictive on an 
electronics product where production is channeled throughout the world than on a live 
animal.  
In addition, such study becomes relevant regarding the extremely limited literature on 
the impact of rules of origin at a sectoral level on anything other than textiles. While 
the impact of textile products on developing countries is certainly important regarding 
the intensity of labor in production, agriculture and industrial goods are also worth 
being studied at.  The estimated equations are now:  
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and 
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  (6.7) 
Equations (6.5) to (6.7) use only imports (into developed reporters) as dependant 
variable in order to concentrate on the impact of developing country exports. All three 
equations are equivalent with the only difference being the range of products k 
considered. Equation (6.5) looks at the impact on agricultural products, where a 
accounts for HS Chapters 1-24; equation (6.6) focuses on industrial products, where b is 
defined as HS Sections 16-21; and equation (6.7) concentrates on textiles, where c is 
imports belonging to HS Chapters 50-63. 
All variables are expected to show the same sign and magnitude as in the results 
reported in the previous chapter. The restrictiveness index, kijR  is expected to be 
positive. The larger value it gets, the more trade facilitating the rules become. 
Therefore, an increase in kijR  should have a positive impact on trade in all flows and 
sectors. Results for both sets of regressions are reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.3. North South Trade-All Sectors-Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Trade Exports Imports 
LIMP 0.335 0.286 0.456 
 (130.96)*** (65.70)*** (55.28)*** 
LEXP 0.485 0.657 0.377 
 (168.15)*** (124.70)*** (73.71)*** 
DIST -1.091 -1.256 -0.597 
 (43.52)*** (53.89)*** (9.54)*** 
LANG (dropped) (dropped)  (dropped) 
    
CONTIG 0.817 0.625 1.274 
 (15.07)*** (11.37)*** (10.54)*** 
SELFCER 0.177 0.001 0.703 
 (6.49)*** (0.02) (11.27)*** 
RI 0.026 0.022 0.016 
 (13.97)*** (10.82)*** (4.50)*** 
Constant 7.316 6.117 2.945 
 (37.45)*** (32.16)*** (6.08)*** 
Observations 172334 110445 61889 
R-squared 0.73 0.81 0.68 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6.4. North-South Sectoral Trade-Imports from South-Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Agriculture Industry Textiles 
LIMP 0.479 0.630 0.548 
 (20.51)*** (44.55)*** (29.42)*** 
LEXP 0.263 0.286 0.287 
 (21.44)*** (36.24)*** (25.31)*** 
DIST -0.844 -0.624 -1.111 
 (5.07)*** (6.37)*** (7.76)*** 
CONTIG 0.946 1.595 1.002 
 (2.87)*** (8.53)*** (3.40)*** 
SELFCER 0.953 0.251 0.942 
 (5.89)*** (2.53)** (5.80)*** 
RI 0.032 0.046 0.035 
 (2.54)** (4.42)*** (2.87)*** 
LANG    
    
Constant 4.893 -0.007 7.248 
 (3.56)*** (0.01) (7.13)*** 
Observations 7645 21295 10254 
R-squared 0.69 0.68 0.67 
Semi-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The results are reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Trade flows reported in Table 6.3 are 
reasonably well explained by the variables in the model. R-squared in the three 
columns stands for .74, .81 and .68.  The lower fit of the imports model was also a 
feature of the results in Chapter 4. All the variables detailed in Table 6.3 are positive at 
the one percent level except for self-certification in the exports column. The acceptable 
R-squared along with the significance and expected sign of the coefficients is a positive 
indication regarding the applicability of the index.  
:LWK UHJDUGV WR WKH PDJQLWXGH RI WKH ´VL]Hµ YDULDEOHV WKH WUHQG KLJKOLJKWHG DERYH
seem to be strengthened. The gap between the importance of the ´SXVKµ DQG ´SXOOµ
measures is wider for exports than for imports, where it is now actually reversed. It 
seems to reinforce the argument that exporters sell differentiated products which are 
less sensitive to the conditions of the market itself. However, the distance variable 
displays a larger coefficient for exports than imports. This could reflect the 
overdependence of countries like Mexico and Tunisia on US and EU exports, from 
which they receive 49 percent and 68 percent respectively.107 At the same time, there 
seems to be a trade-off with the contiguity variable. This seems plausible in view of the 
contiguity variable which is much larger in the case of imports, acknowledging the fact 
that Mexico is a much more important exporter to the US than Tunisia and Egypt (close 
but not contiguous countries) are to the EU.  
The restrictiveness variable, kijR , is positive and significant at the one percent level in 
all three equations, as expected. Its coefficients are .032, .022 and .016 respectively for 
total trade, exports and imports. The variable is defined in levels, implying that a unit 
change in the index scale translates in 3.2 percent, 2.2 percent and 1.6 percent on the 
corresponding dependant flow holding all other variables constant.108 This implies an 
impact on trade between the most and least restrictive rules of 60.8 percent, 41.8 
percent and 30.4 percent, respectively.109 Equivalently, changing from a TT rule (level 
eight on the index) to RVC (level 19) entails a 35.2 percent increase in total trade. The 
restrictiveness index displays the same sign as other examples in the literature as in 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries-and-regions/ 
108
 Since the index is defined in discrete numbers, taking the variable in levels allows a better 
interpretation of its coefficient. 
109
 100**)120( E '  
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Anson et al. (2005) and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis), although a more 
modest impact.110  
Finally, self-certification remains positive throughout the regressions although in the 
case of exports it is not significant. Its magnitude is comparable to the results in the 
previous chapter for imports and somewhat lower for exports.  
The fact that exports are more sensitive to improvements in the restrictiveness of the 
rules of origin than imports is somewhat counterintuitive as exports from developed 
countries would be expected to show less reaction to changes in the restrictiveness of 
the rules. Nevertheless, Table 6.4 provides further insight into this question.  
In Table 6.4 all variables are significant at the one percent level, with the exception of 
the restrictiveness index for agriculture, which is significant at the five percent level. 
Gravity variables show a similar size and magnitude as previous regressions in this 
study. The size of the coefficient is comparable across the sectors with the exception of 
distance for textiles, which is larger than for industrial goods (-1.11 versus -.624). As 
before, there is a trade-off with contiguity in terms of magnitude, suggesting an 
equivalent explanation as to the size of the Mexican market in the US relative to other 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV·H[SRUWVWRGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV$QRWKHUUHDVRQFDQEHLQWKHIDFW
that 45.9 percent of Mexican exports, a distant country from the EU, are in machinery 
and transport equipment.111      
With regards to the restrictiveness variable, it displays the expected sign in all three 
instances. Interestingly, the coefficients are higher in all cases than in the aggregated 
imports column reported in Table 6.3 (-.032 for agriculture, -.046 for industrial products 
and -.035 for textiles). This indicates the possibility of the existence of certain sectors 
that are less sensitive to the restrictiveness of the rules of origin. Sectors like mineral 
products and fuels are prominent imports of developed countries from their 
developing partners and there is no incentive on the side of the importer to set 
VWULQJHQW 5R2 ,Q IDFW (XURVWDW  UHSRUWV WKDW  SHUFHQW RI (8·V LPSRUWV IURP
Chile are in fuels and mineral products; 65 percent of their imports from South Africa 
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 RoO restrictiveness in Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) displays a coefficient of 1.48 in 
absolute terms. 
111
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/mexico/ 
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are either fuels and minerals or products not classified as agriculture, chemicals, 
machinery or textiles.  
A number of studies have already documented the negative impact of rules of origin 
on textiles. In particular, Augier et al (2004) obtain evidence on RoO being particularly 
harming for EURO-MED countries in the absence of diagonal cumulation. They 
explain the harmful effect of RoO on textiles because they usually target the 
geographical sourcing of inputs, limiting their ability to source from the cheapest 
producer. Portugal-Pérez (2008) finds that African countries benefitting from a 
relaxation on the RoO requirements increase their exports by 300 percent. The case of 
WKH´GRXEOHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQµKDVEHHQZLGHO\TXRWHGDVDQH[DPSOHRIKDUPIXOUXOHLQ
the context of EU trade agreements. This rule requires two steps of production to be 
undertaken in a country to attain originating status, which is usually an onerous task. 
As a result, Brenton and Manchin (2003) report very low utilization rates for textiles 
from developing countries into the EU, suggesting their high sensitivity to RoO. The 
results in the present study sustain previous evidence. Developed country usually 
import low quality textiles from the South, which are manufactured in labor intense 
industries. Not being capital intense, these industries will probably have difficulties in 
adapting to more stringent rules of origin, considering their limited capacity to invest 
or to source themselves from more expensive inputs from the developed FTA partner. 
As for agricultural products, the impact of the rules of origin was probably more 
GLIILFXOW WR SUHGLFW 7KH (XURSHDQ IDPLO\ RI 5R2 UHOLHV RQ WKH ´ZKROO\ REWDLQHGµ
criteria, whLFKLVD´WDNHLWRUEUDNHLWµUXOHHLWKHUWKHDQLPDOLVERUQDQGJURZQWKHUH
or not and it is unlikely that a country without the conditions to grow a certain product 
becomes an exporter of such product. At the same time, processed agricultural 
products, including fisheries, are usually subject to controversy with regards their rules 
of origin. Naumann SRLQWVWR´RQHURXVFRQGLWLRQVµRI(85R2ZLWKUHJDUGVWR
fisheries that prevented developing countries from exporting to the EU. Altogether the 
coefficient in Table 6.4 gives an indication that RoO are in fact sensitive to the 
stringency level of the rules. Another possible interaction with regards to agricultural 
products is that they are subject to another notable non-tariff barrier, such as Sanitary 
and Phitosanitary (SPS) measures, which can also be used as disguised protection 
(Iacovone, 2002). While these measures may reduce the effect of RoO on trade (the 
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same way that RoO served to reduce the effect of tariffs), further analysis needs to be 
conducted in order to ascertain this point.  
Industrial products have usually been disregarded either by policy or empirical 
literature on rules of origin. The reason of the scarce interest in analyzing the impact on 
industrial products may reside in the supposed lesser importance of preferences for 
industrial products. Industrial tariffs are on average lower than agricultural tariffs and 
hence the impact of tariff preferences under FTAs is reduced. Cadot and de Melo 
(2007) calculate cost estimates of RoO compliance in the range of 3 percent. Together 
with similar calculations in previous studies, the authors establish in the range of three 
to five percent the preferential margin needed by developing country producers in 
order to export under the FTA. Industrial tariffs in the EU and the US amount to 3.3 
and 4.1 percent respectively, according to the WTO Tariff Profiles (2009). In addition, 
tariff preferences in FTAs are normally topped with trade-facilitation provisions such 
as recognition of standards or fast-lanes for exports. This, which is not taken into 
account in the calculations by Cadot and de Melo (2007) may reduce the preferential 
margin needed to apply for FTA treatment. Therefore, it seems plausible that despite 
lower tariffs in industrial products (which are, in any case on the verge of the 
´SDUWLFLSDWLRQ FRQVWUDLQWµ H[SRUWHUV PD\ KDYH DQ LQFHQWLYH WR FKDQQHO WKH SURGXFWV
XQGHUSUHIHUHQWLDOFRQGLWLRQVKHQFHXVLQJWKH)7$·V5R2 
The impact showed by the restrictiveness variable indicates that in fact, it is the most 
sensitive sector of the three to changes in the rules. This may account to the fact that 
industrial goods exported from developing to developed countries must be produced 
by large enough companies which have the capacity to compete with developed 
country companies in their home market. If such is the case, these firms may have an 
optimized profit function and changes in cost, as caused by changes in the rules of 
origin, may entail a process of readaptation before being able to comply with the rule.  
6.8. Conclusion 
At present, empirical literature on RoO relies entirely on ex-ante indices, first 
developed in Estevadeordal (2000) and subsequently followed and augmented in a 
VHULHVRIVWXGLHV7KHVHFRQGPDLQJRDORIWKLVVWXG\LVWRSURYLGHD´UHDOµLQGH[RI5R2
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restrictiveness, which can help gap the bridge identified in the literature in view of the 
following weaknesses of existing indices: a) Being an ex-ante observation rule, ex-ante 
LQGLFHVDUHEDVHGRQWKHDXWKRU·VVXEMHFWLYLW\WKHUHIRUHYarying from author to author; 
b) Ex ante indices are based on unchecked premises; and c) in order to calculate the 
correct index, imports are more relevant than exports. 
The way to construct a correct restrictiveness index is to do so using an ex-post 
observation rule, which is done from the estimates obtained in Chapter 5. In particular, 
from all the regressions conducted in Chapter 5, the ones used to compose the index 
are those of the import equation of Method 1. This choice is determined by two aspects. 
First, both theory and empirics suggest that RoO are in fact laid down by hegemonic 
importing countries; second, method 1 is the only one that allows for combination of 
rules.  
The restrictiveness index, kRI is defined as follows: 
))(242.())(178(.))(211(.))(210.(
))(131.(.229)(RVC)()-.143)(CTS()-.039)(CTH(-.180)(CC)(
EXCALTWOTT
RVCEURI k

 
 
This equation, when combined all over the RoO included in origin protocols yields 70 
different results. These 70 rules can now be ordered from 1 to 70 and an index would 
already be obtained. However, having 70 different values restricts the workability of 
the index, as there are many of these levels which rarely take place in protocols of 
origin. In order to develop a more verifiable index, these 70 instances are grouped into 
20. 
This index, which ranks from 1 to 20, being 20 the least restrictive, can now be used to 
assess stringency levels across agreements and is directly comparable to ex-ante indices. 
Interestingly, despite the differences between ex-ante indices, and the ex-post index, 
they share common findings with respect to the restrictiveness of the agreements. For 
both of them, NAFTA is the most restrictive agreement, with the EU family presenting 
more facilitating rules and other US-based FTAs standing in between. 
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An analysis of the stringency of the RoO is also performed by sector using the ex-post 
restrictiveness index. It shows textiles as the sector with most restrictive rules. The one 
surprise in terms of sectoral restrictiveness is agriculture, being as it is a highly 
protected sector. 
The ex-post index is subsequently used empirically to assess the sensitivity of exports 
from developing countries into developed countries to the stringency of RoO, by 
looking at three sectors in particular: textiles, agriculture and industrial products. The 
results of the estimation show significant results and the coefficients display the expect 
sign. The results show that trade in every sector reacts negatively to increases the 
stringency levels of the RoO, as should be the case. The one that shows a higher 
inclination to react negatively to RoO stringency is the industrial sector. It seems 
plausible that despite lower tariffs in industrial products (which are, in any case on the 
YHUJHRIWKH´SDUWLFLSDWLRQFRQVWUDLQWµH[SRUWHUVPD\KDYHDQLQFHQWLYHWRFKDQQHOWKH
products under preferential FRQGLWLRQVKHQFHXVLQJWKH)7$·V5R2 
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Chapter 7. Review Process of Rules of Origin 
 
7.1. Historical Background on Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin were initially devised as uncontroversial technical neutral devices to 
implement necessary trade policies, such as compiling statistics or labeling 
requirements (LaNasa, 1995). The author continues to describe how first attempts to 
harmonize rules of origin were turned down under the premises that defining origin 
ZDV´LQHVFDSDEO\ERXQGWRQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFSROLFLHVµ 
As Forrester (1994) notes, they only began attracting attention after the signature of 
free trade agreements between the European Communities and the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) countries in the mid 1970s. Increased Japanese exports were feared 
by European policy-makers and consequently, by 1980, they started drafting strict rules 
to ensure that no unwanted Japanese (and American) components fled the European 
market through the partner EFTA countries.  
Three other factors emerged at similar period. First, increasing internationalization of 
production. As Forrester (1994) indicates, original rules in the EU were designed as if 
production took place in one single country. Such a definition of origin was not valid 
anymore. Second, the intense increase of Free Trade Area (FTA) numbers after the 
uncertainty created by the outcome of the Uruguay Round; in 1991 there were 50 active 
RTAs in the world and by 2000 that number had increased to 200, according to figures 
of the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 112  Rules of origin are 
intrinsically more sensitive in FTAs than multilaterally as they go beyond their initial 
intended technical specification to be the devices through which preferences are 
granted. Third, Harilal and Beena (2003) highlight how, following several successful 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) rounds of negotiations, countries had 
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lost by the mid 1990s much of their power to conduct trade policy by the use of tariffs. 
They needed to restore to non-traditional trade policy mechanisms.  
These four factors converged in a renewed interest by policymakers to gain control 
over rules of origin. As such, an Agreement of Rules of Origin emerged as part of the 
WTO during the Uruguay Round. By then, the other economic superpower at the time 
other than the EU, the US, had joined the regionalism trend. The North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) came into force in 1994, providing for highly restrictive rules, as 
is shown in previous chapters. It then became ever clearer the potentially trade-
disruptive effect of rules of origin. As a consequence, the main objective of the 
Agreement on Rules of Origin was to harmonize rules globally and to ensure that rules 
of origin did not become an obstacle to trade. It is based on the following principles: 
- Equality among members, i.e. Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment 
- Based on wholly obtained or substantial transformation 
- Rules should be objective, understandable and predictable 
- Non-restrictiveness 
- Easily administrable 
- Coherence 
The Agreement explicitly excludes preferential rules of origin from its scope, which is a 
VLJQ RI WKH FRXQWULHV· LQWHQWLRQ WR UHWDLQ WKLV WUDGH-policy mechanism under their 
control.  
In parallel, FTAs started relying more on rules of origin. The first FTA officially 
containing provisions on rules of origin came into force in 1991.113 Although this fact 
must be taken with caution, it reveals the fact that pre-WTO FTAs did not attach so 
much importance to rules of origin.114 The reality is that many of them, such as the 
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) based origin on an across-
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 See Appendix 7.1 one for a list of RTAs containing provisions on rules of origin.  
114
 This figure, though official, is misleading as there are some agreements that supersede others, such as 
the European Communities, which is currently considered to have entered into force in 2007 in account of 
the last enlargement. Also, some agreements may not be notified to the WTO. 
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the-board general requirement, either a Change in Tariff Classification (CTC) or a 
Regional Value Content (RVC). Only after the coming into force of the WTO or, more 
particularly, NAFTA, it was that the bulk of FTAs adopted the complex set of rules of 
origin we know today.115  
7.2. Rules of Origin Around the World 
According to the WTO, today there are 210 notified RTAs to the WTO of which, 172 are 
FTAs.116 Most have their own system of origin determination, reproducing for this 
trade measure the so-called spaghetti bowl of FTAs.117 The complexities of an overall 
analysis of each of them are thus enormous. However, many FTAs share common 
traits on their origin requirements, or are even identical, which allows to classify FTAs 
DFFRUGLQJWR´IDPLOLHVµ118 In account of their influence over other origin regimes in the 
world two most important ones are the Pan-European System of Rules of Origin 
(PANEURO) and NAFTA. Here follows a depiction of some of the most prevalent 
ones.  
The rules applicable to agreements signed by the EU are highly complex, with a variety 
of combinations and alternatives between every type of rule (i.e. CTC, RVC, Technical 
Test (TT) or Wholly Obtained (WO)). RVC and CTC are the most commonly used 
rules, in many instances in combination with each other. WO are applied to 
agricultural products and textiles are normally subject to TT rules. As Estevadeordal 
and Suominen (2004bis) point out, the EU is extremely stiff in the application of its 
rules. In its attempt to harmonize rules across agreements, the EU established the 
single list of RoO, which is applied equally to all FTAs, with only minor modifications. 
Brenton and Manchin (2003) state that the EU has one way of negotiating rules with 
SURVSHFWLYHSDUWQHUV´\RXDFFHSWWKHPRU\RXDFFHSWWKHPµ$WWKHVDPHWLPHHTXDO
rules are employed across all the agreements in account of its willingness to promote 
diagonal cumulation.119 
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 See Appendix 7.2 for a list of origin determination criteria in RTAs. 
116
 See Appendix 1.1 
117
 This term was first used by Bhagwati in 1995 to refer to the multiplicity of FTAs around the world.  
118
 See Chapter 6 for a comparison of restrictiveness across selected FTAs. 
119
 See Chapter 3 for a description of this provision. 
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NAFTA rules are characterized by being very restrictive. Product specific rules are 
extremely detailed, with more than 2,000 different entries. They are largely based on 
Change in Tariff Classification (CTC), whether a Change in Chapter (CC), a Change in 
Tariff Heading (CTH) or a Change in Tariff Subheading (CTS); exceptions to the CTS 
are common place. Also, in most cases they are either supplemented or complemented 
by a content requirement. TT rules are used too, essentially for textile products. 
'LIIHULQJ IURP (8·V UHJLPH DJULFXOWXUDO SURGXFWV DUH XVXDOO\ VXEMHFW WR &hange in 
Chapter (CC) rules.  
In turn, the US has extended the NAFTA system to other agreements. Except US-
Jordan and US-Israel, which rely on across-the-board rules for all products, all other 
agreements follow the NAFTA style. However, unlike the EU, the US is more flexible 
in allowing for certain departures from NAFTA rules. Lastly, regime-wide provisions 
of both PANEURO and NAFTA are listed in Table 7.1 below. 
Table 7.1 Regime-wide provisions in NAFTA and PANEURO 
 
Agreement De 
minimis 
Absorption Cumulation Certification Duty 
Drawback 
NAFTA 7 percent, 
albeit 
subject to 
limitations 
for 
agriculture 
and Ch. 84 
Yes, except 
automobiles 
Bilateral Self-
certification 
No, 7 years 
alter the 
entry into 
force of the 
agreement 
PANEURO 10% Yes Bilateral Public-
private 
certification 
No 
Source: Origin Protocols from the Agreements 
Other families of rules of origin tend to be highly influenced in their shape by either 
NAFTA or PANEURO. FTAs in the Americas share the same structure as NAFTA, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH ´QHZ JHQHUDWLRQµ DJUHHPHQWV WKH RQHV VLJQHG DIWHU 1$)7$
However, the rules applied are not necessarily the same and they are all less restrictive 
than NAFTA (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004bis).  
By its part, the EU exerts its influence in Africa, with agreements like the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) almost replicating EU rules. Similarly, 
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EFTA applies EU type of rules in all its agreements. As in the case of American 
countries with NAFTA, EFTA may vary the exact content of the rule, usually becoming 
somewhat more restrictive than the EU.  
FTAs in Asia adopt a NAFTA-like approach, with a great deal of detail for every 
product. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) find that they rely more than NAFTA 
on CTH, hence becoming less restrictive.  
To end, an additional family would be made of those agreements highlighted above 
WKDW DUH SDUW RI WKH ´ROG JHQHUDWLRQµ PRVW RI ZKLFK DUH 6RXWK-South agreements. 
Examples of these are the Common Market of Eastern and Sothern Africa (COMESA), 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA).    
7.3. Preferential Rules of Origin and the Multilateral 
Trading System 
As mentioned above, the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin explicitly excludes 
preferential rules of origin from its scope.120  Therefore, the only WTO article that 
applies to preferential RoO is GATT Article XXIV. This article may be invoked by WTO 
members to allow them departing from the MFN principle if two or more members 
participate in an FTA. However, some conditions must be met. In particular, Article 
XXIV:5 states:  
Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union 
or of a free trade area; Provided that: 
 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of 
a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each if 
the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or 
the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included 
in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive 
than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same 
constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim 
agreement as the case may be; 
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 The only reference to preferential rules of origin in this agreement is made in the Common Declaration 
attached to it where it states that the rules should be transparent. 
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And Article XXIV:8.b: 
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories. 
Preferential rules of origin are therefore not explicitly mentioned in WTO law. 
+RZHYHUWKHWHUP´RWKHUUHVWULFWLYHUHJXODWLRQVRIFRPPHUFHµ(ORRC) could apply to 
them. ORRC is not precisely defined in WTO and thus, has been suggested to include 
measures like Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures (SPS) or Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), although no final decision has been made (WTO, 2000). Even though the exact 
SURYLVLRQV RIZKDW EHORQJV RU QRW WR ´RWKHU UHVWULFWLYH UHJXODWLRQV RI commerceµ DUH 
not defined, the WTO includes rules of origin as part of the factual presentations which 
are drafted to promote transparency of FTAs. Factual presentations are objective 
overviews of what are considered to be key provisions of the agreements.  
,QFOXGLQJ RU QRW 5R2 DV SDUW RI WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI ´RWKHU UHVWUictive regulations of 
FRPPHUFHµ LV FUXFLDO ,Q RUGHU WR EH DOORZHG SUHIHUHQWLDO GLVFULPLQDWRU\ WUHDWPHQW
under Article XXIV, an agreement must fulfill the conditions indicated above. If it does 
not, the agreement could be challenged before the WTO court. Article XXIV:5 is usually 
seen as the external requirement for FTAs, while Article XXIV:8 specifies the internal 
conditions under which an agreement may be considered an FTA. This means that 
FTAs have one external and one internal criterion they need to fulfill in order to qualify 
under Article XXIV. 
In accordance to WTO (1997), rules of origin have been suggested by some member 
states to be included in the definition RI´RWKHUUHVWULFWLYHUHJXODWLRQVRIFRPPHUFHµ If 
such were the case, and rules of origin ZHUHIRXQGWREH´PRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQ«SULRU
WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI WKH IUHH WUDGH DUHDµ WKHUH FRXOG EH D SRWHQWLDO OHJDO EDVLV WR
challenge the agreement. In fact, preferential rules of origin are always more restrictive 
than multilateral rules of origin, i.e. prior to the formation of the agreement. Their 
potential for diverting trade is well documented in the literature, as has been shown in 
previous chapters. Moreover, diverting trade may actually be the very reason of their 
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existence, as suggest Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003). Therefore, imposing overly 
restrictive rules of origin could give rise to a WTO dispute.  
,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH LQWHUQDO UHTXLUHPHQW VSHFLILHV WKDW ´RWKHU UHVWULFWLYH UHJXODWLRQV RI
FRPPHUFH«DUHHOLPLQDWHGRQVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOO WKH WUDGHµ121 As has been seen before, 
restrictive rules can divert trade, but overly restrictive rules can actually suppress it, as 
noted by Augier et al. (2004). Again, this could encourage countries to challenge an 
)7$ RQ WKH JURXQGV WKDW ´RWKHU UHVWULFWLYH UHJXODWLRQV RI FRPPHUFHµ KDYH QRW EHHQ
eliminated. 
Further complaints raised at the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements related to 
rules of origin include concerns about the issue of diagonal cumulation. Voices raised 
against this provision adduce that diagonal cumulation extends preferential treatment 
to members with whom there is no legal basis. Lastly, WTO (1997) details how some 
countries defend how, LQ RUGHU WR FDOFXODWH ZKHWKHU ´VXEVWDQWLDOO\ DOO WUDGHµ LV
liberalized between the parties of an FTA, account must be taken of the degree of 
restrictiveness of the rules. The extension of this reasoning is that tariff liberalization 
can be overwhelmed by restrictive rules of origin. This argument is in line with the 
theoretical and empirical literature in the vein of Anson et al. (2005) who defend that 
rules of origin undermine trade preferences.  
In sum, as long as no decision on excluding RoO from the scope of the term ´RWKHU
UHVWULFWLYH UHJXODWLRQV RI FRPPHUFHµ DQ\ PHPEHU LPSRVLQJ WUDGH GLYHUWLQJ UXOHV of 
origin could potentially be challenged on the basis of Article XXIV.  
No FTA itself has been challenged at the WTO. 122  Every WTO member except 
Mongolia is part of at least one Regional Trade Agreement (RTA). Thus, challenging 
one RTA could turn against itself. However, although unlikely, if any member were to 
depart from regionalism in favor of multilateralism, it could challenge RTAs on the 
basis of not liberalizing trade among the parties sufficiently (XXIV:8) or imposing 
additional barriers on third countries (XXIV:5). If rules origin maintain their current 
restrictive configuration, they could be a prime target of such challenge. 
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 6HH:75(*:IRUDGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHFRQFHSWRI³VXEVWDQWLDOO\DOOWKHWUDGH´ 
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 See WTO (2007b) for a summary of disputes at the WTO. 
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7.4. Voices in Favor of RoO Revision 
Whether from a theoretical, empirical, or case-study perspective, there is broad 
consensus in the literature about the impediments that RoO can represent to trade. 123 
The effects associated to them are countless. These are some of the most prominent 
flaws that are considered to be intrinsic to preferential RoO regimes: 
a) RoO are costly: 
Anson et al. (2005) estimate the costs of complying with NAFTA rules of origin and 
PANEURO at about 4 percent of the price of the final good. In a subsequent study, 
Cadot et al. (2005) add administrative costs to estimation and find them to increase by 
almost seven percent in the case of PANEURO and two percent in the case of NAFTA. 
Mattoo et al. (2003) argue that African exports to the US would have been five times 
higher if the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) would have had a simpler RoO 
system. At the sectoral level, Portugal-Perez (2008) finds evidence that African exports 
to the US increased by 300 percent once the single transformation rule was adopted. 
b) RoO distort trade: 
Simplified at the limit, any alteration of the optimal combination of factors of 
production induces effects on trade. The alteration imposed by rules of origin is likely 
to require input sourcing from less competitive FTA partners. Therefore, rules of origin 
are commonly regarded as causing trade diversion. Rodriguez (2001) builds a 
theoretical model to conclude that RoO can not only divert trade but also cause trade 
regression, i.e. the inefficient allocation of trade resources among FTA partners. 
Similarly, Augier et al (2004) point out that RoO can lead to trade suppression, i.e. 
reallocating international inputs by local inputs.  
c) RoO  are drafted in the interest of developed countries: 
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 Theory shows how RoO decreases overall welfare. However, it has also been demonstrated how, under 
certain conditions RoO can improve overall welfare. See Chapter 2 ± Literature Review for a summary of 
the different effects of RoO from a theoretical, empirical and policy oriented point of view.  
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If RoO can alter trade patterns, it is developed countries who grasp the benefits of 
these disruptions. Krueger (1993) shows theoretically how American intermediate 
good producers are the chief gainers of NAFTA. In the same fashion, Anson et al. 
(2005) obtain evidence that rules of origin become more restrictive as tariffs in the 
developed country drop, implying a protectionist use of RoO. The negotiations on 
rules of origin for the automobile sector are a widely quoted example of how the rules 
were drafted in order to protect local manufacturers in the US, (Deardorff, 2004). 
Some authors have taken this argument a step further and affirm that the drafting of 
rules of origin is controlled by powerful sectoral lobbies in developed countries. Herilal 
and Beena (2003)  FDOOWKLVWKH´SULYDWL]DWLRQµRIWUDGHSROLF\DQGWDNHWH[WLOHOREELHVWR
have played an important role in the framing of restrictive NAFTA rules. Deardorff 
(2004) finds it a plausible explanation that the reduced size of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) makes it impossible to deal with the intricacies of all the rules of 
origin that are involved in FTA negotiations. As a consequence, trade negotiators duly 
accept assistance from willing industries. 
d) RoO are obscure: 
As a follow-up of the previous criticism, the process of setting the rules remains 
obscure. There is little scrutiny over the crafting of the rule. Brenton and Manchin 
(2003) highlight that current European rules of origin seem to be applied now because 
they were already used in the past. This leads the authors to suggest that original rules 
of origin reflected the interests of particular groups who intend to maintain the status 
quo. Flatters (2002) raises the same question about the modification of SADC rules of 
origin, which went from and across-the-board regional value content requirement to a 
set of rules that closely resembles that in the EU-South Africa agreement, although 
South African textile producers were against stricter rules.  
e) RoO may differ widely across agreements 
The multiplicity of agreements described above results in a multiplicity of rules among 
FTAs. These rules may or may not be similar; as a consequence, exporters in countries 
being part of several agreements may encounter added difficulties to export under 
each of the regimes. As Naumann (2010) notes, opposite rules may undermine the 
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capacity for exporters to achieve economies of scale, as different processes may need to 
be performed to export to different markets. The following example illustrates this 
issue: 
Example of contradictory rules of origin 
Product Chile-Costa Rica FTA Chile US FTA 
210690 
A change to heading 
2106 from any other 
heading, except from 
Chapter 17 
A  change to a single fruit or single 
vegetable juice of subheading 2106.90 from 
any other chapter, except from headings 
08.05 or 20.09, or from fruit or vegetable 
juices of subheading 2202.90 
A Chilean exporter could produce edible ice mixtures preparations (Harmonized 
System (HS) 210690) from ice cream and other edible ice (HS 2105) and export to Costa 
Rica.124 The change in tariff classification required by the rule would be satisfied (from 
HS 2105 to HS 2106). However, this product was produced without a change in 
chapter. As a consequence, it would not enter the US under the preferential regime as it 
would not satisfy the rule. 
In view of the problems that current RoOs pose as they stand, there are countless 
voices asking for their reform. Taken together, these voices pursue the same principles 
as those underlined above as guiding the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin. In 
practical terms, they imply two general demands. First, rules should be less stringent 
and; second, administrative procedures should be less costly.125   
In the first group of demands, proponents argue for a relaxation of the technical criteria 
involving RoO. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) even hope for their complete 
removal, although they see the political impossibility of this.  
Making the rules less stringent is often associated to global harmonization. The 
&RPPLVVLRQIRU$IULFD´7KH%ODLU5HSRUWµFDOOVIRUDQDFURVV-the-board rule of 
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 Supposing that no sugar (HS Chapter 17) was added  
125
 One differing opinion is that of Harris (2009). He argues that developing countries benefit from extra 
protection under stringent rules of origin as they act as an incentive to attract investors and produce 
locally. In the absence of these rules, investors would shift to the cheapest country and only perform 
minor operations in the developing country FTA member before exporting to the larger market.  
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origin requiring just 10 percent value added for developing countries; the World Bank 
(2007) defends that attention should be given to ensure that RoO are identical across 
agreements. Cornejo and Harris (2007) endorse the creation of a General Origin Regime 
for the Americas for all existing FTAs, all sharing the same RoO. Estevadeordal and 
Suominen (2004bis) defend a multilateral harmonization of preferential rules, for 
which they see a political viability. In the same fashion, LaNasa (1995) suggests 
following the multilateral negotiations on the harmonization of rules of origin and 
adopting the resulting rules internationally. Garay and De Lombaerde (2004) agree 
with this opinion, although they consider it a second best alternative, the first one 
being establishing a CTC rule for all products.  
Which general criteria to use, if any, is an aspect where there is no agreement among 
researchers. Cadot and de Melo (2007) suggest setting a global value content 
requirement while the World Bank (2007) follows Garay and De Lombaerde (2004) in 
calling for a harmonized CTC rule; in their view, it outperforms CTC because of its 
simplicity.  In addition, calls for reform have also focused on specific sectors. After the 
UHOD[DWLRQ RI (8·V FULWHULD IRU JUDQWLQJ RULJLQ IRU ILVKHULHV LQ WKH 3DFLILF-Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA), authors such as Naumann (2010) call the EU to extend 
these new rules to all agreements.126 However, most sectoral demands concentrate on 
the textile sector. One example is Portugal-Pérez (2008) who calls for the simplification 
of the double transformation rule into single transformation.  
Other requests in favor of relaxing the technical aspects of the rules involve regime-
wide provisions. In particular, the extension of cumulation is a common concern. 
Harris (2009), Augier et al (2004) and Naumann (2010), among others, defend the 
application of diagonal cumulation across all the agreements of a developed member, 
such as the EU or the US. This would allow developing countries with different 
comparative advantages to benefit each of them from one stage of production. This is 
of particular importance in countries with limited industrial basis and thus, reduced 
capacity to integrate vertically within the country itself. 
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 Under the new rules, Pacific Island fisheries exporters only need to have an on-shore factory for the 
good to qualify under the agreement, as opposed to the stringent nationality requirements applied 
previously. 
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Administrative costs have been found to represent the order of two to seven percent 
depending on the agreement.127 According to Cornejo and Harris (2007) one of the 
main determinants of administrative costs is the paper work entailed in proving origin. 
Related to the proof of origin is the issue of certification, i.e. the steps an exporter needs 
to undertake in order to get the product certified. Broadly, there are two models, 
private certification, and public certification. The first one consists of a declaration by 
the exporter himself while the second one involves inspection by public authorities.128 
According to Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis), self-certification as opposed to 
public certification is likely to lead to lower administrative costs for two reasons. First, 
it reduces the bureaucratic steps to attain origin, with the accompanying diminution in 
the amount of work and time involved for the exporter; and second, it places the 
burden of proof of origin on the importing country, rather than the exporting. For 
imports into Northern countries from developing partners, this is potentially an issue 
that may reduce substantially the administrative costs of the regime.  
7.5. Current Efforts 
Accounting for the calls for a revision of RoO, Garay and De Lombaerde (2004) explain 
how the European Commission launched in 2003 an effort to review rules of origin. 
Among other constraints, it was found that European business perceived the rules as 
complex, restrictive and burdensome. According to Naumann (2010), the European 
Commission issued two papers expressing preference for the value added approach. 
These papers confronted opposition by industry with regards to the technicalities of 
the calculations. 129  Since then, progress to undertake the reform slowed down. 
However, late in 2010, the Commission issued a new regulation simplifying the rules 
of origin for GSP countries.130 One of the main aspects of these rules is the adoption of 
self-certification by 2017. However, this legislation includes one step from a public 
authority as it requests exporting countries to register their exporters. At the same 
time, other changes consist of a move to single transformation in textiles for LDCs as 
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 See Cadot et al. (2006) for a review of administrative costs across the literature on rules of origin.  
128
 Empirical research so far has focused on any of these specific provisions has centred on the procedure 
to obtain the certificate. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) find a strong positive influence of self-
certification on aggregate trade, as opposed to public certification. 
129
 7KHSURSRVDO VXJJHVWHG D FKDQJH WR ³QHW SURGXFWLRQ FRVW´ IURP WKH FXUUHQW ³H[-ZRUNV SULFH´ ZKLFK
according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) implied an increase in administrative costs.  
130
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 
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well as improved cumulation conditions across regions. Also, RVC seems to be more 
and more the preferred option by the Commission, although there is still no official 
position on that respect (Thorstenten, 2008 and Steele, 2010) 
In the US, attempts have also been made in order to harmonize rules of origin by the 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is the agency responsible for determining 
origin. However, instead of seeking the utilization of one criterion across the spectrum 
of products, Jones and Martin (2011) highlight that there was an attempt to extend 
NAFTA rules of origin to all trade. This proposal was put forward in 2008 and it 
received considerable criticism from industry. No action has been taken so far. 
Regarding modifications in the rules of origin in FTAs, NAFTA saw an amendment 
DLPHGDW´OLEHUDOL]LQJUXOHVRIRULJLQµin 2009 on products representing 140 $ billion in 
annual trilateral trade.131. 
Lastly, at the multilateral level, efforts to harmonize continue within the framework of 
the Harmonization Work Programme established by the Agreement on Rules of 
Origin. This programme started with the creation of the WTO and it was intended to 
complete its work within three years. As of 2010, the Chairman of the Committee on 
Rules of Origin announced that work harmonization had been agreed for 55 percent of 
the products. However, it must be noted that the Harmonized Work Programme 
(HWP) of the Committee requires harmonization of rules on 2,739 products when the 
usual universe of products in a medium size country is in the range of 4,500.132  
This overview of the reform process at different levels reveals an interesting factor. 
Whether at national, regional, or multilateral level, it seems that RoO are extremely 
sticky; once they are set, it is very difficult to change them. This seems a logical 
conclusion when thinking that once exporters adapt to trade under one rule, it may be 
costly to change their processes to comply with a different rule.  
                                                     
 
131 http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/tech-
rect.aspx?lang=en&menu_id=35 
132
 http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100505.htm 
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7.6. Policy Proposal 
A number of relevant facts stem from the present study. First, rules of origin are costly, 
distortive and complex as they stand. It follows that there is a need to review rules of 
origin, both legally and economically. This effort should be particularly addressed at 
the harmonization of rules. Second, the estimations of the impact on trade carried out 
in the previous two chapters show that RVC rules are the most trade-conducive type of 
rule.133 Third, there is a reluctance to modify rules by the part of industry in developed 
countries. 
Taking these elements into account, a recommendation for adoption of an across-the-
board alternative RVC rule appears as the best choice. At the same time, agricultural 
(unprocessed) products would be left aside from the application of this rule; it is very 
difficult to add value on life beings. Agricultural products would, in turn, be provided 
with an alternative WO rule for all agricultural (and other WO) products, which is the 
second type of rule in the ex-post index in terms of its positive impact. Cadot and de 
Melo (2007) also argue in favor of an RVC general rule.  
The amount of regional content required in this rule would have to be negotiated. 
However, the estimates on the positive performance of this rule obtained in previous 
chapters do not take into account different levels of value content but just the type of 
rule itself. The implication is that, within reason, changes in the regional content 
requirement should not imply large modifications in the ability to export under this 
criterion. In any case, there could be a possibility for countries to establish a different 
threshold within a range.  
Setting this rule as an alternative would not change the current status-quo for all those 
producers willing to export under the current regime. Therefore, this proposal 
simplifies the multilateral efforts undertaken at the WTO in that industry would not 
have to readapt to a new rule; it would just add an alternative. Having the possibility 
to export under two different rules has also been found to have positive effects on 
trade, particularly on imports. Its application would then be straightforward.  
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 See Tables 4.17-4.19 
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Additionally, allowing for self-certification is also recommended. This may prove to be 
more difficult to apply as it would mean that countries requesting public authorization 
would have to forego this prerogative. For those countries, a mixed system could be 
envisaged. Such system could afford speedier transit to those products having been 
publicly certified (nothing would prevent an exporter/importer to use public 
certification), while still declaring legal a self-certified document. 134  Provisions 
exempting (importing) developing countries/LDCs from adopting self-certification 
could also be drafted, as argued below. However, support for self-certification 
procedures is not unanimous in policy makers as it is in the literature. Steele (2010) 
warns against the main risk of self-certification, namely the fact that EU importers may 
resist importing from suppliers who are not used to self-certification. 
Some researchers find the application of an RVC rule unadvisable. LaNasa (1995) 
argues extensively against it. His main criticisms are described below followed by the 
corresponding counterarguments: 
a) The RVC test generates substantial compliance costs for companies: 
Proving origin may indeed be more costly than under a CTC requirement. However, in 
WRGD\·VZRUOGFXVWRPVSURFHGXUHVDUHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPSXWHUL]HG, easing the process to 
trace down the value of materials. At the same time, having a multilateral binding 
agreement granting the application of this proposal, firms would have an incentive to 
invest in adapting to comply with these procedures. The returns from their investment 
would be justified on the grounds of long-term gains.  
In addition, by relying on self-certification, the burden of proof would fall on the 
importing country administration, therefore liberating the developing country exporter 
from the extra costs associated with this rule. The extra amount of resources needed to 
deal with additional verification procedures would come from increased trade.  
b) The RVC test generates substantial uncertainty for companies: 
                                                     
 
134
 Developing countries/LDCs could find a difficulty on applying self-certification as their 
administrations could not comply with verification procedures. Alternatives for these countries such as 
additional resources to adapt administrations or even temporary exemptions from the regime could be 
envisaged.  
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This uncertainty is based on the fluctuations of exchange rates and the price of raw 
materials. Additionally, LaNasa argues that this would provoke identical goods 
varying their qualification of origin depending on the exchange rate relationship 
between the importer and the exporter.  
With enough political will, there would certainly be alternatives to overcome this issue. 
For instance, a reference price could be set every year both for the exchange rate and 
for the raw materials. The spirit of this rule is to promote trade in a way that still 
prevents trade deflection. If at the beginning of the year a product made of a certain 
material was deemed to be originating, there is no reason to prevent that same product 
from retaining its originating status as the price of the material increases. In such way, 
fluctuations both across countries and time would be minimized. 
c) The RVC test leads to inconsistent results for similar products: 
The reason for this lies in that countries calculate regional content in different ways. 
)RU LQVWDQFH WKH(8XVHVDV UHIHUHQFH WKH´H[-ZRUNVµSULFHZKLOH WKH86SUHfers the 
´WUDQVDFWLRQYDOXHµ 
Ideally, countries would adopt the same system, based on some internationally agreed 
´%HVW3UDFWLFHVµ+RZHYHULIWKH\GLGQRWLWZRXOGVWLOOUHSUHVHQWDFOHDULPSURYHPHQW
IURP WRGD\·V VWDQGLQJ SRLQW ZKHUH FRXQWULHV QRW RQOy differ on their calculation 
methods but they differ on the rules altogether.  
d) The RVC test penalizes low cost operations: 
The primary comparative advantage is cheap labor and cheap materials for a number 
of countries. Those countries would find more difficulties in attaining originating 
status than countries with capital-intensive facilities. 
Today, such industries and countries can be clearly identified. This system could 
HQYLVDJHD´GHYHORSPHQWµSDFNDJHZKHUHE\two possibilities could occur: i) affording 
a lower regional content requirement for LDCs; and/or ii) affording a lower content 
requirement for certain industries/products.  
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In summary, all the caveats normally expressed against this sort of system could be 
resolved with enough will from the parties. At the same time, countries would retain 
their rightful control over preventing trade deflection and industry would not have to 
readapt unless voluntarily. In any case, problems caused by any technicalities related 
to this system would most likely be outweighed by the benefits from increased trade. 
7.7. Conclusion 
Rules of origin were initially devised as uncontroversial technical neutral devices to 
implement necessary trade policies. They only began attracting attention after the 
signature of free trade agreements between the European Communities and the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries in the mid 1970s. Three other factors 
emerged at similar period. First, increasing internationalization of production; second, 
the intense increase of Free Trade Area (FTA) numbers after the uncertainty created by 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round, and third, the power lost in tariffs after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  
The FTAs that proliferated in mid 1990s were being accompanied by origin protocols. 
As thH)7$QXPEHUJUHZSRZHUIXOFRXQWULHVVWDUWHGWRGHYHORSWKHLURZQ´WHPSODWHµ
of RoO, turning into what are now called families of RoO, the most notable being the 
PANEURO-type of RoO and NAFTA-type RoO. These rules, theoretically innocuous 
threaten to cause a problem to the WTO as they represent a potential violation of 
GATT Art.XXIV. Concerns at the WTO as well as within the signatories of FTAs have 
prompted the debate over the reform and harmonization of RoO. Those calling for this 
reform argue that RoO are: costly, trade distorting, in the interest of developed 
countries, obscure and show great dispersion across countries.  
Some timid efforts are being made in this respect both in the US and the EU (as well as 
multilaterally). However, it is not an easy task. The overview of the reform process at 
different levels reveals an interesting factor. Whether at national, regional, or 
multilateral level, it seems that RoO are extremely sticky; once they are set, it is very 
difficult to change them. This seems a logical conclusion when thinking that once 
exporters adapt to trade under one rule, it may be costly to change their processes to 
comply with a different rule. 
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In view of the results of this study, as well as in account of current reform efforts, one 
policy proposal is suggested, namely the adoption of an across-the-board alternative 
RVC rule. At the same time, agricultural (unprocessed) products would be left aside 
from the application of this rule; it is very difficult to add value on life beings, which 
would be added an alternative WO rule to comply with in addition to the rule already 
in place.  
This proposal simplifies multilateral efforts undertaken at the WTO in that industry 
would not have to readapt to a new rule; it would just add an alternative. The fact that 
it would be offered as an alternative disqualifies most criticisms received by this type 
of rule which would, on the contrary, add a great deal of transparency, predictability, 
implicating lower costs.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
8.1. Summary of main aspects 
Literature on RoO can be broadly divided in theoretical and empirical. None of them 
was developed until the mid 1990s and has remained limited in scope thereafter.  
Theoretical literature was largely influenced by the literature on local content 
protection started by Grossman (1981) and Mussa (1984). Most studies on this regard 
explore the impact of RoO on prices, production, trade flows, welfare and on the chain 
effects on intermediate and final goods. Most studies start their analysis by focusing on 
the alteration that the imposition of a RoO brings to the optimal combination of inputs 
of the pre-FTA equilibrium. From here, the overview of the economic literature on RoO 
reveals that these instruments can be powerful policy mechanisms in affecting a wide 
range of trade related aspects. In particular, there are five main observations. First, 
RoO tend to cause harmful effects on welfare although, under certain conditions, they 
can actually improve it; second, RoO are more likely to result in positive effects when 
compared to pre-FTA scenarios that contemplate tariffs rather than free trade; third, 
intermediate goods are likely to experience increased demand at the expense of final 
good producers; fourth, as the restrictiveness of the RoO increases, so does the 
probability that they produce harmful effects and; fifth, the details of each particular 
situation matter.   
Empirical literature on RoO can be divided into ex-ante and ex-post literature. The 
former scrutinizes RoO protocols and assigns values to each type of RoO, as well as to 
the different regime wide provisions. This current of the literature was developed 
under the need to compare origin regimes across trade agreements and concentrates 
largely on the development of ex-ante indices of RoO restrictiveness. By its part, ex post 
literature focuses on the impact of RoO on different trade-related variables, such as 
trade volumes, tariff preferences or the cost of compliance with RoO. A majority of the 
work done uses the restrictiveness indices developed ex-ante as exogenous 
independent variables that explain the trade variable under scrutiny. Additionally, 
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there are a handful of studies that code RoO in different ways so as to assess the 
estimated impact on trade volumes, although these studies are usually quite limited in 
scope. 
From the review of the empirical literature there are two main findings that become 
relevant in the present context. First, there is unanimity in that RoO impede trade 
when taken as a package. To my knowledge, no study has shown positive trade effects 
of RoO when looking at a representative selection of trade flows.135 However, the 
second main finding is that when RoO are disaggregated into their different 
components, some of them that can actually increase trade. This is the case of some 
regime-wide trade facilitating measures, and some concrete types of product-specific 
RoO. The potential for further research to explore this latter finding is encouraged by 
the fact that only a handful of studies have looked at these questions.  
Rules of origin are very complex trade policy mechanisms that lay down a series of 
conditions a product needs to meet in order to be considered originating in a particular 
geographical area.  
A first distinction of RoO families must be done between preferential and multilateral, 
or non-preferential, RoO. Often, the general public is mistaken by thinking that the 
types of rules used in these two groups are different, while they are not. The 
distinction between them relates then to whether they are used in a multilateral or 
preferential context. In the context of the present analysis, the focus will concentrate on 
preferential RoO.  
A second clarification between RoO refers to whether a condition applies to the entire 
spectrum of products or it details the characteristics a specific product must meet. The 
former are known as regime-wide provisions and although subject to variation, they 
estipulate the provisions regarding the procedural requirements needed to 
demonstrate origin, the possibility to accumulate production in other countries or de 
minimis rules, among others. By its part, the rules that apply to a specific product are 
called product-specific rules of origin, which are traditionally the main focus of study 
when RoO are considered. 
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 Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004bis) concentrate on selected intermediates. 
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Product-specific rules of origin lay down the conditions a product must meet to 
become originating.  They can be broadly divided into Wholly Obtained (WO) rules 
and Substantial Transformation criteria. WO rules require a product to be originating 
in a particular area to achieve originating status. Substantial transformation rules refers 
WR WKRVH UXOHV WKDW UHTXLUH WKH SURGXFW WR XQGHUJR ´VXEVWDQWLDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQµ LQ
order to become originating. They are divided in three main groups: i) Change in Tariff 
Classification (CTC), when the rule requires the product to change its HS tariff 
classification to become originating. Depending on the level at which the change is 
required (chapter, heading or subheading), the change in tariff classification is called 
change in chapter, change in tariff heading or change in tariff subheading; ii) 
percentage rules, which require the product incorporate a certain percentage of local 
content in its total value; and iii) technical test (TT) rules, which set any particular 
action in order to confer originating status. The WO rules together with the groups of 
VXEVWDQWLDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQUXOHVDUHWKHPDLQIRXU´IDPLOLHVµRI5R2, as exemplified in 
Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1. Different Types of Product Specific Rules of Origin 
 
Wholly obtained (WO) 
 
Substantial 
Transformation 
Change in Tariff 
Classification (CTC) 
Change in Chapter (CC) 
Change in Tariff Heading 
(CTH) 
Change in Tariff 
Subheading (CTS) 
Regional Value Content (RVC) 
Technical Test (TT) 
 
These four families are usually subsequently combined among themselves in origin 
protocols. One or more rules can be provided as either alternatives or as a 
supplementary requirement for a good to obtain originating status. A further type of 
rule relates to exceptions added to the CTC rule, whereby the rule allows an exception 
to main required change in tariff classification. 
This thesis attempts to provide an estimate of the impact on trade of product specific 
rules of origin (RoO) and regime-wide provisions, as well as to construct an ex-post 
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restrictiveness index on the basis of the results found in the estimations. Therefore, the 
driving force behind the choice of methodology is how to assess the ex-post trade 
impact of RoO, as opposed to forecasting. The framework chosen for such analysis is 
the gravity equation, which has been widely used in order to assess different policy 
variables. 
The gravity equation has become in the last decades one of the most popular empirical 
devices to analyze trade flows, having been used to control for practically any factor 
potentially influencing trade flows. Two main reasons stand out to place the gravity 
model as the preferred method of estimation in the context of this study. First, the 
gravity equation provides a relatively acceptable theoretical framework for the use of 
RoO. A second crucial reason for choosing gravity modeling as the preferred 
framework is its good empirical fit. Additionally, a number of theoretical 
considerations are explored in order to correctly: i) whether the gravity equation suits 
the desired data sample, consisting of North-North and North-South trade flows; ii) 
whether the model can evaluated at the disaggregated level; iii) which trade flow can 
be theoretically sound to be explored. These three questions are looked into by 
reviewing the theory about the gravity model, which confirms each of the issues. A 
final theoretical consideration provides a justification to perform the analysis using 
panel data.  
Under the conditions provided for the theoretical aspects, the general equation to be 
estimated is laid down: 
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which will be estimated for total trade, exports and imports.   
Subsequently, the approach for modeling the RoO is described. The underlying logic 
beneath it is to transform the product-specific RoO in dummy variables that can be 
plugged into the equation and their coefficients estimated. However, the intrinsic 
complexity of rules the rules of origin calls for the elaboration of four different types of 
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analysis in order to ensure their correct study, each of them requiring its own way of 
introducing the product-specific RoO. The first method considers all possible 
interactions of the four families of rules, including combinations, alternatives and 
exceptions to the main rule; the second method attempts to identify the individual 
impact of each of the main four families; the third method is an extension of the 
second, with the difference that divides the main CTC family into its subcomponents 
(CC, CTH and CTS); and the fourth method assigns an individual value to every 
possible combination of rules, classifying each of them as a different dummy variable.  
One implication of this methodology is that it considers RoO as being exogenous, 
which may give rise to potential endogeneity bias. The usual way to correct this bias is 
the use of fixed effects at the individual level. This option is discarded regarding the 
time-invariant nature of the key variables of interest.  
The study analyzes total trade, exports and imports at the 6-digit level for four 
reporting countries and 16 partner countries for the period between 2005 and 2008, 
yielding 1,224,833 observations. Trade data is obtained from COMTRADE. Data for 
rules of origin is obtained directly from the protocols of origin of each FTA. 
Considering that EU-based protocols amount to around 800 product specific rules and 
US-based to around 2,000, it yields a total of close to 24,000 rules that need to be coded.  
The most frequent rule in origin protocols is CTH, followed by RVC, although these 
two rules are less commonly used individually and rather are combined or 
supplemented with other rules. Additionally, these two rules are, on average, 
represent a higher proportion of total rules present in origin protocols than the trade 
channeled through them on total trade. 
Prior to estimating the equations, a number of clarifications need to be made. First, a 
poolability tests performing a Wald test on the coefficients of the estimated equation 
confirms the validity of pooling the data. Second, a choice has to be made between the 
use of fixed effects and random effects. Theoretically, fixed effects are preferred 
because using random effects requires the assumption of the observations being 
randomly drawn from a population and that the individual effects are not correlated 
with the regressors. This, in principle is a hard assumption to maintain in trade 
201 
 
settings. This decision is confirmed econometrically by the Hausman test and country 
fixed effects are included, which help solve an eventual heterogeneity problem; this 
positive outcome is however likely to be jeopardized by the fact that fixed effects are 
not included at the individual level but a country level. Third, collinearity diagnosis 
reveals a problem of multicollinearity, which is solved after some transformations in 
the data, notably combining EFTA countries into one unique country and grouping 
reporting country fixed effects in two groups, developed (EU and US) and developing 
(Mexico and Chile).  
Subsequently, a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) method is chosen to perform 
the regressions. However, the Breusch-Pagan and the Breusch-Godfrey test reveal the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, respectively, inducing estimation 
by Generalized Least Squares (GLS), which yields unbiased estimators. Lastly, the 
variables are transformed in logarithms in order to reduce the dispersion of the data. 
This comes at the price of dropping zero values, which, although the way of dealing 
with them has still not been properly settled in the theory, may lead to selection bias.  
The regressions show very interesting results, with most variables being significant 
across each method of estimation and showing the expected sign of the coefficients. 
The specification of the RoO does matter. An RVC type of rule can increase trade by 
22.9 percent whereas a TT can reduce it by 21 percent. Each of the methods of 
estimation show interesting results, except method four, where most variables are 
insignificant. The one clear-cut fact about the regressions is that RVC type of rule is by 
and large the most trade-conducive rule. Two a priori counterintuitive results ² the fact 
that a combination of rules favors export trade and that CTS reveals clearly more trade-
obstructing than CC for imports ² lead to the argument that rules of origin are clearly 
GHYLVHGE\LPSRUWLQJKHJHPRQLFFRXQWULHV7KHLUH[SRUWHUVGRQRWUHDOO\´FDUHµDERXW
them but the importers ensure that protection is granted to the home market. Lastly, 
gravity variables show the expected sign and coefficient. 
At present, empirical literature on RoO relies entirely on ex-ante indices, first 
developed in Estevadeordal (2000) and subsequently followed and augmented in a 
VHULHVRIVWXGLHV7KHVHFRQGPDLQJRDORIWKLVVWXG\LVWRSURYLGHD´UHDOµLQGH[RI5RO 
restrictiveness, which can help gap the bridge identified in the literature in view of the 
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following weaknesses of existing indices: a) Being an ex-ante observation rule, ex-ante 
LQGLFHVDUHEDVHGRQWKHDXWKRU·VVXEMHFWLYLW\WKHUHIRUHYDU\LQJIURPDXWKor to author; 
b) Ex ante indices are based on unchecked premises; and c) in order to calculate the 
correct index, imports are more relevant than exports. 
The way to construct a correct restrictiveness index is to do so using an ex-post 
observation rule, which is done from the estimates obtained in Chapter 5. In particular, 
from all the regressions conducted in Chapter 5, the ones used to compose the index 
are those of the import equation of Method 1. This choice is determined by two aspects. 
First, both theory and empirics suggest that RoO are in fact laid down by hegemonic 
importing countries; second, method 1 is the only one that allows for combination of 
rules.  
The restrictiveness index, kRI is defined as follows: 
))(242.())(178(.))(211(.))(210.(
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This equation, when combined all over the RoO included in origin protocols yields 70 
different results. These 70 rules can now be ordered from 1 to 70 and an index would 
already be obtained. However, having 70 different values restricts the workability of 
the index, as there are many of these levels which rarely take place in protocols of 
origin. In order to develop a more verifiable index, these 70 instances are grouped into 
20. 
This index, which ranks from 1 to 20, being 20 the least restrictive, can now be used to 
assess stringency levels across agreements and is directly comparable to ex-ante indices. 
Interestingly, despite the differences between ex-ante indices, and the ex-post index, 
they share common findings with respect to the restrictiveness of the agreements. For 
both of them, NAFTA is the most restrictive agreement, with the EU family presenting 
more facilitating rules and other US-based FTAs standing in between. 
An analysis of the stringency of the RoO is also performed by sector using the ex-post 
restrictiveness index. It shows textiles as the sector with most restrictive rules. The one 
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surprise in terms of sectoral restrictiveness is agriculture, being as it is a highly 
protected sector. 
The ex-post index is subsequently used empirically to assess the sensitivity of exports 
from developing countries into developed countries to the stringency of RoO, by 
looking at three sectors in particular: textiles, agriculture and industrial products. The 
results of the estimation show significant results and the coefficients display the expect 
sign. The results show that trade in every sector reacts negatively to increases the 
stringency levels of the RoO, as should be the case. The one that shows a higher 
inclination to react negatively to RoO stringency is the industrial sector. It seems 
plausible that despite lower tariffs in industrial products (which are, in any case on the 
YHUJHRIWKH´SDUWLFLSDWLRQFRQVWUDLQWµH[SRUWHUVPD\KDYHDQLQFHQWLYHWRFKDQQHOWKH
products under preferential conditions, henFHXVLQJWKH)7$·V5R2 
Rules of origin were initially devised as uncontroversial technical neutral devices to 
implement necessary trade policies. They only began attracting attention after the 
signature of free trade agreements between the European Communities and the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries in the mid 1970s. Three other factors 
emerged at similar period. First, increasing internationalization of production; second, 
the intense increase of Free Trade Area (FTA) numbers after the uncertainty created by 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round, and third, the power lost in tariffs after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  
The FTAs that proliferated in mid 1990s were being accompanied by origin protocols. 
As the FTA number grew, powerful countries VWDUWHGWRGHYHORSWKHLURZQ´WHPSODWHµ
of RoO, turning into what are now called families of RoO, the most notable being the 
PANEURO-type of RoO and NAFTA-type RoO. These rules, theoretically innocuous 
threaten to cause a problem to the WTO as they represent a potential violation of 
GATT Art.XXIV. Concerns at the WTO as well as within the signatories of FTAs have 
prompted the debate over the reform and harmonization of RoO. Those calling for this 
reform argue that RoO are: costly, trade distorting, in the interest of developed 
countries, obscure and show great dispersion across countries.  
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Some timid efforts are being made in this respect both in the US and the EU (as well as 
multilaterally). However, it is not an easy task. The overview of the reform process at 
different levels reveals an interesting factor. Whether at national, regional, or 
multilateral level, it seems that RoO are extremely sticky; once they are set, it is very 
difficult to change them. This seems a logical conclusion when thinking that once 
exporters adapt to trade under one rule, it may be costly to change their processes to 
comply with a different rule. 
In view of the results of this study, as well as in account of current reform efforts, one 
policy proposal is suggested, namely the adoption of an across-the-board alternative 
RVC rule. At the same time, agricultural (unprocessed) products would be left aside 
from the application of this rule; it is very difficult to add value on life beings, which 
would be added an alternative WO rule to comply with in addition to the rule already 
in place.  
This proposal simplifies multilateral efforts undertaken at the WTO in that industry 
would not have to readapt to a new rule; it would just add an alternative. The fact that 
it would be offered as an alternative disqualifies most criticisms received by this type 
of rule which would, on the contrary, add the following advantages: 
 Provide an alternative, not an obligation. Therefore, exporters or producers 
not willing to adapt are free to do so; 
 Harmonization of rules would be straightforward, thereby reducing the 
costs of complying with the rules; 
 Costs derived by the added complications of tracing the value of goods are 
be reduced in the presence of computerized customs, which is more and 
more the case iQWRGD\·VZRUOG 
 Even if such costs remain high, producers would have an incentive in 
investing to overcome them; legally binding simplified rules across the 
world seems to justify such investment; 
 Predictability is assured; and  
 It still guarantees countrLHV·ULJKWWRSUHYHQWWUDGHGHIOHFWLRQWKURXJKUXOHV
of origin 
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8.2. Main contributions 
The review of the literature had identified four main gaps in the empirical analysis of 
RoO so far. In view of these gaps, the main aims of the thesis were: i) to provide further 
evidence on the impact on trade of product-specific preferential rules of origin; ii) 
develop a restrictiveness index based on empirical findings; iii) open the path for the 
impact of the rules of origin on particular sectors other than textiles; and iv) to 
contribute with further evidence on regime-wide provisions. 
The first aim is tackled in Chapter 4, where several estimations are performed on an 
ample data set to provide further evidence of the impact of each type of rule of origin. 
To my knowledge, this is only the third study doing so and the first one on such a an 
broad dataset. 
The second aim is achieved by the development of an ex post restrictiveness index. By 
being based on the coefficients of previous estimations, this index overcomes the 
problems related to existing indices in the literature. 
The consistency of the ex post index is tested on three different sectors: agriculture, 
textiles and industrial products. To my knowledge, no study had looked at whether 
these sectors were affected by different degrees of stringency level of the RoO. 
The fourth aim, contributing to expand the literature on regime-wide provisions has 
been limited by econometric considerations. However, this thesis does provide further 
evidence on the effects of one of these provisions, self-certification. 
Finally, a policy proposal is put forward with the intention of contributing to the 
debate on the reform of rules of origin. 
8.3. Directions for future research 
In view of the still incipient empirical work on rules of origin, there are a number of 
directions that can be explored. The comprehension of the effects of the rules continues 
to be limited. The findings in this thesis regarding the impact of each type of specific 
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rule suggest that further research is needed in this area. It would be interesting to 
assess if the rules have a similar impact on trade for different sectors. In particular, the 
impact on the agricultural sector would be interesting to assess in view of the large 
share of GDP and employment it represents in developing countries.  
Equally, regime-wide provisions appear to have a considerable effect on trade and not 
only from the perspective of easing compliance with the rules, as it is the case of the 
certification procedures. In particular, voices raised against this so-perceived 
facilitating policy measure should encourage research on this regard.  
Finally, rules of origin have been used to model other economic aspects, such as tariff 
preferences or investment flows. The ex post index developed here could be used to 
improve the understanding of these questions.  
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Appendix 1.1. List of RTAs in force 
 
RTA Name Coverage Type Date of entry into force 
Andean Community (CAN) Goods CU 25-may-88 
Armenia ² Kazakhstan Goods FTA 25-Dec-2001 
Armenia ² Moldova Goods FTA 21-Dec-1995 
Armenia - Russian Federation Goods FTA 25-mar-93 
Armenia ² Turkmenistan Goods FTA 07-jul-96 
Armenia ² Ukraine Goods FTA 18-Dec-1996 
ASEAN - Australia - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2010 
ASEAN ² China Goods & Services PSA & EIA 01-Jan-2005(G) / 01-Jul-
2007(S) 
ASEAN ² India Goods FTA 01-Jan-2010 
ASEAN ² Japan Goods FTA 01-Dec-2008 
ASEAN - Korea, Republic of Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2010(G) / 01-May-
2009(S) 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Goods FTA 28-Jan-1992 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) Goods PSA 17-jun-76 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 
- Accession of China 
Goods PSA 01-Jan-2002 
Australia ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 06-mar-09 
Australia - New Zealand 
(ANZCERTA) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-1983(G) / 01-Jan-
1989(S) 
Australia - Papua New Guinea 
(PATCRA) 
Goods FTA 01-feb-77 
Brunei Darussalam - Japan Goods & Services FTA & EIA 31-jul-08 
Canada ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 05-jul-97 
Canada - Costa Rica Goods FTA 01-nov-02 
Canada ² Israel Goods FTA 01-Jan-1997 
Canada ² Peru Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Aug-2009 
Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) 
Goods & Services CU & EIA 01-Aug-1973(G) / 01-Jul-
1997(S) 
Central American Common Market 
(CACM) 
Goods CU 04-jun-61 
Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) 2006 
Goods FTA 01-may-07 
Chile ² China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Oct-2006(G) / 01-Aug-
2010(S) 
Chile ² Colombia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 08-may-09 
Chile - Costa Rica (Chile - Central 
America) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 15-feb-02 
Chile - El Salvador (Chile - Central 
America) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jun-02 
Chile ² India Goods PSA 17-Aug-2007 
Chile ² Japan Goods & Services FTA & EIA 03-sep-07 
Chile ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Aug-1999 
China - Hong Kong, China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2004 
China - Macao, China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2004 
China - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-oct-08 
China ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2009 
Colombia ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-1995 
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Common Economic Zone (CEZ) Goods FTA 20-may-04 
Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) 
Goods FTA 08-Dec-1994 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) 
Goods FTA 30-Dec-1994 
Costa Rica ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-1995 
Dominican Republic - Central 
America - United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-mar-06 
East African Community (EAC) Goods CU 07-jul-00 
EC ² Albania Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Dec-2006(G) / 01-Apr-
2009(S) 
EC ² Algeria Goods FTA 01-sep-05 
EC ² Andorra Goods CU 01-jul-91 
EC - Bosnia and Herzegovina Goods FTA 01-jul-08 
EC ² Cameroon Goods FTA 01-oct-09 
EC - CARIFORUM States EPA Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-nov-08 
EC ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Feb-2003(G) / 01-Mar-
2005(S) 
EC - Côte d'Ivoire Goods FTA 01-Jan-2009 
EC ² Croatia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Mar-2002(G) / 01-Feb-
2005(S) 
EC ² Egypt Goods FTA 01-jun-04 
EC - Faroe Islands Goods FTA 01-Jan-1997 
EC - Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jun-2001(G) / 01-Apr-
2004(S) 
EC ² Iceland Goods FTA 01-Apr-1973 
EC ² Israel Goods FTA 01-jun-00 
EC ² Jordan Goods FTA 01-may-02 
EC ² Lebanon Goods FTA 01-mar-03 
EC ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jul-2000(G) / 01-Oct-
2000(S) 
EC ² Montenegro Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2008(G) / 01-May-
2010(S) 
EC ² Morocco Goods FTA 01-mar-00 
EC ² Norway Goods FTA 01-jul-73 
EC ² Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCT) 
Goods FTA 01-Jan-1971 
EC - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 01-jul-97 
EC - South Africa Goods FTA 01-Jan-2000 
EC - Switzerland - Liechtenstein Goods FTA 01-Jan-1973 
EC ² Syria Goods FTA 01-jul-77 
EC ² Tunisia Goods FTA 01-mar-98 
EC ² Turkey Goods CU 01-Jan-1996 
EC (10) Enlargement Goods CU 01-Jan-1981 
EC (12) Enlargement Goods CU 01-Jan-1986 
EC (15) Enlargement Goods & Services CU & EIA 01-Jan-1995 
EC (25) Enlargement Goods & Services CU & EIA 01-may-04 
EC (27) Enlargement Goods & Services CU & EIA 01-Jan-2007 
EC (9) Enlargement Goods CU 01-Jan-1973 
EC Treaty Goods & Services CU & EIA 01-Jan-1958 
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Economic and Monetary Community 
of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
Goods CU 24-jun-99 
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) 
Goods CU 24-jul-93 
Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO) 
Goods PSA 17-feb-92 
EFTA ² Albania Goods FTA 01-nov-10 
EFTA ² Canada Goods FTA 01-jul-09 
EFTA ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Dec-2004 
EFTA ² Croatia Goods FTA 01-Jan-2002 
EFTA ² Egypt Goods FTA 01-Aug-2007 
EFTA - Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Goods FTA 01-Jan-2001 
EFTA ² Israel Goods FTA 01-Jan-1993 
EFTA ² Jordan Goods FTA 01-Jan-2002 
EFTA - Korea, Republic of Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-sep-06 
EFTA ² Lebanon Goods FTA 01-Jan-2007 
EFTA ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jul-01 
EFTA ² Morocco Goods FTA 01-Dec-1999 
EFTA - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 01-jul-99 
EFTA ² SACU Goods FTA 01-may-08 
EFTA ² Serbia Goods FTA 01-oct-10 
EFTA ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2003 
EFTA ² Tunisia Goods FTA 01-jun-05 
EFTA ² Turkey Goods FTA 01-Apr-1992 
EFTA accession of Iceland Goods FTA 01-mar-70 
Egypt ² Turkey Goods FTA 01-mar-07 
EU - San Marino Goods CU 01-Apr-2002 
EU ² Serbia Goods FTA 01-feb-10 
Eurasian Economic Community 
(EAEC) 
Goods CU 08-oct-97 
European Economic Area (EEA) Services EIA 01-Jan-1994 
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 03-May-1960(G) / 01-Jun-
2002(S) 
Faroe Islands ² Norway Goods FTA 01-jul-93 
Faroe Islands - Switzerland Goods FTA 01-mar-95 
Georgia ² Armenia Goods FTA 11-nov-98 
Georgia ² Azerbaijan Goods FTA 10-jul-96 
Georgia ² Kazakhstan Goods FTA 16-jul-99 
Georgia - Russian Federation Goods FTA 10-may-94 
Georgia ² Turkmenistan Goods FTA 01-Jan-2000 
Georgia ² Ukraine Goods FTA 04-jun-96 
Global System of Trade Preferences 
among Developing Countries (GSTP) 
Goods PSA 19-Apr-1989 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Goods CU 01-Jan-2003 
Honduras - El Salvador and the 
Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-mar-08 
Hong Kong, China - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2011 
Iceland - Faroe Islands Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-nov-06 
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India ² Afghanistan Goods PSA 13-may-03 
India ² Bhutan Goods FTA 29-jul-06 
India ² Nepal Goods PSA 27-oct-09 
India ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Aug-2005 
India - Sri Lanka Goods FTA 15-Dec-2001 
Israel ² Mexico Goods FTA 01-jul-00 
Japan ² Indonesia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jul-08 
Japan ² Malaysia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 13-jul-06 
Japan ² Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Apr-2005 
Japan ² Philippines Goods & Services FTA & EIA 11-Dec-2008 
Japan ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 30-nov-02 
Japan ² Switzerland Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-sep-09 
Japan ² Thailand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-nov-07 
Japan - Viet Nam Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-oct-09 
Jordan ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 22-Aug-2005 
Korea, Republic of ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Apr-2004 
Korea, Republic of ² India Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2010 
Korea, Republic of - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 02-mar-06 
Kyrgyz Republic - Armenia Goods FTA 27-oct-95 
Kyrgyz Republic - Kazakhstan Goods FTA 11-nov-95 
Kyrgyz Republic - Moldova Goods FTA 21-nov-96 
Kyrgyz Republic - Russian Federation Goods FTA 24-Apr-1993 
Kyrgyz Republic - Ukraine Goods FTA 19-Jan-1998 
Kyrgyz Republic - Uzbekistan Goods FTA 20-mar-98 
Lao People's Democratic Republic ² 
Thailand 
Goods PSA 20-jun-91 
Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) 
Goods PSA 18-mar-81 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Goods PSA 01-Jan-1994 
MERCOSUR ² India Goods PSA 01-jun-09 
Mexico - El Salvador (Mexico - 
Northern Triangle) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 15-mar-01 
Mexico - Guatemala (Mexico - 
Northern Triangle) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 15-mar-01 
Mexico - Honduras (Mexico - 
Northern Triangle) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jun-01 
Mexico ² Nicaragua Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jul-98 
New Zealand ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2001 
Nicaragua and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2008 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-1994 
Pacific Island Countries Trade 
Agreement (PICTA) 
Goods FTA 13-Apr-2003 
Pakistan ² China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jul-2007(G) / 10-Oct-
2009(S) 
Pakistan ² Malaysia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2008 
Pakistan - Sri Lanka Goods FTA 12-jun-05 
Panama ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 07-mar-08 
Panama - Costa Rica (Panama - Goods & Services FTA & EIA 23-nov-08 
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Central America) 
Panama - El Salvador (Panama - 
Central America) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 11-Apr-2003 
Panama - Honduras (Panama - 
Central America ) 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 09-Jan-2009 
Panama ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 24-jul-06 
Panama and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2004 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) Goods FTA 01-Jan-1998 
Peru ² China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-mar-10 
Peru ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Aug-2009 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) Goods PSA 11-feb-73 
Singapore ² Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 28-jul-03 
South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) 
Goods FTA 01-Jan-2006 
South Asian Preferential Trade 
Arrangement (SAPTA) 
Goods PSA 07-Dec-1995 
South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA) 
Goods PSA 01-Jan-1981 
Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) 
Goods CU 15-jul-04 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) 
Goods FTA 01-sep-00 
Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) 
Goods & Services CU & EIA 29-Nov-1991(G) / 07-Dec-
2005(S) 
Thailand ² Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2005 
Thailand - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-jul-05 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 28-may-06 
Turkey ² Albania Goods FTA 01-may-08 
Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina Goods FTA 01-jul-03 
Turkey ² Chile Goods FTA 01-mar-11 
Turkey ² Croatia Goods FTA 01-jul-03 
Turkey - Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Goods FTA 01-sep-00 
Turkey ² Georgia Goods FTA 01-nov-08 
Turkey ² Israel Goods FTA 01-may-97 
Turkey ² Jordan Goods FTA 01-mar-11 
Turkey ² Montenegro Goods FTA 01-mar-10 
Turkey ² Morocco Goods FTA 01-Jan-2006 
Turkey - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 01-jun-05 
Turkey ² Serbia Goods FTA 01-sep-10 
Turkey ² Syria Goods FTA 01-Jan-2007 
Turkey ² Tunisia Goods FTA 01-jul-05 
Ukraine ² Azerbaijan Goods FTA 02-sep-96 
Ukraine ² Belarus Goods FTA 11-nov-06 
Ukraine - Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
Goods FTA 05-jul-01 
Ukraine ² Kazakhstan Goods FTA 19-oct-98 
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Ukraine ² Moldova Goods FTA 19-may-05 
Ukraine - Russian Federation Goods FTA 21-feb-94 
Ukraine ² Tajikistan Goods FTA 11-jul-02 
Ukraine ² Uzbekistan Goods FTA 01-Jan-1996 
Ukraine ²Turkmenistan Goods FTA 04-nov-95 
US ² Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2005 
US ² Bahrain Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Aug-2006 
US ² Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2004 
US ² Israel Goods FTA 19-Aug-1985 
US ² Jordan Goods & Services FTA & EIA 17-Dec-2001 
US ² Morocco Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2006 
US ² Oman Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2009 
US ² Peru Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-feb-09 
US ² Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 01-Jan-2004 
West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) 
Goods CU 01-Jan-2000 
 Source: WTO 
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Appendix 5.1. Random Effects and OLS Estimation 
 
OLS RANDOM EFFECTS 
 All Trade Exports Imports All Trade Exports Imports 
ltotimpo
rts 
0.377 0.364 0.357 0.378 0.362 0.404 
 (334.15)*** (202.56)*** (124.13)*** (332.04)*** (196.25)*** (144.75)*** 
ltotalex
p 
0.571 0.594 0.587 0.571 0.606 0.559 
 (569.76)*** (269.97)*** (314.48)*** (569.12)*** (272.86)*** (302.91)*** 
ldistw -0.579 -0.502 -0.770 -0.695 0.144 -0.927 
 (58.47)*** (32.48)*** (54.56)*** (28.13)*** (4.11)*** (51.54)*** 
comlang_
off 
0.411 0.778 0.186 0.806 1.296 0.296 
 (42.12)*** (60.75)*** (12.30)*** (7.13)*** (13.72)*** (10.38)*** 
contig 1.191 1.120 0.880 1.292 2.034 1.189 
 (70.20)*** (53.16)*** (27.57)*** (35.20)*** (43.59)*** (30.00)*** 
Selfcer 0.451 0.359 0.983 0.264 0.332 0.734 
 (26.09)*** (18.26)*** (30.40)*** (11.15)*** (13.14)*** (30.82)*** 
cc -0.214 -0.260 -0.123 -0.223 -0.225 -0.298 
 (12.84)*** (12.99)*** (4.56)*** (13.28)*** (11.19)*** (10.95)*** 
cth -0.150 -0.258 -0.020 -0.157 -0.237 -0.182 
 (10.85)*** (16.01)*** (0.86) (11.31)*** (14.72)*** (7.76)*** 
cts -0.193 -0.301 -0.120 -0.200 -0.258 -0.280 
 (12.37)*** (16.16)*** (4.70)*** (12.67)*** (13.79)*** (10.94)*** 
rvc -0.009 -0.095 0.164 -0.012 -0.105 0.068 
 (0.63) (5.57)*** (6.62)*** (0.83) (6.17)*** (2.72)*** 
rvceu -0.096 -0.055 -0.170 -0.106 -0.046 -0.312 
 (4.31)*** (2.15)** (4.51)*** (4.77)*** (1.79)* (8.17)*** 
tt -0.298 -0.327 -0.206 -0.299 -0.313 -0.225 
 (18.79)*** (17.65)*** (7.77)*** (18.81)*** (16.92)*** (8.48)*** 
comb -0.007 0.196 -0.193 -0.004 0.163 -0.048 
 (0.53) (12.71)*** (8.61)*** (0.31) (10.55)*** (2.14)** 
alt 0.146 0.058 0.161 0.147 0.061 0.220 
 (11.86)*** (4.10)*** (7.61)*** (11.91)*** (4.32)*** (10.30)*** 
exc -0.184 -0.159 -0.207 -0.189 -0.135 -0.263 
 (19.05)*** (13.27)*** (13.85)*** (19.49)*** (11.27)*** (17.43)*** 
wo -0.203 -0.389 0.256 -0.191 -0.401 0.534 
 (10.61)*** (17.33)*** (7.91)*** (9.50)*** (17.47)*** (16.72)*** 
Constant 0.181 0.347 2.615 1.654 -6.423 3.476 
 (2.16)** (1.98)** (15.31)*** (7.15)*** (20.03)*** (20.56)*** 
Observat
ions 
437101 240193 196908 437101 240193 196908 
R-
squared 
0.63 0.67 0.59    
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 6.1. List of Rules Ordered by Restrictiveness According to the Ex-Post Index 
 
B Type of Rule RI Level Type of Rule 
1 CCex&TT 36 CC OR CTS 
2 CTSex&TT 37 CTS 
3 CC&TT 38 WO&RVCEU 
4 CTS&TT 39 CC OR CTS&RVC 
5 TT&RVCEU 40 CTS&RVC 
6 CCex OR CC&RVC 41 RVCEU 
7 CTH&TT 42 RVC&RVCEU 
8 CCex OR TT 43 CTH OR TT 
9 CTH OR CTS&TT 44 CTH&TT OR RVC 
10 TT&TT 45 CTH&WO 
11 CCex 46 CTH 
12 CTHex&RVCEU&WO 47 CC OR CTH&RVC 
13 CTSex OR TT 48 TT OR TT 
14 CTH&RVCEU 49 CTH&RVC 
15 CTSex 50 CCex OR RVC 
16 CCex OR CTS&RVC 51 WO&WO 
17 CTHex&RVC 52 CTH OR TT 
18 TT&RVCEU 53 CTH OR CTS&RVC 
19 CTHex OR TT 54 CTSex OR RVC 
20 CCex OR CC&RVC 55 CTS OR CTS&RVC 
21 CTHex&WO 56 RVC&RVCEU OR RVC 
22 CTHex 57 CTHex OR RVC 
23 CCex OR CTH&RVC 58 CTH&RVC OR RVC 
24 CTHex&RVC 59 TT OR WO 
25 CTHex OR CTS&RVC 60 WO OR TT&RVC 
26 TT&WO 61 RVC OR TT 
27 CC OR TT 62 WO 
28 TT 63 WO&RVC 
29 RVC&TT 64 CC OR RVC 
30 CTSex OR CTS&RVC 65 RVC 
31 CC 66 CC&WO 
32 CTH&WO&RVCEU 67 CTS OR RVC 
33 CTS OR TT 68 RVC OR RVCEU 
34 CC&RVC 69 CTH OR RVC 
35 CTS&WO 70 RVC OR RVC 
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Appendix 6.2. Developed and Developing Countries in the Sample 
 
Developed Reporters Developing Reporters  
EU Chile 
US Mexico 
Developed Partners Developing Partners 
Australia Chile 
Canada Egypt 
EU Israel 
Iceland Jordan 
Japan Mexico 
Norway Tunisia 
Switzerland South Africa 
US  
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Appendix 7.1. List of Agreements Containing Provisions on Rules of Origin, by date of 
entry into force 
 
RTA Name Date of entry into force 
EC ² Andorra 01-jul-91 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 29-Nov-1991(G) / 07-Dec-2005(S) 
EFTA ² Israel 01-Jan-1993 
Faroe Islands ² Norway 01-jul-93 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 24-jul-93 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 01-Jan-1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 01-Jan-1994 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 08-Dec-1994 
Costa Rica ² Mexico 01-Jan-1995 
Faroe Islands - Switzerland 01-mar-95 
Kyrgyz Republic - Armenia 27-oct-95 
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) 07-Dec-1995 
Armenia ² Moldova 21-Dec-1995 
EC ² Turkey 01-Jan-1996 
Georgia ² Ukraine 04-jun-96 
Kyrgyz Republic ² Moldova 21-nov-96 
Armenia ² Ukraine 18-Dec-1996 
Canada ² Israel 01-Jan-1997 
Turkey ² Israel 01-may-97 
Canada ² Chile 05-jul-97 
Kyrgyz Republic ² Ukraine 19-Jan-1998 
EC ² Tunisia 01-mar-98 
Mexico ² Nicaragua 01-jul-98 
Georgia ² Armenia 11-nov-98 
Chile ² Mexico 01-Aug-1999 
EFTA ² Morocco 01-Dec-1999 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 01-Jan-2000 
EC ² Morocco 01-mar-00 
EC ² Israel 01-jun-00 
EC ² Mexico 01-Jul-2000(G) / 01-Oct-2000(S) 
Israel ² Mexico 01-jul-00 
East African Community (EAC) 07-jul-00 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 01-sep-00 
Turkey - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 01-sep-00 
New Zealand ² Singapore 01-Jan-2001 
EFTA - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 01-Jan-2001 
Mexico - Guatemala (Mexico - Northern Triangle) 15-mar-01 
Mexico - El Salvador (Mexico - Northern Triangle) 15-mar-01 
Mexico - Honduras (Mexico - Northern Triangle) 01-jun-01 
EC - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 01-Jun-2001(G) / 01-Apr-2004(S) 
EFTA ² Mexico 01-jul-01 
Ukraine - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 05-jul-01 
India - Sri Lanka 15-Dec-2001 
US ² Jordan 17-Dec-2001 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) - Accession of 
China 01-Jan-2002 
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EFTA ² Jordan 01-Jan-2002 
EFTA ² Croatia 01-Jan-2002 
Chile - Costa Rica (Chile - Central America) 15-feb-02 
EC ² Croatia 01-Mar-2002(G) / 01-Feb-2005(S) 
EC ² Jordan 01-may-02 
Chile ² El Salvador (Chile - Central America) 01-jun-02 
Canada - Costa Rica 01-nov-02 
Japan ² Singapore 30-nov-02 
EFTA ² Singapore 01-Jan-2003 
EC ² Chile 01-Feb-2003(G) / 01-Mar-2005(S) 
Panama - El Salvador (Panama - Central America) 11-Apr-2003 
Turkey ² Croatia 01-jul-03 
Singapore ² Australia 28-jul-03 
China - Macao, China 01-Jan-2004 
China - Hong Kong, China 01-Jan-2004 
US - Singapore 01-Jan-2004 
US - Chile 01-Jan-2004 
Panama and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 01-Jan-2004 
Korea, Republic of - Chile 01-Apr-2004 
EFTA - Chile 01-Dec-2004 
Thailand - Australia 01-Jan-2005 
US - Australia 01-Jan-2005 
ASEAN - China 01-Jan-2005(G) / 01-Jul-2007(S) 
Japan - Mexico 01-Apr-2005 
Ukraine - Moldova 19-may-05 
EFTA - Tunisia 01-jun-05 
Pakistan - Sri Lanka 12-jun-05 
Thailand - New Zealand 01-jul-05 
Turkey - Tunisia 01-jul-05 
India - Singapore 01-Aug-2005 
Jordan - Singapore 22-Aug-2005 
Turkey - Morocco 01-Jan-2006 
US - Morocco 01-Jan-2006 
Korea, Republic of - Singapore 02-mar-06 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 28-may-06 
Japan - Malaysia 13-jul-06 
Panama - Singapore 24-jul-06 
EFTA - Korea, Republic of 01-sep-06 
Chile - China 01-Oct-2006(G) / 01-Aug-2010(S) 
EC - Albania 01-Dec-2006(G) / 01-Apr-2009(S) 
EC (27) Enlargement 01-Jan-2007 
Egypt ² Turkey 01-mar-07 
Pakistan ² China 01-Jul-2007(G) / 10-Oct-2009(S) 
EFTA ² Egypt 01-Aug-2007 
Chile ² India 17-Aug-2007 
Chile ² Japan 03-sep-07 
Japan ² Thailand 01-nov-07 
Pakistan ² Malaysia 01-Jan-2008 
Nicaragua and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 01-Jan-2008 
Panama ² Chile 07-mar-08 
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Turkey ² Albania 01-may-08 
EFTA ² SACU 01-may-08 
Japan ² Indonesia 01-jul-08 
Brunei Darussalam ² Japan 31-jul-08 
China - New Zealand 01-oct-08 
Turkey ² Georgia 01-nov-08 
Panama - Costa Rica (Panama - Central America) 23-nov-08 
Japan ² Philippines 11-Dec-2008 
US ² Peru 01-feb-09 
Australia ² Chile 06-mar-09 
Chile ² Colombia 08-may-09 
EFTA ² Canada 01-jul-09 
Peru ² Singapore 01-Aug-2009 
Canada ² Peru 01-Aug-2009 
Japan ² Switzerland 01-sep-09 
Peru ² China 01-mar-10 
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Appendix 7.2. List of RTAs According to the Criteria Used in Origin Determination 
 
RTAs 
 
Criterion 
CTH Percentage 
 
Technica
l 
test 
EC - Cyprus Association     
EC - Malta Association     
PANEURO (50)    
PE- (15)    
EC - Morocco EuroMed.    
EC - Tunisia EuroMed.    
EC - Algeria Co-operation    
EC- Egypt Co-operation    
EC- Jordan Co-operation    
EC- Lebanon Co-operation    
EC ² OCTs    
EC- Syria Co-operation    
EC ² Mexico    
EC - South Africa    
EFTA ² Israel    
EFTA ² Morocco    
Estonia-Ukraine    
Canada ² Chile   136 
Mexico-Chile   4 
NAFTA   4 
Canada ² Israel    
Mexico ² Israel   4 
United States-Israel    
ANZCERTA   137 
SPARTECA   138 
AFTA   139 
CACM    
CARICOM       
COMESA    
MERCOSUR    
 
 
                                                     
 
136
  Used in fewer tariff items than the other two methods. 
137
 The test - which is in fact a "geographical" test -  requires that the last process of manufacture 
(excluding minimal operations) be performed in either Australia or New Zealand. 
138
 The test requires that the last process of manufacture (excluding minimal operations) be performed in 
South Pacific Islands. 
139
 The test requires that the last process of manufacture be performed in exporting ASEAN member 
State. 
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